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PREFACE.
With its origin in Max Weber and his annlysis of bureaucracy,
the term rationality has been close to deified. But while Weber
discussed several aspects of the term (for example the relationship
between "zweckrational" and "wertrational") and the modifications
of rationality through different types of authority relationships
(traditional, legal and charismatic), modern organization theory
seems to concentrate on n refinement of one kind of rationality:
the making and sustaining of distinct goal/subgoal hierarchies.
ØI The role of technocrats or experts in bureaucracy, and their
dislike for other than well-founded, scientific premises for their
decisions (as spelled out f.ex. by Jean Maynaud in his book
"Technocracy") is based 3n this c3ncept of rationality. The same
seems to be basis for the widespread belief in planning as a pana-
cea for social, economic and political shortcomings in almost any
society. And when planning and centralization go hand in hand we
perceive agein that rational hierarchy or pyramide of goals and
subgoals - with the planners at the top - as the motivating model.
But is the focus on a special concept of rationality only un-
realistic dreaming? Definitely not. The accomplishments are as
tangible as one could want. But intangible problems are arising,
and administrative systems are being adjusted to them. Diverse
social groups with their specific cultural and political
institutions are awakening and are able to channel their demands
ever more strongly to decision-making centres. This is a challenge
both to the hierarchical unified system of administration and
the concept of rationality that it is built on.
It is basically this perspective, together with a live concern
for problems of agricultural and social development, that has
motivated the present study. What is a viable concept of organi-
zational rationality? This is the normative or political question
in the study. How is top-level policy-making related to lower-
level planning of development projects? This is the descriptive
question that can make a provisional answer to the first one
possible.
Policy-making then is thought of ns the explicit construction
of goals and general coordinated progrnms of ection for the
orgsnization and its main parts. Planning will be a term applied
eapecially to the process of initiating and designing a project
blueprint or project plan. Although this division between the two
concepts is highly debateable, we choose to use them in this
fashion because they then in a meaningful way seem to uncover
interesting processes.in FAO-processes that in turn perhaps cnn
be criticized using other definitions of the same terms.
The discussion of planning and policy-making that follows is
at a micro- or organizational Theory in this field has
fh increasingly concentrated on understanding the decision-making
processes that precede plan and policy decisions, and the trend
hns  been to focus on technical aspects of communication, in-
formation processing and structure. In this study we make an
attempt - however rudimentary - to unite this approach with the
problems of politics or the problems of choosing between values
and allocating resources. We believe in other words that the
administrative system in FAO plays a basic role in a political
as well as an administrative - process, and that problems dis-
cussed at a macro-political level are relevant for a micro analysis.
Planning has been discussed mostly in a national setting.
We turn to the international field both as a step towards more
comparative study of the role of different nationality groups and
ss a source of possible modification of our knowledge of planning.
Through this approach and through the empirical data on internatio-
nal development projects that are presented, we hope the reader
will  enjoy the following pages.
I want to  thank Professor Knut Dahl Jacobsen for his  encourage-
ment and guidance and Arne Løchen for his lengthy and patient
introduction to the inner workings of PAO. In PAO a lnrge number
of the secretariat personnel kindly let me have their time. My
thanks go to them and to Mr. Wirin and Mr. Peters, - then
also to Halvor Stenstadvold for stimulating discussions about
theoretical problems  in general,
Oslo, January  1969
Thorvald Gran
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INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT POLITICS IN FAO.
The Food and Agriculture Orgnnization of the United Nations
(FAO) is in n period of change and rnpid expansion. This is a study
of how the organization has pdapted to chnnge cn the one hand and
how it has tried to influence chenge nnd initiate development in
the poor countries around the globe, on the other. The central
concern is to identify and discuss the values present in FAO policy
and search for their origins through en analysis of the FAO
development project program.
It is believed thnt the velues (brondly defined as goals,
subgoals and methods) present in the policy of nn organization
nre related to the administrntive systom and the personnel structure
in the orgnnization. Thus we nre interested in the process that
seemingly generntes the values present in the project pinns and
the nntionality and professional structure of the groups •hat
tnike pnrt in the process of project planning.
Every organizntion interacts in some way with its environment
and the ultimate goal of FAO is to participate in the pgricultural
development of member countries. FAO could therefore bc looked
nt from the environment, that is, tnking the neods of member
countries as a starting point, and studying how FAO fulfills these
needs. This perspective is not chosen in the present study. We
( stnrt in the orgnnization and look outwnrds along thc lines defin-

ed by the orgpnization through its policy nnd development projects.
We nre basically concerned with the orunizational processes that
scnn the environment for information nnd generate the main lines
of policy. A natural continuation of this study would be to
approach the work of FAO from a closer acquaintnnce with environ-
mental demands. Maybe there is P serious discord, a discord that
- because of approach - would be difficult to grasp in this study.
Problematic change is a salient feature of FAO from 1959 on-
wards. In that year the United Nations Special Fund was created
in New York and new operational tasks set the orgnnization on a
serious test of ndaptation nnd innovntion. The new task wns first
and foremost the planning Rnd implementing of the Special Fund
projects. We will, ns indicated Rbovel concentrnte on the
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planning of these projects in the organization,
The earlier functions of FAO had wholly been of a scientific/
advisory chRracter. In 1959 FAO entered the field of concrete ope-
rntions. The orgenization suddenly hnd two major fields of neti-
vity, Regular and Special programs as they were defined. This
also had a tremendous effect on the size of the organization in
budgetary terms, the specinl prograMs quickly outgrowing the
regular activities.
How has FAO tnckled the problem of planning several hundred
Special Fund projects? WhRt values are present in FAO policy and
why nre they there? And genernlly - does FAO hpve a policy in
the Special Pund sector of its work?
After formulnting the analytical frnmework far the study of
planning in an internationnl orgnnizntion in Chapter 1, the
problem of whnt demands impinged on the orgnnization, how they
were perceived and processed in the system will be studied in
Chapter 2, By looking nt the historicnl development of FAO we can
study the question of what functions the organization has chosen
to perform, how it has conceived the environment and how it has
adapted to chnnge in this environment.
Whet is in other words the relstionship between the functions
and structure of the administrative system end the velues or Eoals
it seeks to accomplish in the environment? Has FAO since its start
in 1945 acquired the nbility to prceive and understand problems
of agricultural developmant in the culturnlly diverse national
societies it operptes in, in such a way that locel needs are met,
or is the orgnnization subordinated to international rivalries
and under the control of certain powerful nntions? What, in other
words, are the main values present in the planning of policy in
the organizntion?
In the third chapter we describe the organization, its en-
vironment and resources. We study some of the variables that are
related to the size of the orgnnization's resources and some of
the structural problems of the organization at the formal level.
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We turn in Chapter 4 t0 the chnnging role of FO lendership
in defining and pursuing functional goals for the orgnnization.
We look at the pince the Special Fund program has in relation
to problems in the regular program, and the change that the new
Director General, Mr. Boermn, may initiate in the organizntion.
A detpiled study of the planning of development projects in
FM) nnd the policy which this process has as its result will be
the subject of Ohapter 5. By studying the structure of the UNDP/
FAO projects operntional in 1967 further insight into the policy
of the orgnnization will be gained. Why this policy is pursued
in the specific F.A0—system is agnin the central question of
the study.
It wns enrly in tbe study—prepnration understood thnt FO
was seriously split over tFae question of policy—makin and opera—
tions. This conflict, because it relates to the planning of
UNDP/FAO projects and to tha problem of bureaucrtic change and
innovation, will bc studied in Chnpter 5. Why was the perceived
need for ndministrative change so strong, nnd why  was  the mornle
of the members of the orgnnizntion so low? Where, in or outside
the system, did the demnnds for change originate? and how nre the
demands being met?
The mnin elements in the study, ns described above, nre depict—
ed in Diagram 1.
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DIAGRAM 1
CENTRAI ELEMENIS OF THE STUDY iND THEIR INTERRELATIONS.
Values, identi—
ficetions end
preferences
The edministretive
>system for project
plenning
The historic:l
development of
gonls and
resources
goel
formuletions
f
The role of
professionals
Informption
from the
environment
The planning process
1, initiating projects
choosing projects
recruitment of
exp2rts
coordination and
control
Conflict
about the
administrntive
system
Tho rusults of
plenning:
The project
progrem
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After this introductory presentatio-n of what will be studied
in the following pages - why have I pt all chosen planning of
agricultural dovelopment in FAO as nn object of study? First, I
see the tnsk of FAO, to improve production, distribution and
quality of food in the underdeveloped pprts of the world as a major
problem in the lnst half of this century. Secondly, the multination-
al or supranational approach to this problem seems to me a poten-
tially promising method, and the study of planning in a multi-
national social group like F.A0 may ndd to our understanding of
this approach. Thirdly, a centrnl concern of national studies of
administrntion is the relationship between bureaucrats and clients,
in Norway especinlly lower class nnd politically marginal clients.
study of FAO's function in relation to diverse underdeveloped
national societies in the international system may ndd to our know-
ledge about this problem. Especially interesting is the question:
Of what importance is it thnt n client group hns ndministrntors
in the system who closely identify with the needs and wishes of1)  the group? A centrnl thesis of Professor Knut Dahl Jacobsen is
thnt client groups not "protected" by administrators who socially
and professionally identify with the group will lose in the contest
for resource allocetions fron the administrntive system. Does
this apply to FAO? Is for example the nationality structure in the
organization influentinl on the geographical distribution of pro-
jects, and is the professional structure related to the type of
projects identified ns importnnt in the different project countries?
A fourth renson for choosing FAO is the interest we hnve in
understanding multinationel participation in a planning process.
What influence does the mixture of different cultures have on the
structure nnd function of an ndministrative systen, and how do .the
different cultural grouns adjust to ench other? Cnn we find aspects
ofa special type of internntional public administration, or does
FAO for example fall well within the western concepts of rational,
efficient, hierarchical organization? It is hoped that a descript-
ion and study of planning in FAO will indicnte possible answers
to these more general questions of public administration.
1) Knut Dahl Jacobsen:"Informasjonstilgang og likebehandling i den
offentlige virksomhet". Tidssk.f. samf.forskn. Oslo 1965.
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORY AflD METHOD OF ADMINISTRIJIVE STUDIES.
1. ,Nnal tical model of administrative lonnin .
The role of a model.
It is essential to have a model of what planning is before
a study of a specific case is undertnken. By a model is meant
nn abstract construction of concepts and their interrelntionships.
The model guides search for information, but is also a consti-
tuting element of whnt we eall data. Dnta are in other words pheno-
mena in our environment observed nnd registered in relntion to
a hypothetionl or thecretionl model. Theory is defined ns gene-
ralizntions based on testod hypotheses, in other words what we
may cnll accumulated knowledge. Hypotheses on the other hand -
nre stntements nbout correlations thnt have not been tested. Thus
it is imperativethnt these stntements lend themselves to falsi-
fication. It is easily seen then that mcdels can be constructed
by using both theory nnd hypotheses.
The danger of using theory alone is that knowledge accumulated
under specific historicel conditions is planted into the supposed-
ly new situation prcsent sociel research is interested in. Hypo-
theses should therefore hnve a central place in model building
within the socinl sciences, more so the more chenging the situn-
tion is. Thus n centrnl position of f.ex. Heinz Eulau 1) is that
the problem situation itself (in cnsu the planning of develop-
ment projects in FAO) should be consulted already in the phnse
when research questions are formulated.
Plannin RS a socio- s cholo ical rocess,
Before turning to the pinnning concept, what does present
theory of organizations spy about decision-making?
A general theoretical proposition is that decisions are made
by limited retional human beings, influenced by formal and in-
formel aspects of orgnnizntion and by individunl and environment-
al prefernces nnd values. The model of man ns limited rr-tional
is one of Herbert Simons basic viewpoints. 2)Contrnry to the
implict assumption in earlier theory thnt all niternntive solutions
to a problem are given, Simon snys that mnn in a decision—making
situntion hns to search for alternetives. This search process
is in itself highly problemationl end interesting. The first limit
on man's rationality is the need he has to simplify the problem
situntion to make senrch in a limited number of directions possible.
The second limit is man's tendency to stop searching alreedy when
a sntisfactory ,n1ternntive presents itself or is found. Economic
theory usually operntes with the older model: Man chooses the
3)best alternntive from all possible alternatives. While econo—
mics operates with a theory of maximization, Simon suggests for
decision—making studies in organizations a theory of satisfaction.
(glik Search is stopped when a satisfactory solution is found. Man does
not maximize, he Hsetisfices". Simon sujEests the following model
for the dynamic relationship between search ond setisfaction and
factors influencing this relationship. It is believed applicable
to both individual and proup or team decision—making in an organi-
4)
zational setting.
DI,GRM 2
GENE= MODEL OF IDLPTIVE MOTIVTED BEHJWIOR.
	 
>1 S satisfaction
L Search
	
Expected Level of
	
R value of A aspiration
reward
A closer look at these variables and their interrolationships
pose some interesting hypotheses about organizational behavior.
Search is a funrsion of satisfction, the more sptisfied with
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activities and procedures in a specific field of work the less
search for innovetions. This also indicates that when senrch for
information or decision-alternatives is underteken this will affect
the state of satisfaction in the organism. When a certain amount of
information has been accumulated search will stop because of felt
satisfaction, and R decision will be made. Now because this state
most often occurs before all possibilities hnve been looked into,
a theory of maximization would not give the same decision-result
as this theory of "satisfaction". Rether one has to study 1) at
what point the organism is satisfied enough to stop searching
and 2) in what direction, or in what mnterial, or with what
41Ih people is senrch undertaken?
When search is incrensed the expected value of reward is
augmented. This in turn increases the feeling of setisfection
in the organism and makes aspirations (A) higher. But increased
aspirations in a given situation reduces the feeling of satis-
faction in that situntion. Thua S = R - A. The nuthors also
pöstulate that A will alweys exceed R. (The following equation is
dA •suggested: = (R 
	 where a andixis larger thnn 0)
This implies that aome search will always be undertaken. The
model is hypothetical and could be tested in experimental orga-
nized groups. In this paper it will be tnken as a postulato.
James Merch and Herbert Simon suggest in their book a
distinction between two kinds of decision-making, so called pro-i
grammed and unprogrammed decision-making, the latter most often
connected with planning. What characterizes the two types nccord-
ing to the authors? Programmed decision-making is undertaken
when the problems at hnnd are familiar to the decision-maker
and the process to be foIlowed is known in beforehand. Thus
firemen's decisions when the alarm goes is programmed as is the
storeholder's decisions when inventory is ordered because a cer-
tain minimum level is renched. Unprogrnmmed decision-making on
the other hand is undertaken when new nnd unfsmiliar problems
arise and when the orgenization does not have a ready mnde
method to make the decision.
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Is lannin different from routine decision-makin ?
The distinction as depicted 2bove does not say anything
specific about the decision-making process. It only describes
two different starting points for decision-making, one with old
problems, the other with new, one with an orgnnizational method
present, the other without. Now the interesting question seems
to be: When decision-making is undertaken, does the same indi-
vidual follow two distinct methods in the two situations? If
we as Simon concentrate on high echelon decision-making, the
first difficulty for the decision-:maker is to distinguish between
old nnd new problems. It seems more likely thnt in the stream
of "familiar" problems which nrise at R decision-maker's desk
new elements and questions a2re integrated in this stream. These
elements are decided upon by p2rtial, and quite programmed, ad-
justments to the normal and known decision-making procedure.
What appears as innovntive or new outputs from the organization
are exactly certain complex sets 3f this kind of regulatory de-
cisions.
Thus, what distinguishes pinnning from routine decision-making
is not the process, but the output. Plans in a public administra-
tion setting can most fruitfully be defined as a complex set
of decisions about a desired future stnte of affairs, where value
considerations or in other words political problems, are n salient
5)fenture, Thus the centr21 problem in the study of planning
is to identify velue premises in the decision sets we choose
to call plans, to find their origin and explain their consequences
in the social groups we are interested in,
The role of vnlues ideals and identifications.
Peer Soelbergs analysis of how new problems are solved in-
crease the impression that the planning process is prugrp,mmpd
1.renif tbe orgniz3tion a uch doc.sn't furnish the decision-
maker with e specific method. He seems to document that rationali-
ty in decision-making is ev-n more limited th2n Simon believes.
While Simon st2tes that soarch is undertnken until a satisfactory
number of alternatives is found and then choice is made, the
central proposition of Soelberg is that long before search is
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terminated the nctual ch 6)oice is made, This choice is larEely
decided by comparing possibilities to an earlier constructed
ideal solution. It seoms likely that when a new problem is identi-
fied the structuring of an ideal solution will be highly program-
med by the vnlue and preference structure embedded in the indi-
vidual. The search process thus becomes even less rational than
the process Simon describes. While Simon reckons with some kind
of rational comparison between the alternatives thPt nre gene-
rated, Soelberg stntes from his material that this does not seem
to teke place. Each niternative is immedintely compared to the
idenl solution and accepted or rejected. The search that con-
elL tinues after choice has been made hRs a special, non-rationnl
purpose: To find an alternntive "poor" enough to obviously con-
firm the correctness of the choice made long ago.
Thus the position taken in this study is that pinnning (as
unprogrammed decision-making) is best studied as a trait of
orgnnizntions, not of individuals. Planning, or in other words
the process of innovating, is s political process wherc the
dynnmic force is the value set and identifications of groups.
Through a complex and relatively steble set of interections, or
in other words through orgenization, the relptive influence of
the groups is regulnted. Becnuse individuels and also small, un-
influential groups seldom cnn innovate velues, innovations in
an organization are related to chenge in the pattern of regulated
interactions. Such chnnge implies influence from new groups.
We can imagine et leest two cnuses of such change. 1) That new
people enter the organization or 2) that environmental support
or demands which rench inside the orgenization boundaries change,
thus incrensing the influence of some groups, diminishing that
of others in •he planning system. Usually 1) is n function of 2).
If demands are to "resch" the orgenization, two requiremonts can
be set: 1) that groups in the environment nre able to communicnte
in one form or enother their demands to the organization boundary
and 2) that those inside thc orgenization perceive as meaning-
ful the demands mede. This is also n function of the velue set
and identifications of individuals processing the demands.
The value sets (consisting of socio-political, economic and
technics1 preferences) serve ns a sift for distinguishing rele-
vant from irrelevent informntion nnd Ps n scale for deciding
what situntions or problems in the environments are worth the
effort of FAO. Now if this is correct, and innovntion or innovstive
planninE is a result of diesatisfaction with existinE work nnd
information about possible niternntives, it ndds strength to the
idea that innovntions by individuals is unlikely, that innovation
relevnnt for the work of an orgsnization is a group phenomenon
related to the politionl influence of Eroups in and outside the
system. This iden of planning is nt the bsse of the following
e) The roblem of gonl for=lntions.
In contrnst to earlier studies of ndministrstion (Gouldnor,
Taylor, Fnyol) modern scientists like Simon, Blau, Etzioni, Caplow
7)and Mnrch tnke the finding nnd formulnting of operotional
goals for an orgnnization ss highly problemationl. Simon.f.ex.
tpkes the position that individuals sesrch for new operational
goals when those existing no longer satisfy the individual. This
has been used to construct a stress-model of innovntion, stnting
that new gonls nre formulnted and set to work only after n psycho-
logionl feeling of dissatisfaction has initinted search. Victor
Thompson seems to add to this point of view, stoting tnat although
some kind of conflict in the orgonization is essentinl for orgnni-
zational innovntion, this must probnbly be combined with n high
degree of personal security. It seems naturall considering the
position taken in this study on the question of individual inno-
vation, that conflict in Thompsons terms relntes to conflict of .
intersts butwuun gruups in and uutsidu thu urgonizLion. 1f this
is the case it is interesting to note agnin the position of Knut
Dahl Jacobsen 9) Shall interests of n specific client group be
met in an administrative system it is essential that the group
has experts in the system identifying with it. Thus it seems thnt
decision-meking is highly progrnmmed nnd vslue-bound. To expect
culturally determined administrntors to be innovative - in an un-
progrnmmed fashion - to the benefit of new or other client groups,
Igh
study.
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is not encouraged by resenrch results. So although goal formu-
lntion is problemetical, it would seem most fruitful to study
the problems at the organizationnl or intergroup level, teking
the individunl gonl end vnlue preferences as relatively stable
factors.
Formal and informal as ects of or-nnization.
In the general theoretical proposition mnde at the beginning
of this section it wns pointed out that decision-making is in-
fluenced by both formal and informal nspects of organization.
We mean by informal nspects of organizetion those lines of
communication end authority thet nctually exist, whether these
coincide with the formn1 lines of nuthority or not. By authority
we mean legitimate influence, or in other words the ability of
one person to chenge or orient nnother person's action without
this other person critically reviewing or judging the correct-
10)ness or usefulness of the action. This implies thRt both
the formal hierarchy of positions nnd authority in the orgnni-
zation, the legally defined goals and methods ad the formal
lines of communication, interaction and influence are imprtent
factors in a study of administretive decision-making. What we
are interested in is the sociological, not the legal question
of what planning in FAO is. We are interested in whnt individuall
orgenizational and environmentel factors influence the planning
process.
We have hitherto discussed centrel concepts of orunization
theory. We have not mentioned any specific implications of this
theory for international ns opposed to national orgnnizations.
Also we have not said anything specific about the model in which
these concepts belong. Let us turn to the last problem first,
A critique of the s stems approach.
As the concepts 'groupsl, 'organization' and 'environment'
indicate, the general approPch is one of system analysis. We
will define an organization, national or international, as a
system of interacting parts, employed essentially in processing
and evalusting informntion. The orunization functions in an
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environmentand cnn be seen PS P subsystem within a larger en-
vironmental system. From tho environment demands and support
impinge on the organizetion. These demands are screened, processed
and communicated within the orgnnization, and the results are
decisions, most of them of intraorganizational relevance. Some
sets of these decisions nre communicated back to the environment
as outputs, and are nbsorbed or discarded there. Depending on
the influence of the outputs in the environment they, by way
of the feedback mechnnism, influence the inputs, and new demands
nnd new support is communicated to the organization. This over-
view can best be illustrnted by Dnvid Eastons simple model.11)
DIAGRAM 3
A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM.
demands---> system
inputs within outputs
support 1 puts
environment environment
feedback
Viewing the organization as a system of interacting groups
trying to nttain certnin goals but through the feedback mecha-
nism and self-meintenance et the snme time seeking some kind of
working equilibrium, is a view that often neglects the power
aspect of organizational control.
12)To study how group or or-
ganization leadership imposes constraints on the interactions
and communications of subordinates is therefore important. It
is interesting to note two other points Mayntz makes about
system theory. 1) The systems approaoh hns normative aspects.
By uing it Lh v1ucs of plurnlism and democrney constitute the
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framework for study, An organization is by definition a system
of largely autonomous groups curbing each other's excessive claims,
2) Because of 1) the systems appronch is probably not as ahistoric—
al as its proponents claim. It represents a study7framework
relntive to a specific historical and socinl situation.
The systems approach might therefore easily conceal poWer—
conflicts in an organization where several nationality and cul—
turegroups meet,
h) International or anization.
The main difference between a national and an international
(111horganization is the composition of the membersip in the two,
and the structure of the environment. To look into the distri—
bution and structure of the different nntionality groups in FAO
and on the FAO/UNDP projects will be of central interest.
Which is the dominant group or groups, how do the nRtionality
groups interact with ench other and how are the different groups
distributed regionally?Is FAO first and foremost a professional
organization and therefore an exponent for a random mixture of
cultures, or is there  s  certnin trend in the distribution and
mixture of different nntionality groups? Secondly, what influence
does the mixture of nationalities have on the planning process
in the orunization? Are differences bctween nationality groups
stable fnctors in the decision—making process or do the groups
adjust to each others administrative preferences? Or is perhaps
a completely new organization—ideology dGveloped? 13)Lastly,
and very important, does an organizational ideology for how to
fix goals, for what goals to choose and for the planning of
projects actually exist? As Mayntz points out the problem of
normative consensus on the organization level may be fictitious.
Maybe there is no cultural system underlying the functional
14)relationships in an organization.
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2. Problems of method and datn collection.
After the general problem of how FAO develops the plans for
the UNDP/FAO projects was clear, general litternture ebout the
orgenization and the project program was consulted, This littera—
ture is mentioned under appropriate hendings in the bibliography.
Because this litternture wes rather meeger on sociologicel and
perceptions data, it was decided to visit the orgenization at a
relatively early stnge. It was also important from the start to
have the organization point out centrn1 problems it encountered
in the planning of UNDP/FAO projects, Therefore, after a general
layout wns ready, was contected. It responded very willingly
end a number of unstructured interviews were held in the Rome—
headquarters from 15 september to 5 october,1967. The material,
together with n number of documents were analyzed and in January
1968 a structured questionnaire Was set up on the bnsis of the
materinl already gpthered. This questionnaire, es it was pre—
sented to the organizntion, is presented as Appendix 1 to this
study. FAO responded negatively to the request because "... it
would occupy too much time of our officers..."
15)
The size of the sample was not discussed. A limited number of
personal interviews could be held, and in the beginning of March
structured interviews with 21 rendomly chosen Project Supervisors
was held in Rome. In addition a few more unstructured interviews
were held.
The interviews were immediately typed out and form the central
basis of the following study. The interview results do not make
possible any rigid classification, but they are believed to indi—
cate the problem perceptions of some of the central personnel
in the orunization.
Documents in addition to the biennal programs of Work and
Budget and other Conference reports indicating the historical
development of FAO and the development of the special nctivities
of the organization are listed in the bibliography. All of the
material mentioned there has been referred to or hns been con—
sulted during the study period. Several of the unstructured
interviews give informntion on historical questions, and several
people outside F13.0, but engaged in one way or another in the
-16-
organization's work havc been consulted.16)
The main difficulty in applying the socio-psychological con-
cepts of the Simon-school on the study of planning in FAO was
to make the c 17)oncepts operational. This crented large diffi-
culties even during the interview sessions, often making question
adjustments and revisions necessary. Although the analytical
rigidness of the study thereby was reduced, a lot was gained in
the understanding of whRt those interviewed felt were central
planning problems.
A central question that was pending in the organization while
the interviews were taken, Was the suggestion to split the
organization in an operetional and a technicnl/scientific pnrt.
The reason for this suggestion was the new sperational demands
the UNDP program made on the organizetion. Many of the interviews
centered on this problem and interesting litterature on this
espect of FAO pinnning had been worked out by the organization.
This litterature, central in the following enalysis, is also
mentioned in the bibliogrnphy.
The main base for the analysis of the project policy of FAO
is the operational UNDP/FAO program as it existed in 1967.
Information about project size, location in the field, location
in the organization, and nationality structure of the experts
on the 170 projects thnt were operational, has been gathered
from severel cetnlogues (see bibliography) and punched on IBM
cards. Together with general informntion about the environment,
income per capitn, students pr. 1000 population, population size
etc. a picture of the UNDP/FAO project policy is constructed.
This policy is in turn related to aspects of the administra-
tive structure of FAO, (operating division, nationality of the
Project Supervisors etc.).
Although this description should give a good picture of what
FAO is doing where nnd with what resources, the main theoretical
problem is to establish relationships between such variables as
nationality of project experts and influence on project policy.
Does in other words the expert structure say nnything about the
preferences, perceptions or values in FAO? or anything about the
effect of FAO projects in specific project countries? Although
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such questions will be discussed more closely in the appropriate
pnrt of the study, the general feeling is thRt severn1 assump—
tions underly the conclusions put forward in the following
study. To make this feeling explicit, let me briefly stnte some
of the assumptions.
I assume thnt the concepts of orgnnization and planning, de—
veloped mainly in the USA and discussed in the preceding pages,
are meaningful in a study of FAO. The opposite position, that
they are not because is recruited from a number of different
cultures with their own administrative trnditions is more or less
discardcd. The main renson for this is the lnrge number of
4.1Ih Europeans and Americans in the orgnnization nnd on the projects.
AS we shnll see, Asians and Africans are a very small minority.
However, historical factors also support the idea that FAO is
a "western" organization. As we shall see in the next section
it was created in an ern when American influence was dominant
in international organization.
An important assumption is that there are systematic differ—
ences between nationality groups, differences thpt hpve relevance
for prnje.nt plannirg nd implemontation. That tes ar assumed
and not discussed is a weakness.
However, by giving an overview of the nationality distribution
of FAO experts we get a general picture of political trends in
the work of FAO, of who controls the FAO resources, and it enables
us later to compare the work of the most important nationals on
individual projects. Data on the distribution of experts also
makes possible a study of the role of FAO in cultural and poli—
tical integration. To what degree can FAO ignore national and
international political strife in planning UNDP/FAO projects,
or in other words to what degree can FAO emphasize its purely
professional character and functions? 18)
Conclusion. 

To sum up we want to study the planning process, or the gene—

ration and development of project plans in FAO. The general factors
we believe influence this decision—making process are displayed
in Diagram 4, together with the main interrelationships between
the fectors or variables. Focus will be on policy—making in FAO as
it is a result of individual, organizational and environmental factor:
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DILGRAM 4
MODEL OF
operatonal
projects
planning
project
development
implementation
of projects
satisfnction decision-making
search
focus of demands
expectations inf=ation support
from environment
xperience division of
ackground labor
personality orgnnizational environmental
factors factors factors
Main Source: March and Simon, Or anizations John Wiley, 1958
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Letter from FJO dated 28 February 1968.
People in the following institutions have been interviewed.
The Norwegian Council on Nutrition(functions also as the
Norwegian FAO-committee). The Norwegian Department of Foreign
Affairs. The Ministry of Oversees Development, London. The
Norwegian Directorate of Health and Norwegian agricultural
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For a theoretical discussion of this problem, see Ilkka
Heiskanen, Theoretical Approaches and Scientific Strategies
in J1dministrative and Organizstional Research, A Methodo—
logical Study. Commentetiones Humanarum Litterarum.
Vol. 39, Nr. 2, 1
For a discussion of functionalism and the role of inter—
national organizations in political integration, see
Ernst B. Haas, Be ond the Nation State, Stanford Univ.
Press California, 1964.
-21-
CHAPTER TWO.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FAO ITS FUNCTIONS AND METHODS
1. The birth of FAO in October 1945.
a) The olitical forces.
The League of Nntions embodieq the political and mornl
ideals of the interwar period. They were represented in con-
cepts like national sovereignty, democrecy, and collective secu-
r- 	
rity for groups of stptes. By securing overwhelming force to
the peace loving stetes the power of eggressive or bnd states
1)
was to be balanced and wer avoided in all future.
These concepts initinted the politicel decisions of the interwar
period. On 1 september 1959 they definitely proved a failure.
The crenticn of the UN system was besically built on the same
concepts. Tho terrifying war situntion from 1939to 1945 created
the same psychological setting for political decisions es
the first world war, only this time of a new and more fright-
ening dimensien. UN wns conceived as the new international
endeavour by the victorious states. Collectively the peace-
loving world should bc rebuilt and aggressors controlled. Is
nations became peaceloving they would be admitted to the
orgnnizntion. It was obvious to many that both Nazi and Communist
doctrine were considered aggressive in nature, and Communist
stntes taking part in the wnr effort against Nazi Germany soon
became sceptical to the UN system of organizations. Besides being
politically and economically weak, they perceived themselves as
ersona non rnta in the ideological setting of the UN system.
These political forces, nationalism, collective security,
bnlance of power, reconstruction of penceloving states and
communist insecurity were pressing when FAO•WPS born, The
orgenization was in principle to be universal and it was to be
centralized in one unified decision-making system, with one
collective idea of operations. Each member was to have one vote,
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but for a nation to obtein membership ofter FAO h2d formally been
estnblished e 2/3 majority of member votes WPS required. Thus
the "worthiness" of nn applying nntion wns tG be evaluated by
the members prior to edmittance, Thus universelism in FAO is
modified by the normative principle of "worthiness".
.•he social and a ricultural settin .
In 1945 the disastrous collapse of Europe was perceived
as the mein international problem, The poverty of regions in
Africa, Latin America and Asia had hardly been noticed,
(111h mninly because these regions were without government orgeni-
zations thnt could formulate the demands of the indigenous
populations. FAO neturally adopted the European reconstruction
perppective to its work when it first opened its eyes to the
world.
The reletion of this perspective to FAO's overall gonl,
egricultural development, is interesting. When it turned to the
problems of agriculture in the USA, FAO soon found that the
development of productionWPS not the crux of the matter. Rather
agricultural production in the yenrs immediately following the
war was overwhelming in these regions, nnd the use nnd distri-
bution of surplus was the ngricultural problem. This became
FAO's main concern in its first years of work. Thus the goals
of FAO were adjusted to the political, economic and even military
problems of the victorious notions in the Second World War. The
directive force in the organization was highly politicel, and
the professional undertakings of the orgenization were sub-
ordinated this force. Considerations of the technical nnd social
problem of increased ngricultural production was relegoted to a
second place, and tbe universal approach was a more or less empty
ideal.
The or nnizotional herita-e Of FAO.
The Lengue of Nati3ns had, through strong personalities
like Philip Noel Paker and Fridtjof Nansen, accomplished con-
siderable relief work in the interwer period. In 1943 USA
invited e lorge group 0f nations to discuss the need and the
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methods for this type of work when the war eventUally was over.
A Conference met in Hot Springs in 1943 with 44 na:tions partici—
pating. The discussions centered on three main questions. 2)
Food standards and the need for food,
Food production/food needs,
Problems of trade and distribution.
Although the first point, food standards, WaS brought up as
a result of the success of the Health Section of the League of
Nations in uniting problems of health to problems of food, the
(11111
final decision of the Conference to create an Interim Commission
did not explicitly join the question of health to that of creat—
ing an agricultural organization. The  way  was thus open for the
making of WHO a little later, nnd for quite serious competition
between this organization and FAO concerning what the splient
problems of development are nnd how to solve them.
The Interim Commission dissolved itself in the fll of 1945.
It hnd then worked out a suggestion for a FAO Constitution and
an approving Conference was called for in Quebec the SPMC year,
Those nations could mect that hnd approved the suggested Consti—
tution. 37 Countries met, 5 that had approved it did not and the
Soviet Union, member of the Interim Commission was one of those
nations not meeting. In 1946 5 new members were approved. Finland
and Sweden however had still not applied for membership, await—
ing the organization's development.
Those were the immediate organizational arrangements that
led to the creation of FAO. The orgnnizntion, however, had a
more distant heritage. Around the turn of the century, and a—
round the name and nctivities of Dnvid Lubin, nn International
Institute of Agriculture was born in Rome 3). Lubin believed
that the lnck of up to date informntion on a world bnsis was
much of the cnuse of the strong fluctuations of prices in
sgriculture. Thus he c=eived the Institute as an international
clearing house for ngriculturP1 information. After the Second
World War the Institute was absorbed by FAO, and through the
 
Institute's publications and census work FAO got a good
start on its task of distributing agricultural information,
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a type of work thnt has been central in FAO from the beginning.
d) The impact of McDou all,
The London World Monetary and Economic Conference (1933) end-
ed in prolonging the then current policy of restriction in the
face of unemployment, falling prices nnd surpluses in agriculture.
An Australian delegation to the Conference, headed by Stenley
Bruce and with Frank McDougnll ns adviser, felt that a new approach
5)was essentiai. Togother with Sir John Boyd Orr and others they
first clarified the close relationship between health and food.
Secondly McDougall summed up his own thinking on the solutions
of the surplus problem in Burope, nnd USA. He advanced n more act-
ive concern for better socinl policies es a base for increasing
agriculturnl demPnds, for better international dissemination of
informetion on food problems and agricultural production, and for
a reduction of wholesle prices in several of the deVeloped
European countries. His ideas were a base for FAO ections in the
first years.
A more genernl report, written under the auspices of McDougall
during the work of the Interim Commission, set out more general
principles end suggestions for FAOs future work. These, however,
did not really come to the foreground of FAO's activities until
the interest in surplus problems hpd subsided. Some of his idens
from this report were the following:6)
A basic principle for FAO is thet the welfare of producers
and the welfare of consumers are in the finnl analysis
identical.
The barriers that stnnd in the way of the needed improve-
ments are many and difficult: deep-rooted customs and tra-
ditions, lack of educetion, rigid economic and social
institutions, vested interests, lack of money, lack of inter-
national collaboration,
In some ways the major need in the decades ahead is the
development of less advanced societies. This is a great
opportunity not only for improving human welfare but for
expanding the demend for agricultural and industrial products.
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We note the underlying problem of selling tke products produced
in the advanced societies, that obviously had an important
standing in the minds of the creators of FAO. We note also the
weight given in these program declarations to social and insti—
tutional aspects of development. Improvement in agriculture is
related to social change. The following chapters in this study
will focus on how and to what degree this problem has been
tackled in FAO.
Lastly McDougall already in 1942 formulated ideas on the
technical functions as additions to the traditional informative
function of FAO.
"FAO will have special responsibilities towards the less ad—
vanced countries. To discharge these duties it will not be
enough for arrangements to be made for the provision of
agricultural credits. It will be equally necessary to afford
technical guidance and help. For this purpose a corps of agri—
cultural technologists may be recruited, drawn from those
countries with advanced methods of agriculture and available
to be sent to any part of the world to assist in improving
agricultural methods... This might well become one of the major
purposes of the international orgenization." 7)
2. The develo ment of FAO. Chan inP functions.
å) The first Director General.
The Scotsman, Sir John Boyd Orr was in 1945 elected the first
DG of FAO, at the age of sixty five. He built the first small FAO—
administration in Washington (where the Organization had head—
quarters until 1951 when it moved into the building Mussolini had
set up for his Ethiopia—department in Rome). Several professional
committees were established in 1945. With the food crisic in 1946
an International Emergency Food Council was set up, however with—
out any formal authority. A large advisory commission was sent to
Greece,to advise the government on its reconstruction policy.
Sir John's great idea was a World Food Board with formal and real
authority to coordinate trade in agricultural products. The pre—
mises for his belief were that lack of food was first of all a
problem of distribution. It was technically possible to produce
edequate quantities, if prices were stabilized and markets opened.
Better distribution required an increase in economic activity.
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His idea of an ective and powerful board wns drnstically cut down
by the lnrge agricultural producers, and the Food Board ended
up with ndvisory authority on the problem of how to stabilize
prices. In addition it could undertake the development of reserves
of food and reserves of credit. In Sir John's mind the board
suggestion had failed, and after a drastic attack.on the DG by
the British delegation leader to the FAO Conference, Orr resigned
in 1948. 8)
Even Sir John Boyd Orr, who had participated in the construct-

ion of FAO, and who therefore was well acquainted with the politic-
, al and economic considerations behind the creation of the organi-
zation, went too far in his suggestions for FAO activity. The UK
and the US would not tolernte even a minimum of international
control over their nctions in the field of agriculture. The need
for FAO to comply with the wishes of the poverful and rich nations
was obvious in the first years.. Another expression for the major
powers' view of FAO as something bnsically troublesome wns the
budgetary nllocntions to.-the orgnnization. From its inception in
1945 up to 1950 the'total annual budget from all 45 members was
5 million dollars. Already from the first FAO Conference Sir John
Orr was handed 250 concrete suggestions for work.
b) Continued defeat,
The second DG, the Americnn undersecretary of farm politics,
Mr. Dodd, n Democrat, continued in defining FAO's role as that
of surplus management. In 1949 he suggested an International Com-
modity Clearing House, with a revolving fund of one billion dollars,
and with all countries being able to buy goods in its own currency
at full price. If a country would and could pay in hard currency
it would be offered a reduced price. The FAO Confernnce in 1949
flatly turned the suggestion down, on four arguments: 9)
Soft currency debts are a large burden for buying countries.
Hard payments reduce their reserves.
The arrangement would interfere with normal trade.
Buffer stocks are unhealthy for world economy.
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The Conference, to avoid being completely and bluntly negative,
agreed to Mr. Cardons 10)proposal of a Consultative Committee
on Surplus Disposal. This commission suggested an Emergency Food
Reserve in 1951. At the 1953 Conference this sugg.,:stion also was
flatly turned down. But in 1954 the surplus problem in the
developed countries wns becoming ncute, and in 1954, at lnst,
a 20 nation subcommittee on surplus disposal was set into action.
The approach of the developed nRtions to FAO's work was at the
level of ideas positive, nt the level of even minimum operations
deeply negative and sceptical. The resources and the morele of
ei 	 the orgnnization wero in the middle fifties at n serious low point.
c) The be innin of chan,e.
Although the attempts of FAO at handling the surplus problem
through international coordination were unsuccessful, new areas
of work emerged around 1950. The nucleus was the creation of the
Expanded Progrnm for Technical Assistance (EPTA). This was the
first technicnl assistance program started by the General Assembly
of the UN and based on voluntnry contributions from member govern—
ments. The EPTA activities were to be executed through cooperation
between the UN a.A the Specialized Agencies. It was a first break—
through on the operational level for the McDougall ideas, ideas
that had b2en obstructed by several of the developed nntions in
FAO and in other international organizations.11)
EPTA concentrated on sending individual experts to assist
governments in the evaluation or planning of development policy.
Up to 1966 13.000 experts from 90 countries had been on EPTA
missions, while 31.000 scholarships had been allotted to Dersonnel
12)from the poorer countries. EPTA, through a Technical Assist—
ance Board in New York, set targets for the possible allocation
of funds to the individual countries. This became an influential
factor in the approval of projects, possibly to the detriment of
individual project evnluations ns such. The projects were executed
by UN organizations, and FAO took about 25 % of the projects.
Overhead costs for ndministration were allotted to the executing
agency, thus making the projects orgenizationally ettractive.
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d) The UN S ,eciel Fund the finnl ush to ower.
In 1959,the wish in mnny underdeveloped countries for lnrger
nnd more effectful action on the pnrt of the UN mnterialized in
the creRtion of The Specinl Fund (SF) 13). The battle for this
was intense and complex. Similar idens had been pending in the
UN in the SUNFED suggestion (A Special 111:: Fund for Economic
Development) bnsed on the idea of giving poor countries soft
US nnd other donors were agninst the suggestion because
soft loans resulted in too much waste. The USSR supported SUNFED
vigorously. Mr. Paul Hoffmnn, earlier Ford ndministrator and leader
of the implementation of the Marshall plan, suggested the prein-
(1111 vestment idea ns e compromise between existing EPTA nctivities
and the wishes of the several political perticipators. On this
basis the Special Fund (SF) was approved nnd Hoffman appointed
its leader.
The impact of this progrnm on FAO hns been enormous.
In budgetary terms the impect of the Special Program on the
Regular Program cnn be illustrPted in the following diagram.
From about an equal position in the biennium 1960/61 (20 million
dollars each) the Special Progrnm has outgrown the Reguler Program
by more than two times up to 1968/69.
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DIAGRAM 5
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAO REGULAR AND SPECIAL BUDGETS
FROM 1958/59 TO 1968/69
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This change of einphasis has had large repercussions on the
administrative system in FAO. From an advisory/information
gathering organization it has become the implementer of e large
operational project progrnm in about 100 underdeveloped countries.
This change of functional emphasis will be studied in the following
chapters.
With the inauguration of EPTA and Special Fund activities most
of the specialized agencies distinguished between Regular Program
and Special Program, the former being the activities financed by
the member governments through their annual or biannual contri-
(11 butions to the organization. Special Programs on the other hand
are those that have their financial base in voluntary government
contributions.
The central ndministrative difficulty for FAO has been to
integrate the Special Program functions into a system constructed
for Regular Program activities, Two central positions on the pro-
blem have been: 1) FAO headquarters-system was originally develop-
ed on the university model, to gather, develop and disseminate
information. Thus, clearly defined subject-matter divisions were
erected. The SF program on the other hand requires integrated
multidisciplinary planning, administration and implementation.
This the system is not geared to perform. 14)
2) The real problem of SF activities, in the opinion of Jones 15)
is that Special Fund administrative work hampers and endangers
FAO's technicel ability. In other words that the two programs have
a mutually detrimental effect.
It is believed by this student that through the SF program
FAO has received and developed an instrument for international
action in the field of agriculture that has for the first time
given the organization direct influence over governments and to
some extent over the lives of people in rural societies in many
of the underdeveloped countries. The influence is to some degree
becoming supranational in the sense that decisions on project
allocations with consequences in national societies are taken
without participation of the countries concerned. FAO, because of
the planning and approval systems that are constructed, is in-
fluential in relation to governments in underdeveloped countries;
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that is, FAO values and preferences nre nccepted to some degree
uncritically by the governments involved. The deciphering of this
influence is one of the goals of the following study. A central
question underlying this preliminary analysis is to what degree
and how FAO-influence through the Specisl Fund progrnm is relat-
ed and adjusted to the indigenous social and economic develop-
ment of the countries concerned.
The Special Fund wns to differ from EPTA on several scores.
No country targets were to be set. Each project was to be
evaluated on its own merits more or less, considering in
addition fnctors like nn equitable geographic distribution of
the whole program, urgency of needs etc.
The SF-projects were to be larger, with the aim of further-
ing and sustaining capital investments of all kinds, and
durntion of the SF projects could be longer, up to five years.
However, because of similarities between EPTA and SF, and
because of the administrative compelxities thnt continued to
accumulate, the two programs were merged in 1965. The merger
was basically administrative, letting the same organs in New
York evaluate requests in both programs. David Owen, the British
leader of EPTA became Co-administrator of the new UNDP with
Paul Hoffman as chief. The two programs were however kept
distinct financially, even though EPTA experts more and more
were used in preliminary probings for SF projects. One of the
reasons for this is the belief in many of the new-nation
governments thnt two programs would attract larger total contri-
butions from the rich nations than one.
This broadly stated, is the base for the development of FAO.
The viewpoints and restrictive interests of the developed nations
hnve been accumulated, hopefully because they have iiritil now
been the most important for the organization's development.
However, the importance allotted to the role of these nations
may be an analytical fallacy. A more correct understanding of
the development of FAO nnd other UN agencies may be gained by
studying the requirements and demands mnde on the system by the
new nations in Africa and Asia. When studying the politics of
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administration in the UN system efter 1960 it would probably be
specially pertinent to put more weight on this approach. However,
would the result in any case be that the rich countries, in
their own political and economic interests, control the develop-
ment of the poor? 16)
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Notes. 

For a critical discussion of the international principleshere mentioned, see J. W. Burton, International Relations
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965, page .
The following parngraphs draw heavily on the article of
John Ringen, "FAO" in Tidsskrift for det Norske LandbrukOct/Nov. 1946, Vol. 53 No page
From A.H. Boerma, FAO and the World Food Problem, past,
present and future. 3 Oct., 1968.
The Institute held a world census on agriculture in 1930,ibid, page 5,
Taken from The McDou all Memoranda FAO, 1956 page 1,
Taken from Hambridge, Gove, The Stor of FAO, Van Nostrand
1955 page 54-60.
Taken from Hambidge, op.cit., page 82.
See Jones, J.M. The UN at Work, Pergamon Press 1965,page 126, and Ringen, op.ci 
	 page 300.
Hambidge, The Story of FAO, op. cit., page 72.
Director Generpl of FAO from 1949 to 1956 when his failinghealth made the calling of a Special Session of the FAO
Conference necesspry.
Jacob, P. E. and A. L. Atherton, The D amics of Internation-
al Or anization Dorsey Press 196 page or e case o
WHO.
See Onarheiminnstillin en page 102. *
General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII).
Taken directly from interviews in FAO.
Jones op.cit., page 117,
Le Monde asked, on reporting from the FAO Conference in
November 1967 when an African was candidate for D.G.: La FAO,
va-t-elle cesser d'6tre un instrument de "contr8le" pnr lespays riches du d6veloppement agricole du "tiers monde"?(Jacques Nob6court, Le Monde 4 nov. 1967, page 1)
Report presented to the Norwegian Foreign Department 9 Decem-ber, 1966, on the continued development of Norwegian Foreign Aid.
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'CITAPTER THREE
DESCRIPTION OF FAO AND ITS ENVIRONY=.
a) The environment. FAO is faced with the problem of communi-
cating meaningfully with about 130 governments on all five
continents. These governments are the basic units in FAO's en-
vironment, basic because they are the chief sources of informa-
tion to the organization. FLO is centrnlized in Rome with one
unified administrntive structure built around the Weberian
principle of a hierarchical, departementalized system of legal
authority. Weber showed that this bureaucratic model is related
to the emergence of modern industrialized societies. FAO commu-
nicates mostly with governments in countries that have not
reached this stage of economic development. Is therefore the
structure of FAO detrimental to efficient communication with
these governments? (efficient in the sense 'whnt is perceived
in FAO is representative of whnt the individupl governments have
as intentions.1.). Although this study does not look into the
problem, it would seem voluable to investigate the relative
efficiency of communicntion between FAO with its present structure1
and the governments in countries at different levels of economic
and institutional development. A conclusion might be that to
communicate efficiently, the structure of parts of the now uni-
fied orgnnization should be more closely related to institution-
al end economic characteristics of the different regions. A
logical extension of this might be to crente regional FA0s.
The following diagram is a general picture of FAO in its
environment.
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DIAGRAM 6
FAO AND ENVIRONMENT
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New York
IBRD
IDA IFC
FAO
I SECRETARIAT
Rome
IRECTOR
GENERAL
JCOUNCIL ONFERENCE
REGIONAL
CONFERENCES
1 ECOSOC UNDP 1
ILO WHO UNESCO
ICAO IMCO IAEA etc.
FAO FIELD ORG.REGIONAL
BANKS
IIvrEMBER GOVERNYÆNTS
NON—MEMBER
STATES
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
\
WORLD POPULATION
\ FAO
COMMITTEES\.
33% 19% 48%
developed developing
1) Percent of world population 1961, Source Russett (et.al.)
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Each of the UN organizations isa sovereign unit with separate
membership. UN in New York is only in 2n ideological sense the
leading organization in the system. However, all of the Spe-
cialized Agencies and the UN can conclude agreements with each
other (like states) and with member governments and institutions
in member countries. We note the complex system of institutions
that FAO can communicate with at the international, regional
and national level. To what degree they communicete, and how the
relative influence is between them is an empirical question.
But much indicates that at the international level, like at
the national level, competition and rivalry is mare dominant
than cooperation.2)This may be related to 1) the independant
status of each orgenization or 2) insocurity in each UK
organization because the basic idea they represent, world goverr-
ment, is non-functional in the heterogenous nation-state en-
3vironment that st present exists.
About 67% of the worlds population (in 1961) was represented
in FAO through the member governments. The main non-members are
USSR end mainland China, East Europeen stPtes Rre somewhat ambi-
valent, Poland for example was a member from the start, but
4)withdrew at the height of the Cold War in the ninteenfifties,
Poland is now a member again together with Romania. Yugoslavia,
and admitted in 1967 - Bulgaria and Hungary, (Hungary is also
member for the second time The country withdrew in 1951).5)
After the Conference in November 1967 116 nations were mem-
bers of FAO. 90 of these had UNDP/FAO projects. These countries
were distributed regionally as follows. The population size of
the receiving countries is indicated to the right in the table.
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=LE 1,
UNDP/FAO PROJECT COUNTRIESAND TEEIR POPULATION
IN 1961
Region Number ofcountries
Population
(million)
Africa 35 191
Asia 16 741
America 23 214
South 11
Centrnl 12
Europe 7 108
Middle East 9 58
Total 90 1312
Source: Russett op. cit. end UNDP/FAO Catalogue, 31 Jan 1968.
Taking 21 of the 133 naticns listed in Russett ns developed
(including Itply nnd Japan), we find that about 59% of all the
underdeveloped countries received UNDP/FAO projects, or in terms
of population 905 million people. In 1968 UNDP/FAO expended
nbout 50 million dollars on the program That is nbout 5 cents
per person - annunlly.
b) FAO financial resources.
In the Director General's Program of Work and Budget for
7)1968/69 we find the following information on how FAO
expects to use funds allocated to the orgnnization in the twc
years 1968 and-69,
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED USE OF TOTAL FUNDS ADMINISTERED BY FAO


- 1968/69 (million US$)
Total fund-Estimnted
Programoperated_amount of
progremsfunds used
for field
operations
FAO expend,
for operating
Reg. Progr. Field
projects and
FFHC(1)
I Regular Program 59.9 2.1 36,7
II Other Programs
a. No reimbursement



FLO/UNICEF 1.7 1.7 1.6


FAO/IBRD 2.6


3.5


FAO/Regional Banks
b. Reimbursable
0.6


1.2


UNDP(EPTA) 32.9 29.0 8.3


UNDP(SF) 92.5 83.0 14.6


World Food Progr. 1.9 0 2.0


Trust Funds 12.5 10.8 2.8


Total other programs 144.7 124.5 36.0


minus included in I 5.2



Grand Totl. 199.4 126.6 72.8
(1): The Freedom From Hunger Campaign.
The first column shows the size of the allocated funds for
the two-yenr period. For the 116-nntion organization it amounts
to 200 million dollars (Or for example about one half of
Norway's military expenditures in 1969 8)
The second column indicates whnt part of the numbers in the
first are estimated for field expenditures. (about 64%).
The third column is the result of a time-study in FAO, where
an attempt has been made to calculate whnt FAO actually expends
on managing and operating the programs. As the numbersindicate,
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FAO believes thet a lerge part of the Regular Program funds
are used to administer the Special Progrems. This has for se-
veral years been used as an argument for eugmentinE the over-
hend allocations to FAO, from the Special Fund sources (UNDP,
and others), for planning and implementing the Special projects.
As these numbers indicate, FAO's resources are severely limit-
ed when considering the immense end important task the organi-
zation has been given. Hundreds of countries and millions of
people are desparately in need of resources for development
and FAO is an instrument that could be efficiently used towards
agricultural improvement if the political will t0 use the orga-
nization existed. But it doesn't. It seems, as Finn Llnæs
9)indicates in his letest book thRt the well-fed end informed
groups in the so-called develeped euuntries have lost hold of
the tra ic dimension in what goes on erpund them. When we speak
of millions of pegple desparately needing the services of F.Ao
we seem to lose sight 3f the fact that we ere deeling with
millions of individuals, each one often an immense human tragedy.
When the geographical distance from them to us is large we seem
to lose the sense of urgency and responsibility as if distance
has morel importance. We often even end up thinking that FAO's
one hundred million dollars per year is quite a lot.
Actually, though, FAO receives about 1/5 of all allocations
to multilateral organizations10). The rich countries, however,
favor the bilateral approach to development endenvours. Of
total capital transfers from these countries to the poor countri-
es of the world (about 10 billion dollars in 1966), only 5%
went to multilateral organizations. International development
action does not hnve large goodwill. The basic reason seems to
be the want the-rich ountries have to control and:befiefit.
from thQir own assistance efforts.
The third column in Table 2 indicates at least two things.
1) That there is a battle between organizations about who is
to pay the administrative costs of the voluntary development
programs and 2) thet FAO hes used large efforts to find out
on exnctly what programs and projects the experts actuelly
work from day to day. What is the sense of this, considering
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the fact thnt it is just about the snme countries thnt pay the
whole bill anyway? Although it is speculation, these cauntries
might pool all their c3ntributions tn the diverse UN technical
assistance progrnms, nnd in this paol make policy decisions on
the distribution of funds to the different tasks (industry,
agriculture, transportation etc.) in the different regions of
the world. While we now have a lang list of universal organi-
zations duplicating each other in each region and fighting over
who shall do the multidisciplinary tnsks, a reasonable corollary
ta the pooling and centralization of financinl policy-making
would be a regionalization of the UN system, ench region aperat-
ing with one unified .orgPnizatian,
Where do the financial resources of FAO come from?
If we study the Regulnr Program we find the following repartition
of contributions, To depict the base of this distribution the
table gives informatian on the countries' Gross National Product
(projections to 1975). This infnrmation is gnthered from tables
44 and B.10 in Russett. The ranks nre nlso taken from these
tnbles. The totnl, N, is the totnl Number of cases in each
tnble in Russett.
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TABTR 3 

Contributions to FAO nnd UN Re ular Pro


GNP,1975


Percent of Percent of
Country billions Rank FAO Contr. UN Contrib.


US$


1966 67 1965 67
.Austria 17 23 0.7 0.5
Belgium 18 22 1.5 1.2
Canada 64 9 4.2 3.2
Denmark 9 31 0.8 0.6
France 92 7 8.0 6.1
Germany, W. 178
70
3
8
7.4
•
ItPly
9.8
3.3 2.5
Netherlands 21 18 1.5 1.1
Norway 7 36 0.6 0.4
Sweden 19 20 1.7 1.3
Switzerland 19 21 1.2 0.9
UK 104 6 9.5 7.2
USA 826 1 31.9 31.9
Total 1444 N=68 74.7 64.3
Source FAO percentages, Report of the FAO Council, 44th
session, page 62-64.
The 13 countries in the table contribute about 75% of FAO re-
gular funds. US alone contributes 32%. The same 13 countries
represent 64% of the non-voluntary funds allbcnted to the United
Nations Organizetion. One of the main rensons for the difference
in these two percentages is thet USSR is a member of the UN and
not of FAO. By compering the percentage distribution to FAO and
the UN we notice that while the first 12 coUntries listed pay
relatively more of FAOs budget than of the UNs, the United States
pays an equal percentage to the two organizetions. According to
policy decision in the FAO Conference (eighth session), the FAO
scale is to be constructed by directly applyinE the scale of
11)assesments to the UN.
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The columns in the table cnn be used to show that the total
Gross National Product of n member country is decisive for its
scale of contribution. If we compute a correlntion coefficient
between the variable Percent of F_AO Contr. 1966/67 (X) and GNP
(1975) (Y), using the formula:12)
	 N Sum XY - Sum X Sum Y
[N Sum X2 - (Sum X)2] [N Sum Y2 - (Sum Y)2
we find that r = 0.93. In other words thnt r2= 0.865 or thnt 86.5%
of the variation in the scple of contribution is explained by GNP.
c) Personnel. 

The expnnsion of FAO programs (shown in Diagram 5, page 29)
has entailed a similar expansion in personnel assigned to the
organization and to tho field projects. In 1956/57 the total of
FAO personnelWPS about 1700. In ten years from then the number
has incrensed by over 300% to 5300. The approximate distribution
is shown in the following table.
TABTR 4
FAO Secretnrint and Field Stoff 1 1 1968,
FAO Hend uarters Rome
Professional Officers 1050
General Service Personnel 1950
Subtotal 3000
Permanent Re ional StIff
Professional and General Service 600
FAO experts in the field 1700
Grand Total 5300
Source: CL 49/16 page 17 and C 67/3 Annex IV, page 394.
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The size of FAO is indicnted in Table 4 and the expansion in
personnel in Headquarters and in the ficld raise difficult
problems of planning and coordination for the orunization.
Many of those intarviewed indicnted thnt when persennel expansion
per yenr went above n relatively small percent coordination in
the system got out of hand. In other wor;-is they put forward the
same argument that often eppears in discussions of budgetary
expansions. A "reasonableu expansion cf this year's budget is the
percent applied last year. 13)What can be said for and agains
t
this type of thinking?
Obviously if the administrntive system is unitary and hier-
archical the incoming personnel hnve to be ndjusted to the exist-
ing system and get acquainted with superiors and subordinates
before efficient action cnn be undertnken. This is the situation
in FAO, and even small increases cf personnel crente problems,
However, if the administrntive system is problem-oriented, only
loosely hierarchicnl, and constructed with professionnl groups
as building blocks, then persannel expnnsion hns another effect.
First of nll the driving force behind expnnsion is not additions
to the existing administrative system, but new problems that
require solution. In FAO Special Fund project activity was basic-
ally a new problem-set for the organization. New professional
groups could have been employed, teams with their own authority
system could have been constructed nnd put into the FAO system
without creating the miniscule ndministrntive problems that new
personnel now create, It is tempting to drAw the conclusi•n that
a hierarchical authority structure like the one FAO now has is
only efficient when the organization's task is of the same nature:
One task that easily cnn be divided into subtasks and where one
man can have total control of each task. The situation in FAO
is ns different from this as possible.
The planning problem nlso becomes enormous when a basically
unitary hierarchical system reaches the size FAO now has.
Planning iz in FAO scen as n problem of coordinating organization
units as efficiently as possible, The reports written on FAO
administration, as a response to the impnct of the Special Fund
activities, are 0 long discussion of the organization's overall
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structure. Not that this is unimportant. But as this student sees
it, such a discussion is irrelevant as long ns the character
of the organization tasks are uncLear and unstructured. Under
a cloak of "the countries themselves have to decide on substan-
tive tasks", a detailed discussion of how to structure the whole
of FAO is undertaken. Actually, of course, if FAO renlly believ-
ed that countries should decide all substnntive matters, FAO
should turn itself into n recruitment agency, sending competent
experts to development undertnkings planned by the country in-
volved. This is obviously not what the organization wants.
The conclusion then is that because the planning of develop-
ment projects is a political/professional problem, not a technic-
al/administrative problem, it requires a problem-oriented approact
to the structuring of pn organization and to the utilizntion of
personnel. First the character of the tasks hpve to be clarified,
then the administration can be built in relation to the tasks.
Table 4 indicates thet' about 2/3 of the personnel in Head-
quarters are general service (secretaries, clerks etc.). By
using the Programs'of Work and Budget from 1960/61 we find the
following information on the development of the relationship
Professionals/General Service Personnel,
TAB"UR 5,
General Service er rofessional in FAO
1961 1962 1963



1967


1964 1965 1966
937 1080 1080 1280 1493 1637 1815 General Service
535 615 615 714 806 875 988 Professionals
1.75 1.76 1.76 1.80 1.85 1.87 1.84 Ratio
The numbers in the preceding table are from FAO Head-
quarters in Rome, We notice that the ratio has increased from
the beginning, though showing signs of decline ngain in 1967.
This can probably be taken as an expression for increasing admi-
nistrative work as the organization expands its programs.
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However, the number rnay alo indicate that as the organization
grows the professionals nre nble to delegnte ndministrative
activities to personnel in the general service category, Many of
those interviewed in Pj,0 indicnted a wish in this direction
(although most of them were not willing to delegate administra—
tive functions out of their unit to cen-trally placed ndministra—
tive divisions).
We can note from Diagram 5, page 29 that the decline in pro—
gram gruwth from 66/67 to 68/69 is paralelled in a decline in the
ratio General Service/Professional personnel. Although the rela—
tionship of course may be spurious, it may indicate an organi—
zational mechanism. Incrensing growth of progrnms increases the
general service/professional ratio, while declining rates of growt
cause decline in the snme ratio.
The grnding of personnel in Fl() is highly differentinted.
At the top is the Director Gencral, Then follows the Deputy
Director General and Assistant Director Generals. The fourth CPC-
gory is Assistant to Assistant Director Genernls. At the middle
level of the orgenization the grading of directors is divided
in two, D2 and D1. Then follow the five professional grades from
P5 (highest) down to P1. The distribution of these cntegories
in Headquarters Rome in 1961, at the beginning of the Special
Fund program and in 1967 (1/1) is shown in the following diagram,
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DIAGRAM 8.
Relative size of rofessional cate ories in


6 7
D2 18 24
D1 3 30
P5 68 144
P4 155 3 3
p3 133 213
P2 85 125
P1 65 60
1/1 1961 1/1 1967
The expansion at the P4 level, corresponding to professionals
at the subject matter level of Special Fund projects, is the most
striking feature. Secondly we notice the evening out of the
"neck" at the D1 level from 1961 to 1967. The orgenization was
criticized by Mrs. Castle of Great Britain 14) for being op
_
heavy, If this was the case in 1961, the situation has changed
to one where the middle level of professionals represent the
"-weight" of the organization — at least numerically.
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al 25_gap_izat-Lrn structurc.
1. Secretariat. The frmal structure of FAO in 1968 is
depicted in the following Diagrnm 9. The size of the seven units
under the Director General in terms of allocations over the
Regular Proeram Budget for 1968/69 is graphically expressed in
the size-of the boxes. In the left hand box is shown the location
of the main regional offices. The next onc, the Office of the
DG, is considered the main overall planning and coordinating
unit. The Freedom From Hunger Campaign and The Indicative World
Plan team are both placed in this central unit. Then follow 5
departments, the first and the fifth of an administrative ser-
vice nature, the three others toehnienl-subjeetmatter. The
percentage of the UNDP/FAO allocntions to each depnrtment is
indicated in the diagrnm. Beside this percentage we have also
given the number of divisions within the respective depnrtmeut
in brackets. The immense size of the TechnicAl Depnrtment is
best understood if both the size of its box in the dingrnm and
the percent of the UNDP/FAO allocetions to it is compared to the
same dimensions in the other departments.
In 1957FAO was bnsed on five subject mntter divisions
(nutrition, forestry, fisheries, economics nnd agriculture).
In addition there wns n division for information, one for admi-
nistration nnd finance and the DG and his office. In the begin-
ning of the sixties the subject matter divisions were arranged
in departments and a Procrnm and Budgetary Service was construct-
ed in the DG'S office. Outside this office, but directly under
the DG, a FFHC office wns .erected, as an addition to the other
Special Assistonts counciline the Director General. In 1962 all
the departments shown in Diagrnm 9, except the Fisheries Depart-
ment, were in place. Fisheries was until 1965 a division in the
Technical Department. The Director General, because of the
important unused resources in the sea, suggested in 1965 such
a creation. At the Conference in 1965several countries recorded
their doubts about making fisheries a department 15). Argentina
was in doubt about the timing of the suggestion, while France
blankly disagreed in establishing 5 Fisheries Department.
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It could hesitantly support a modest strenghtening of the
Fisheries Division. Finland disagreed because it meant the
suggestion should not be implemented beforc the proposed review
of the organization structure had been undertaken.
Then the review of the organizetion structure was made.
These studies will be analyzed later in this paper.16)A new
Director Genern1 was elected in 1967 (A. D. Boerma) and he pro—
posed to operate FAO on another organizational base. His suggest—
ed structure, that most likely will be implemented after approval
in 1969 17), is depicted in the following diagram 10 (The size
of the boxes in this diagram are more or less haphazard),
Comparing this chart to the one in Diagram 9 we note some seem—
ingly modest chRnge. The Office of the DG hPs been rennmed the
Development pepnrtment, an j\rea Service Unit hos been placed
at the top, Program and Budget Service at the bottom. The Public
Relations Department has been dismontled, and its division for
FAO/Industry Cooperation hRs been transferred to the central
Development Department. The Division for Legal Council hns been
adjoined directly to the DG, while Publications nnd Information
ectivities have been reduced to office status (box far right).
It is noteworthy that one of Dr. Sen's major contributions to
FAO, The Freedom From Hunger Campaign, has also been moved to
this office. (As we shall see in the next chapter, the new
Director Gencral represents a new palic3 approach to FAO). Further
changes are the creation of a policy advisory group directly in
contact with the DG, and the suggestion for the creation in
1970/71 of a Forestry Department.18)
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Each depnrtment in 1968 is divided into Divisions, each with
a Division Directur nt its heade Each division agPin is sub-
divided into branches, sections or offices. The increasing
differentiation of FAO in this sense is depicted in the follow-
ing table.
TABT,F, 6.
Differentiation of FAO into subunits




Unit


1962 1964 1966 1968
No. of Departments 5 5 6 6
No. of Divisions 10 15 21 25
No. of Branches 61 64 78 85
No. of Regional Offices 13 13 13 14
Although there seems to be a general concern for reducing the
number of subunits, the provisional organizational suggestion
of the new DG and the Review Team 19) includes more than 100
subunits in FAO.
2. Conference and Council
Although this study focuses on the function of the Secre-
tariat in the planning of development projects, let me briefly
turn to the description of two other important FAO organs. (Both
will be considered as parts of the enVironment). The first is the
FAO Conference. This is the supreme FAO-authority. Each member
government of FAO has one delegate and one vote in this organ.
It meets once every two years and decides on policy and budget.
When it meets (usually around November) it is subdivided part of
the time in different technical and administrative/economic
commissions. The political climate in the Conference is usually
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reluctant detractionist on the part of the major contributors
while clearly expansionist on the part of the recipient countries20).
The establishment of the total budget size is usually the major
crux of the meeting. However, substnntial changes of the Director
General's suggestion is seldom made. One informant described the
process in the following terms. In the technical commissions
where. mostly country experts meet, increases are suggested, and
the donor representatives seldom deem it possible to oppose these
suggestions. (Experts, whatever their nationality, usually want
to expand their specific type of work in an organization).
Then in the Conference meeting, where the donors more or less can
join forces, deductions nre suggested. The end result is most
often the DG's suggestions.
The interesting question is thus moved to the aren of the
Director General's function. How, and under what politicnl cir-
cumstances, are the main budgetary suggestions compiled an(1, suggost-
ed? The budgetnry aspect of this process are not delved into here,
but is definitely worth a study in itself.
A general perspective on the budgetnry process in UN-
21)
organizations is given by Jacob and Atherton. They ask about
the rationality of the total work arrnngement in the international
field. What would for example a Congressional Committee say to
the fact that the FAO budget (like the others in the UN family)
is scrutinized 1) by the FAO Conference for several days 2) by
probnbly each of the 116 member governments? Viewing the size
of the budget they ask if this is efficient. This student discussed
the FAO budget with representatives of the Overseas Development
Ministry in London, and they stated thnt the budget suggestiun
from the Director Genernl is scrutinized in detail in the pro-
fessional units of the British Government.
The FAO.Conference is probably most aptly described as a meeting
of government representatives, discussing in the general climate
of international politics at the time, with subjectmatter experts
exerting influence on some specific development questions, but
where government influence on FAO's work is limited to an extreme-
ly general guidance of policy and to suggesting, as we shall see,
on line with other units in the environment of FAO, detniled
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national project needs, so specific and in so large a number that
choice, and therefore influence, is in the hands Gf the secretariat.
The FAO-Councilf erected in 1949, after a suggestion by lord
Bruce who was chairman of the Commission that blankly rejected
Mr. Orr's World Food Board proposal, cannot quite as easily as
the Conference be defined as part of the environment of FAO.
Through its frequent meetings and its smaller size it probably
exerts central influence on FLO policy and actions in the field.
However, in the area of UNDP development projects its influence
is most likely more limited. As we shall see, Special Fund acti-
vities are in a peculiar way withdrawn from the decision-making
in FAOs legislative organs.
The Council, which is the highest FLO authority between Confer-
ence sessions, is elected by the Conference. Due consideration
is given to geographical distribution and rotation of membership.
(One of the Scandinavian countries for example nearly automatically
has a seat). The 31 delegates to the Council are elected for 3
year terms and they meet at least 3 times between Conference ses-
22)
sions, Much of the influence that Council has is exerted through
two committees, Program Comm 23)ittee and Finance Committee. They
have 7 and 5 members respectively, all appointed by the Council
in personal capacity.
3. The Director General
The Director General of F.A0 is an institution in himself.
He is elected by the Conference for a four year term, with maxi-
mum possible tenure of 8 years.24) Lrticle VII of the Constitution
of FAO reads: "Subject to the general supervision of the Confer-
ence and the Councill the Director General shall have full power
and authority to direct the work of the Organization".
e) The United Nations Develo ment Pro ram UNDP.
Situated in New York, in the UN Headquarters, this is the cen-
tral agency for the approval of project requests from member
countries. To perform this function the organization first of all
has a Mannging Director and a secretarint, subdivided on the basis
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of subject matter and salient fields of development (communications,
education, ngriculture, industry etc)25). The Managing Director
submits feasible projects to the UNDP Governing Council, an organ
with an equal number of delegates from donor and recipient countries.
A Consultative Board usually comments on the projects before they
are sent to the Governing Council. On this Board are the Secretary
General of the UN, the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assist-26)ance Board, and the President of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Developm 27)ent. The Directors of the Specialized
Agencies are called to meet when projects or questions specifically.
related to their fields are being evaluated on the Board.
The UNDP set guidelines for the typical UNDP project in 1959,28)
These have in large measure been applied, but their generality
have allowed a wide scope of variations, and they have probably
been of little vnlue for the relating of project activities to
the specific needs of the specific cultural, social and economic
regions where the projects have been implemented, The guidelines
were a) large projects, around 2 million dollars each b) pre-
investment nature of projects that could "clear the path" for more
long term investment from other private or government sources,
o) total, not annual planning of each project, d) pinnning of pro-
jects on their own merits, not as before under cOnsiderntion of
country targets, and e) project requests should be in the fields
of manpower development, industry, ngriculture, transport and commu-
nications, building and housing, health, educntion, stntistics and
public administrgtion. In the resolution establishing the Special
Fund (1240 XIII), handicrafts and cottage industries were also
mentioned, but these project cntegories have been dropped...
The large scope of UNDP activity makes it necessary to entrust
most of the'influence over the structuring of project requests to
the Specialized Agencies, Since the stPrt in 1959 1422 requests
hnve formally been registered by UNDP, the total number submitted
being much larger. In the nine years that have gone since then,
873 of these requests have beenRpproved by the Governing Council.
Because the overwhelming amount of technical information relevant
to the different projects is located in the Specialized Agencies,
and because they probablyhnve a more direct contact with demanding
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groups in the environment (for FAO, ngricultural authorities in
member countries) these Ggencies hnve decisive influence on the
formulation of requests. Thus to comprehend the planning process
behind the development projects the values present in the
Specialized Agencies, and the sources of these values would seem
of central interest.
The UNDP formally allocntes projects to the Specialized
Agencies for planninE and implementetion. As of 31 May, 1967,
FAO had received by far the larest portion of the projects,
The following list shows the distribution:29)
01 FAO 38%, United Nations 21%, UNESCO 17%, ILO 10%, while WHO,
IBRD, ICAO, ITU, WKO and IAEA together received 14%.
From this broad description of the planning system in which
FAO is a more or less anton•mous part, let me turn to the
question of policy making at the top level of FAO.
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By structure hcre is mcant stable patterns of communication
and authority and staff comliosition (in terms of nationality,
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16, See page 139
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Jones op. cit., pnee 139.
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op. cit., page 40-47.
General Rules of the Organization, Rule XXV, 2.
A. Løchen, the administrative leader of the Norwegian
Nutrition Council is Third Alternate to the Finance Committee
(1968).
Constitution, Article VII points 1 and 2. The Indian Mr. B.R.
Sen was elected D.G. in 1956. After two terms of 4 years he
was reelected in 1963. In 1967 India again put forth his
candidature, but the Conference turned it down. (Provisional
Report, para 684,) Total salary for the DG in 1968 $53.000
+ allowances.
?a  25. The UNDP is in 1968 undertaking a review of its structure.
New arrnngements are believed to incorporate the need for more
comprehensive planning and evaluation of projects.
This Board was created in 1950 (with EPTA) to evaluate the
earliest development projects nnd the country targets.
Until npril 1967 this was Mr. George D. Woods. The new
President is former Secretary of Defence in the USA,
Robert S. McNamara.
The United Nations Special Fund, An explanatory paper by
the Managing Director, (New York, UN, 59).
F.Y) document C 67/26 pr,„.7,e  footnote 1).
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CHAPTER FOUR
PROBLEMS OF GENERAL POLICY-MAKING IN FAC
Introduction: The lendershi function.
The complexities of the politicel and organizntionel system
of FAO, partly spelled out in the preceding chapter, makes the pro-
cess of formulating and deciding on goals that are meaningful for
both clients nnd members of FAO highly intricete, a game of much
(111give and take. In the historical study of FAO we
SPW how the social
end political forces and values present in 1945 interacted with
individunls to form the goels2 the structurc and the size of the
orgenizetion. The upolitics" of the process were obvious. FAO goals
were nnt given just because the orgenizetinn wns established
formally. At any time in the first years the problem of develup-
ment of the "third world" could hnve been choson as an FAO goal
of primary impnrtance. It wasn't until well into the 1950's.
What are the goals of FAO todny? To enswer this question is
in one sense impossible. .At the lowest level of nnalysis it can be
stpted thnt each individual in F.A0 hns goals for his actions inside
the orgenization and it is the sum of these thet "really" are the
goals of FAO, We could then quickly give up trying to describe them,
In another sense the questinn cnn be disposed of by merely referring
to the explicit goals stnted in the FAO Constitution, Many of those
interviewed in the organization did exactly this.1)
Somewhat more realistically the goals of FAO could be studied
by senrching for the most influential expert groups in the organi-
zstion and identifying the values they perceive ns most important
in different sectors of activity. One hypothesis is that as new
groups in the system gain in influence new goals will emerge.
The changing position of groups could most interestingly - in the
next stage - be studied in relatinn to environmentel pressures
and demends. A leck of correspondence could be an indicator of
organizational isolation, 2)
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Although the scope is limited, this chapter will look into
the role of FAO lendership in the ganl-formulnting process.
What policies have been pursued from this level in the organi-
zation and what effect have the goalformulations had on the work
of FAO?
The leadership function in an organization cpn be interpreted
in many ways. Leaders cnn conceive of their role as basically
goalformulating or goal implementing. The latter/ the trndition-
al ngoal“ of public administration, was important in FAO in the
sense thpt all activity undertaken had to hnve its base expli-
citly in decisions mnde by government representatives. Further,
leaders can centrnlize or decentralize the decision-making power
they control, and leRders can adopt a more or less democratic
process within the organization. However, in all cases the leader-
ship must - implicitly or explicitly - take n stnnd on the over-
all gonls of the organizntion, Rnd to a certnin extent reduce
them to working goals for the main parts of the organizntion.
This may be characterized as n necessary long term activity of
any organizational lendershipo How nre the oranizational goals
formulated and reduced to working goals in FAO, and how have the
organization leaders interpreted their role?
1) The formulation of FAO ,oals. Legnlly this is no problem.
It is the F.A0 Conference that decides on the geals and the budget
of the orunization. But il we ask what decisiun-making procesb
is implied, a much more complex picture arises. Three main groups
of decision-makers take part in the process. 1) The 116 member-
governments, 2) The Conference delegates Rnd their advisors and
3) The FAO Secretariat and the DG. Depending on who they nominate
as delegate and what his political values are, how binding instruct-
ions they give their delegation and how strong they are in the
Conference Assembly, the governments will have influence, or
even power over goal formulation. The expert advisors have a
special influence related to their professional stnnding. While
cleavages between delegates follow traditional political division
lines, cleavnges between experts often follow the professicnal
-60-
groups. Thus contacts and agreements between experts across po-
litical barriers is more likely than between delegates. There-
fore if the nuthority of experts was increased in Conference
meetings a stronger regional integration of policy might be the
result. However, in the FAO-system today, the third group of par-
ticipants, formally without decision-making power at all in the
Conference, probably exert the most influence over the policy-
decisions mnde. Why? 1) Lending personnel in the secretariat
heve comprehensive and detpiled knowledEe about programs, methods
and resources in the orgnnization. 2) They have the advantage
of initiative through the Program of Work end Budget and
3) The Director General, with the help of the Councill arranges
the Conference meeting itself, allowing for a host of tectical
considerntions. Thus, the suggestions made by the Director General
end his secretariat are in large measure accepted by the
3)Conference.
A more difficult question is the influeaeaunit13 in thc) tnviru
ment have on the structuring of the Director Genernl's suggestions.
Diverse national and international institutions make their wishes
and desires known for FAO, directly and through the Regional
4)Conferences, In addition a large number of technical, subject
matter meetings are held in FAO nearly continuously and here many
sugEestions for FAO action arise, The FAO and UN field admini-
( 	 otrationa alao produce demands t1itt may exe£1, influence. What is
the totel result? A central point is that the demands by far out-
stretch resources. If the demands all fell within one policy
tendency the Director General's possibility to structure a policy
would be limited. But as we shall see they don,t coincide and
the Director General has a freedom of policy choice that gives
him large influence over the direction of FAO's work. How this
choice has been made by Mr. B. R. Sen will be our concern in the
following paragraphs.
The Director General of FAO then has large influence over the
UNDP/FAO programs. Besides the problems of information discussed
in the precoding chapte£, thu --111mihistrative system as such plays
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nn important role.. The Governing Council formally hRs the authority
to approve projects. The FAO Conference is for this reason exempt
from officially discussing that policy, end from the Conference
reports it can be seen that the content of the field projects is
discussed indirectly, in relntion to the activity of the Divisions.
However, the Governing Council and the Managing Director of UNDP
largely rely on FLO for edvice nnd guidance on questions of
agriculturel projects. The result is thet the Director General's
authority is augmented, end influence is withdrawn from the organs
where government representatives sit. Let us look somcwhat closer
pt the reasons for this influence.
One reason for FAO influence is the complexity of the UN
system and the complexity of the project planning process.
Only the organizations themselves have thorough knowledge of the
whole system and the new netions are more or less forced to
let them plan the projects. Thus the premises of the organizations
become the premiscs of the countries.
Another reason is the separation of plenning and approving
organizations. UNDP projects ere planned in detail in FAO and
approved in UNDP in New York. Government representatives in New
York, and even the UNDP ndministretion there, arc more or less
presented with a fait accom li from FAO. Government representa-
tives in FAO, in Conference, Council and elsewhere, are with-
drawn from direct influence over project planning. Thcir field
is Regulnr Program, Special Fund nctivities are services done
by FAO for UNDP. That UNDP directly finances a large number of
the professionals in FLO doesn't help much. Government influence
is at a minimum once green light for UNDP allocations has been
given.
Another base for organization influence is the idea that pro-
ject plans are to be compelte in detail for ns long as a five
year period into the future. We will return to this concept of
planning with critical remarks later in the study.
Because of these mechanisms the system of separate Specialized
Agencies is slowly tending towards a kind of supranationalism.
The main brake on the system is the total ellocations the organi-
zations hPve at their disposal. The central danger is of course
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that the values the organizations disseminate are detrimental
to the development of the countries in which they work.
central proposition is that FAO lacks intermediate policy
for action towards agricultural development in the poor countries
of the world. It does not lnck overall, non-operstional organi-
zational policy, or suggestions for action nt the individual
project level. By intermediate policy is meant propositions about
how development townrds the goals set is to be attained with
the organization's resources. Thus-the lack is a) a discussion
about the dynamic mechanisms that sustain development in the
(1111h
specific regions where FAO has projects, and b) decisions about
what mechanisms are to be supported by the organization. Questions
at this level concern for example the relntionship between regional
vnlues (social, religious etc.) and the acceptance of different
types of development projects and the consequences of projects
of different kind (the problem of how FAO activity in the long
run affects political and economic institutions in a project
region). Policy statements at this level would, more than n mere
geographical orientation, mnke meaningful planning possible, and
would draw the work of F1-10 out of the purely technical realm,
a realm that conceals the political and social aspects of all
relevnnt development work.
Policy-making at this level would probably have other inter-
esting consequences. 1) It would reduce belief in global plans
for nericulturl development ns :J.griculture would emerge as an
integrated activity in the totnl economic undertakings of
national societies and would be seen as something related meaning-
fully to socinl and political characteristics of the region in
question. 2) It would bring forth the political implicntions of
the technical work done by FAO and therefore mnke the idea of
regional planning possible. Bringing the political questions to
the surface in the orunization will definitely create difficulties
but if increased difficulties go hand in hand with increased real-
in planning the choice is et lenst an interesting one.
In addition to the general policy guidance expressed in the
FAO Constitution, it is hoped in FAO that an Indicative World Plan
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for agricultural development will provide policy guidance in
the future. The Plan received n scathing critique in Neue Zurcher
Zeitung5) 1) for assuming linear extensions to 1975 and 1985 of
agricultural and institutional developments existing today and
2) for calculating projections on basically noncompnrable and
insufficient statistical dnta. The cultural relativity and the
social aspects of chnnge and agricultural development are again
suppressed, the real problems being cloaked in technical/economic
terms.
The Constitutionally set goals: 6)
to rpise levels of nutrition and standards of living of
the peoples under (the member nations') respective jurisdict-
ions,
to secure improvements in the efficiency of the production
end distribution of all food nnd agriculturn1 products,
- to better the condition of rural populntions,
- and thus to contribute toward an expanding world economy and
ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger,
serve perhaps as a general indicator of the direction in which
FAO moves, but are formulnted at a level from where it is
extremely difficult to deduce operPtionally coherent development
policies. The important question of intermediate policy is hidden
in concepts like 'better conditions', 'better standards of liv-
ing', 'improved efficiency, etc. What exactly do these concepts
stand for in the international context thnt FLO operates?
Examples of policy formulations et the lowest level (individ-
ual' project-like -.t(ftions)abound in thc roports from the Con-
ference,
1) In a randomly chosen branch, The Food Science and Techno-
7)
logy Branch in the Nutrition Division the 14th Conference gave
the following directive instructions; Work should be intensified,
especially in the fields of efficient production and in the
avoidance of waste. The branch should advocate development of
both capital intensive and small industries, finnnced by either
private or public funds, or by cooperatives.
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2) In the Animal Production Branch, the Animal Production
and Health )T;_ava i:Jen,thP rrr. coliference meeting felt that
intensification of defininE suitable livestock breeds and strains
in relation to environment and marketing possibilities was
necessary, Increased studies on wildlife management was deemed
useful. The role of sheep and goat husbaaadry in marginal areas
should not in the future be confined to milk production. Their
potential as ment producera ahould be stressed, and cnution
should be exercised to develop goat husbandry only in suitable
areas. The possibility of introduoing modern techniques in poul-
try and pig production as a means of relieving animnl protein
(11111 shortages was suggeated, with increnaal emphasis cn research
and training in tha -,"a3rL ATS• -ere feedstua L:Oi be suppli-
ed, poultry numbers could be inc2eased,
( 1±1ough Canference also evnlnated more generel tasks of
planning (like the IWP) and statistical and economic problems
(in the Depnrtment of Econ- 1-1(1 Social Affairs) and descriptions
of the general development of agricif_abnie (in relation to the
FAO document ”The Stnte of rood and griculture"), the above
examples indicate the fragmentnry and detailed type of annlysis
the Conference, on the basis of the Director General's proposi-
tions, undertakes, (The lnst couple of Programs of Work. and Budget
have contnined about 440 pages),
2) The olicy of the Directors General,
a) Substantive_policy of Dr. D,R, Sen,
B. R. Sen's background be..;:ore entering the lendership of FAO
can support an understanding of his policy. After the independ-
ance of India (dominion in 1947, republic in 1950), Sen went
to the Indian Embassy in Washington, Later he was ambassador
to Italy. Yugoslavia, the United States End Japan, He was leader
of the Indian deleEnt!on to the UZ General Assembly, and in 1948
he was member of the Indien delegation to FAO, In 1956 he was
the heed of this delegation.
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Sen was the first representative for a developing country to
be elected Director General of FAO. In 1957 he wrote the follow—
ing:8)
"While my allegiance is to all nations, developed and
underdeveloped alike, I cen, in a special sense, speak for
the millions who are striving out of poverty today, in all
the world's vest underdeveloped regions."
In 1956 Sen was not, however, the unanimous candidate of the
underdeveloped world, An indication of the complexities of the
political forces and cleavages working in a "PAO—Conference is
the following statement in Jones' book 9)
"Dr. Sen was the candidate of Great Brit2in, and in fact a
host of the underdoveloped countries supported the American
nominee..."
In 1957 Dr. Sen expressed the basic goals of FAO:
1) to achieve freedom from want and 2) participate in the
achievement of the overall objective, a permanent and progressive
peace.10) In the opinion of Mr. Sen, four basic social forces
had to be considered:
increasing longevity, making increased food production
essential.
the awakening of the common man, thus increasing both demand
and potential for development,
the wish in the underdeveloped countr'es for technical
development.
the generosity of the developed countries, the most signific—
ant development in international relations after the war.
To implement the goals Sen then wanted to a) strengthen FAO's
regional structure and the FAO Committeesand b) strengthen FAO's
field organization. However, there were to be no diminution of
overall services supplied from the centerc
Some of the general aspects of Dr. Sen's policy can be detected
already here. The first is the very wide and dramatic goal formul—
ations. They are in a sense more general than even the Consti:-:
tutional propositions. The peacemaking function of F;10 — which
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everyone probebly would applaud - is not mentioned in the Preemble
to thet document. Thus Dr. Sen continued in a sense as ambassador
at the hend of FAO. His dramatic and general gonl formulations
were intended to awaken the world and make FAO known and influent-
ial. This seemed to reduce his interest in more operational goal
formulations.11)
second aspect is the relntively small interest taken in the
evnluation of the ndministrative system and how it should function.
This is probably related to the lack of intermediate policy
formulations. If they had existed, adjustments of the administrn-:
(111 tive system would have been a much more pressing task. In 1967
The Review Team 12) hed this comment to the structure of the
FAO-secretnriat:
We feel ... that a redical departure from that pattern is
called for nfter more than twenty yenrs, and in anticipation
of the further strains FAO is bound to face as a result of
the increasing demand on its services from member countries.
The time for partial administrative remedies is, in our
opinion, gone."
A third spect is Dr. Sen's interest in large projects operated
by new organizationel units crented above the orEanization but
in close contnct with the Director General's office, drnwing on
the resources of the many F1'10 divisions. Such projects had a pub-
lic relations value - a general trnit of most of the important
innovations Sen introduced in FAO. The second social force mention-
ed on the preceding page is an expression of the importance Sen
attnehed to the infnrmtive .\mlue of 11110 undert::lkings. The first
such special project (besides "a Mediterranean project") wes the
Freedom From Hunger Campaign (FFHC) in 1960. Its main purpose
was and is public engagement in the lack of food. A second project
was the FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program, and the latest addition
is the Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development. All
of these projects were handled by special FAO units. The divisions
with the powerful division directors at the top, were kept out
or mainly used for support purposes.
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Did the suggested program in 1957 represent n policy for
agricultural development at the intermediate level (a goal/sub-
goal structure that clarifies the purpose of FAO's work and that
specifies to some extent the goals lower levels in the organization
are to seek)? This stntement is what was found to nnswer the
question:13)
"It is important to make sure that all of FAO's under-
takings are inspired and informed by a sense of common purpose
and direction. The direction is set by the purpose, and that
common purpose can be only one, which is to maximize FAO's
contribution to welfare through the work taken up within
its own allotted sphere."
This student believes that it would be difficult from this
guideline to decide meaningfully what for exnmple the purpose
of FAO development projects should be.
From this base, what were the main policy suggestions of Mr.
Sen up to 1967? and how did these suggestions change the direction
of FAO?
In 1959 Dr, Sen suggested a program with a total budgetary
increase of 10.8% (from about 20 to 22 million dollnrs( which
he charncterized in the following manner:14)
"It must be borne in mind, however, that the 1960-61 Budget
was virtually a stand-still Budget devoted mainly to the con-
solidation of FAO's basic structure for meeting its new and
increasing responsibilities."
This indicates the basic expansionist zeal of Mr. Sen. He was
very interested in acquiring UYDP projee-cs when that program
was starte, and Mr, Sen engaged FAO directly already at the ini-
tial stager of tL ustablish=t of tiie Special Fund The pro-
jectprogram was integrated into the decision-making system
already at hand in FAO, and contrary to the other special pro-
jects he launched, the Special Fund problems were not discussed
at any length in the Program Introductions before 1961. Rather,
the problem of reimbursement of overhead costs-was a major
question from the beginning. It seems in this perspective that
the growth of FAO Was a central concern for the Director
General.
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In 1961 Mr. Sen felt renson to mention that the balance of
concrete operations and the accumulRtion of agricultural
knowledge must be maintained in FAO activities. Transfer of large
chunks of capital is not alone a solution to economic development.
Å specific determination of needs is necessary at different
stages, and this can only be done through study, the traditional
work of the UN Organizations.
This seems to be an expression for the notion that FO is in
lack of intermediate operational policy. The objectives and methods
to be applied in the different regions of the world with F.:i0's
limited resources have to be clarified and developed through
study, and her problem appears in the stntement: FAO is an
advisory body and is effective only to the extent thnt Member
Governments allow themselves to be guided by its ndvice.15)
Not only does the organization lack relevant knowledge, it also
has difficulties in implementing projects. The two problems may
reasonably be seen as related. When these problems were being
discussed by the Director General, FIO had already been alloted
49 UNDP projects to a -value of 35 million dollars over the UNDP
budget. 16)
In 1963 the DG greatly expanded the scope of his introduction
to the Program of Work‹, Although not explicitly mentioning the
UNDP program, he felt that the policy of FM) should be concen—
trated on 4 major themes:
increased attention to planning and :rogramming.
improvcment of human rcsources, institutionl framwo-lkand
essential government services.
improving quality of diet.
increasing food supply by reducing waste.
In addition he pointed out the need . an integrated organi.,
zation—wide approach to the work of F410. To these ends he suggest—
ed a budgetary increase of 25%.
Two policy aspects seem to emerge at this point. 1) the idea
of more intensive overall planning of agricultural development
and thereby of FAO's activity. 2) increased interest in the social,
institutional nspects of developmente•14s we shall see later, this
has materialized in the recruitment of personnel trained in the
social sciences and in n relatively high grading of this personnel
in the organization.
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In 1965 the Director General of FAO saw the world at the brink
of disaster. "... we heve arrived at the crucial point where any
slackening of effort cnn spell disRster". 17)He pointed out that
the total multi— and bilateral aid had not been sufficient to
reverse the dangerous trend of population outgrowing foodproduction.
This time the special F.:\O projects were mentioned as major themes
in the work of the organization, while less emphasis was given
to planning, production, marketing and institutional improvements.
Education was for the first time mentioned explicitly. This field
had for a long time been a point of competition between FAO,
UNESCO and ILO.18)
Lastly in 1967, the final Program and Budgt written by Mr.
Sen, decreed that the food crisis was over us. The bad hervests
had probably large influence on the DG's dramntic exposition of
the situation. But could there be other reasons? A crisis defini—
tion can be used to legitimate the existence of en organization
or of parts of its program. A crisis might have made the necessity
of a total evaluation of the agricultural problem obvious for
everybody, and though serious ctiticism has appeared both within
19)
and outside FAO, the IWP is generRlly accepted RS legitimate.
A crisis definition could also spur donors to greater grants to
the orgnnization and thus greatly enhance Sen's political standing
in the underdeveloped world, the regions that have a majority vote
in the Conference.
However, March and Simon's theory of optimum 20)stress as a
necessity for innovative, non—neurotic action in an organization,
may cast another light over the effect the use of the crisis
definition has. Spelling out a crisis may increase dissatisfaction
in the organization with the work done to such a degree that
working mornle dwindles. The interviews taken in FAO in 1968 gave
a strong impression that members felt a high degree of non—
efficiency in the work and the planning they performed.
Generally, however, it is felt that Sen's use of the crisis
terms was an expression for his true perception of the agricultural
situation. An expression for strength was his suggestion in 1967
to engage FAO in the problems of family planning as an integrated
part of an agriculturel development program. Here Sen could reckon
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with increased difficulties with the World Health Orgenization
becpuse it of course would feel FAOs interest in family planning
as a competition in its field, Sen's innovotiveness is most like-
ly related to his general expansionist position as FAO leaderp
but his wide contact in both donor and racipient countries put
him in an creative ntmosphere, where informetion nnd idens from
different client and member groups gethered in his mind. Such a
mixture of information, given it does not overload the processing
system, and given this system is geared to absorbing the informa-
tion, is a high esset if innovation is a goal,
We cen thus sum up by snying thet the FAO leedership up to
1967 has not explicitly, at the public level, been concerned
with F;.i0's policy role in the UNDP/F.A0 program. UNDP has been
"slipped" into the system, T-le type of policy-making that Sen hag.
engeged in has left the Divisions quite free to consider,
advise and decide on requests for projects. The leodership has
further been expansive on both programs, And innovetive. New ideas
hpve been put to work in en extrn orgsnizational setting, the
nmbessodor, not the bureaucrat, has been pt the head of the
orgpnization. The environment hes been seen more and more in
terms of crisis, nnd the tendency has been to identify always
stronger with the poor countries, plthough never forgetting where
the financial resources emanate. Policy-making has been most
active at the non-operational level. At the project level the
attempt hes been made to give everyone smething. The alternative,
to construct an intermodiary theory of development that is feasible
within the limited scope of F.A0-resources has been more or
less left out. However, it is hoped that the Indicntive World
Plan will be the starting point for a more operationally coherent
program for the organization,21)
b) Bud etar consideretions.
Some of the trends in the Director General's policy in FAO
mnterialize in his budget suggestions. Using the distinctions in
FAO budgets between Technical/Economic Program and the different
administretive Service Departments(Office of the DG, Public Relat-
ions and Legal Affairs, Area Liaison etc), we find the following
relation between whet the Director General has suggested and what
the FAO Conference has approved for technical activities,
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DIAGRAM 11
BUDGETARY SUGGESTIONS AND APPROVALS,
TECHN, AND ECONOMIC PROGRAM IN RELATION TO ADMIN SERVICES,
\
% of
total
budget52%
51% --
----su,,g,-)stion
by the D.G,
approved by
Conference 50%
—
49% t 58/59 60/61 62/63 64/65 66/67 68/69
Source::.0 Programs of Work and Budget,
The Conference has obviously :f:elt he need to expand the
technicel compared to the administrative program of the organi-
zation with about 1% comi=ed to the DG's suReestions, The
Conference was generally expansive on the technicel side until
the Conference in 1965, when it approved a lower percent of the
total for functions in this cntegory. In 1968/69 the Conference
approval for the techncril nnd economic program for the first
time was below 50 % of the total. Whether the relation between
the two curves can be used to interpret the political climate
in the Conferenoe ib difficult to say. but it 2eem Lhal in 1960/61
the Conference was expensive compared to the DG, the difference
between suggested and epprcved alloceions for the technical pro-
gram being the largest in the budget approved for 1962/63. Then
for 1964/65 the DG felt the need to expand, but now the Conference
was somewhat more reluctant, and these years seem to introduce
a change, However, a major chenge towards more edministrative
work is the approvel of the Indicr,tive ';Torld Plan that is located
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in the office of the DG. In 1967 the Conference npproved about
1.2 million dollars for this purpose out of the totnl two-year
regulnr budget of nbout 60 million dollnrs.
Obvisously, adjustments mede by the Conference are modest.
The adjustments genernlly favor whnt is defined 2S technical/
economic functions.
Turning to the individual subject matter fields within the
technical economic program, we can study the policy of the
Director General in somewhat more detail end see the concrete
ramificRtions of the general policy formulations depicted in
preceding paragraphs. The following table will nlso show the
r-
, "tempernment" of the Conference in the different fields of F1,0
activity., How do the member stetes use FAO?
In table 7 E stands for estimates (or suggestions made by
the DG.) and A for Conference approvels. All numbers are per-
cent2ges of the totel approved budget.
From 1963 to 1967 the Director General hes only found it
appropriate to suggest a relative increase in three subject
matter fields: Fisheries, Rural Institutions end Economio Inaivais
This corresponds to the following facts. a) his suggestion to
create a Depertment of the fisheries division, which wns severely
disputed st the 1965 Conference, 22)b) his wide interpretation
of the FAO goals, rural institutions opening the field of general
societel functions ns en integrated part of FAO-work, and c) his
interest in planning nnd long term nnalysis of the needs and
potentialities of the underdeveloped countries.
It should also be noted that on these three policy points the
DG has been supported by the Conference, his suggestions being
in total increased (from 1957 to 1967 by 0.4 % on fisheries, 1.5 %
on rural institutions and by 0.8 % on economic nnelysis)
In 1959 the Conference approved just about without alter-
ations the suggestions mnde by the DG. Sen was newly elected,
he was probnbly cnreful end so wns the Conference.
In 1961 the tendency had changed to one of general, relative-
ly modest reduction of the Director Genernl's program. In total
the Conference reduced the budgets for the units in the table
with 0.9 %. Studying the numbers for 1964/65 the Conference seems
to have been more active with suggestions both for reductions
and expansions, the result being a modest expansion of the DG's
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suggestions (0.2 %). Then in 1965 mnjor expnnsions were approved;
however, expctly in the sectors suggested by the DG. Especially
rural institutions and economic anPlysis got a boost at this Con-
ference.
In general this analysis seems to support the conclusion that
in an international orgnization like FAO, the policy making or
distribution of resources and values in the orgnnization's program
is a process that culminates in the suggestion for a Program and
Budget made by the Director General nearly a yenr before the
Conference actually meets. Having this importnnt role within the
Regular Program, the Secretariat of FIC should be an even more
interesting focus in the study of the planning nnd the policy of
the UNDP/FAO projects,
c) Mr. Boerma's lans.
While Mr, Sen saw the world as wandering towards a Lunper erisis.
the new Director Genernl, Mr. Boerma has stprted out on "a note
of cautious optimiSm"23).1.1e builds his optimism on a) good harvests
in 1967, b) more political concern for ngriculture in the under-
developed countries, c) the plans of IBRD to incrense investment
in pgriculture and d) the development of high-yielding wheat and
rice strains. This note of optimism might pffect the planning
process in FAO. While Mr. Sen's approach made expnnsion of programs
a central concern, Mr. Boerma's toned down optimism may make quali-
ty and relevance of projects a more natural concern. The adjust-
ment of project content to the new trends in agricultural develop-
ment may seem more important in new atmosphere that hns been
introduced in the orgnnization.
Mr. Boerma has introduced five key areas for FAO activity in
the future. Does his approach represent a coherent intermedinte
theory for development and planning of FAO projects?
The nreas are:
The development and cultivation of the high-yielding
varieties of basic food crops.
A war on waste.
An attack on protein deficiency.
Mobilization of humnn resources for rural development,
Promotion of foreign exchange earnings and savings in the
developing countries.
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We note the weight put on concrete technical operntions. Under
point 4 specinl.coneern is given to the urban problem, and in-
creased agriculturnl training is put forth as n means to improve-
ment. The public relation or informative aspects of FAO activity
are also reduced in importnnce. On the methodological side the
efficient business like approach is emphaeized and overall co-
ordination of planning is to be taken care of by the Development
Depertment (See Diagrnm 10). Whether this approach will bring the
many FAO units into a more coordinated effort for regional
development is rn open question, but for Mr. Boerma, even morc
(- uhan for Mr. Sen, the problem of whnt development is in terms of
attitudes, understrnding and cultural vnlues is more or less sub-
ordinated to thrt of generally producing more and better food.
Stating thnt this should be done more efficiently actunlly pin-
points the problem. Efficient must be thnt which fulfills the
needs and furthers the vnlues of the clients of an organization.
The structure of 111,0 is to e certain extent being adjusted to region-
al diversific 24)ation. An interesting project would be to study
Low the policy outputs of these units 1) compare to evaluRtions
in the regions of the local problems and their solution and
2) are influenced by or adjusted to the policy of the FAO leader-
ship, One hypothesis could be thnt conflict will arise in the
relation regionnl units/FAO leadership if the different regionsl
policies sre incompatible and that subsequently the role or
authority of the regional units will a) never become large or
b) be reduced.
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Conclusion: The needs of clients.
It appears that FAO leadership is not explicitly concerned with
how FAO should use its resources in the different regions of the
world. In the UNDP sector policy is theoretically left to UNDP
organs and project construction is more or less defined as a technic—
al undertaking. We have attempted to show thnt this concenls the
political aspects and the social problems involved in planning
development projects, While F.A0 leadership has concentrated on
what general subjects the organization should work with and the
genernl goals, intermedinte policy has been left to the many di—
r- visions. Planning is at nll levels a question of coordinnting.
If this coordination is difficult, as FAO has experienced, then
this may have its cause within the organization, in the relation—
ships between the different parts of the orgnnization. As the
reports on organization structure show, this has been the prevalent
diagnosis. However, the cnuse of difficulties with coordination
may also reside in the relationship between the organization and
the environment. It may be thet the basic structure of the
organization and the operntional policies it pursues in a wey do
not correspond to the structures and the problems in the environ—
ment.. Planning of policy for a system of public administration is
not only e question of finding end renking general goals. It is
also a question of understanding the indigenous needs of client
groups, constructing and coordinating operntional goals in relation
to these needs nnd availnble resources,ald if this doesn't work
out, to ewIluate and change the organization structure so that
the whole system better can perceive the needs of national societies
and more keenly nnd meaningfully communicate with the different
client groups. This is perhaps the centrnl problem of leadership
in public administration.
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NOTES.
1, Of 21 random supervisors interviewed, four were Asians.
These four were markedly more reluctant in commenting on the
actual goals pursued by the organization in the UNDP sector
then were the others.
2. See for example FAO and the World Food Problem: nst resent 

and future, by Mr. Boerma M page .
In 1967 for example the exact total budget suggestion made
.Liy The D.G. was approved($59.861.000). In 1965, the Conference
increased his suggestion with somewhat under 5 %.
40 Recommendntions from the 5 Regional Conferencies are found
annexed to each Progrnm of Work and Budget.
Neue ZUrcher Zeitun Sunday Edition, 18.6.67, No. 2654.
Preamble to the Constitution of FAO.
55 of the 86 branches are in the 3 technical subject matter
departments. The information presented in points 1) and 2) are
from the report of the 14th session of the Conference 4 decem-
ber 1967,
3, Program of York and Budget 1958/59, page 1,
9. Jones, op. cit., pnge 131,
10, Progrpm of Work and Budget 1958/59, page 3.
110 His first major operntional undertaking, The development of
the Mediteranean region, was generplly a failure. See
Observer, Business News page 9, 9 april 1967.
Council Document CL 49/16 page 13.
Program of Work 1958/59, page 13.
P.W.B, 62/63, FAO Doc, C 61/3 page VI.
150 C 61/3 page III point 4.
16. 0 61/3 page 272.
170 C 65/3 page XIV.
18, See Provisional Report of the Council, 21 Nov, 1968 Annex Dp
Statement by the DG, page D-i.
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19, Ibid pRge Die) for strong support from the new DG.
March and Simon, Or anizations, op. cit., pRge 184.
Of the 21 project supervisors thot were interviewed 12
answered the question whether the IWT would serve as guidance
for the planning of projects in FAr or not, 10 answered it would
have small value, 2 tht it would hnve some. None answered it
would have large value,
See earlier in this paper, page 45-47
Provisional Report of the Council 21 Nov. 1968, page D i).
The Development Deportment is suggested to contain Regional
r- Service units.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PLANNING OF UNDP/FAO PROJECTS, 

We have studied policy-making in the organization from above,
the role of FAO leadership and the gene2'11 characteristics and
problems of planning in FAO, In this chapter we approach the
problem from below, looking first at the structure nnd the con-
tents of the project program. Then we turn to the problem of
how projects are generated and picked out for implementation,
A comparison of FAO and units in the environment, especially
UNDP in New York, will indicate the scope of FAO influence on
policy, Problems encountered in the search for projects will
be discussed and the organizntion's communicntion internally and
with the envirolunent will be looked into, A third pnrt of the
chapter will return to the macro level of analysis and look at
the effect it has that FAO operntes with two distinct progrnms,
the UNDP (Special Fund) and other activities under the Regular
Progrnm. At'last we will bring the thrends together by a study
of wide conflicting views on organizational planning in FLO.
1, Descri tion of the UNDP/FAO program, 

a) Number of rojects and budget allocations.
From the inception of UNDP to 31 December 1967 UNDP's
(overning Council has approved 315 projeJts for which FAO should
be the so-called executing agency 1)• Another 300 were formally
in the phase of preparation, and (the following numbers are more
or less guesswork) an additional 300 pended in the organization
ns possible suggestions. Probably around 1000 development projects,
more or less well defined were in other words in the planning
system of the organization, and n11 indicators show that this
number is incrensing. Of the 315 formally approved projects
about 170 were operational in 1967, and as these are registered
in detail, they will be the base of the following policy and
planning analysis.
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UNDP earmsrks funds for the spproved projects, and for the
315 mentioned above, 291 million dollprs were allotted. This makes
an overall avernge of 0.92 million dollars per project os the
following Table 8 indicntes. It also shows the number and the
average size of the projects approved each year from 1959onwards.
TLBT,F,8,
Number of approved projects and their average size


pr. year and in total.
195960616263 64 65 66 67


Number approved






Total


15 32 16 31 54 59 45 53 50 315
Averaaeiize






Overs
(in 0.83 0.78 0.81 0.89 0.81 0.86 1.10 1.16 0.84 0.92
The number of projects approved each year seems to have
tempornrily culminated in 1966, and earlier in 1960. This compares
to the movement of the upper line in Diagram 12 on the page 81
which shows points of culmination in the same years. .As Table 8
shows, the nverage size has increased quite evenly up to 1966
but then it fell back to the level of 1963/640 This may indicate
a change of policy because of dissatisfaction with the results
of the projects up to 1966, Several members of FAO have indi-
cated that this is so and that smaller, more flexible projects
will be the line from here on.
The earmarkings from UNDP include about 10 % overhead costs
to the executing ngencies, This 10 % goes to the divisions in
FAO that execute the projects and becsuse the reimbursement is
connected directly to the individual projects, the size and
number of projects a division has the responsibility for affects
the size and influence of the division. There is here probably
a mechanism strongly affecting the planning process in the
organization.
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The UNDP conceptin cf development-project activities also
contains the stipulation that an approximetely equal amount to
the earmarking should be furnished by the country ltself,
especially funds needed for local expenditures. The implementation
of this idea is highly variable and is affected by the countries'
Rbility to pay'. But on the whole it is probably realistic to state
thet the average size of the project in monetary terms is 1.5
million dollars.
Diagram 12 depicts the annual earmarkings made by UNDP for
projects executed by FAO. For all years exept 1961 and 1967 the
yearly total has increased. Compared to the allccations made
through the Regular Budget it is obvious that the Special Fund
program has been the most expansive.
MILL $
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DIAGRAM 12 

Development of earmarkings made by UNDP/SF
and expenditures by FAO.
/9.5
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Source: 1) FAO Project CetRlogue (SF) no. 21 aug. 21 1967
2) FAO Conference Report on Field .:,ctivities, Document
C/67/26, page 7.
.0 0.7
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How can we interpret this material? If we compare the curve for
earmarkings with the curve for expenditures nctually mede by
an interesting fenture appenrs, First of all the organi-
zation seems to have a stebilizing effect in relation to the funds
and resources that actually flow to the Projectcountries, If
fluctuations in earmarkings are a result of fluctuations in the
willingness of contributors to furnish funds, the international
organizations here pexform a service for the underdeveloped
countries.that is essential. By absorbine financial fluctuations
they make coherent planning and stable implementation of projects
possible.
However the stnbilizing effect may hinve another consequence.
The curve indicating earmnrkings makes severe drops in 1961
and in 1967, These reductions may •e an adjustment to
relatively stable (nnd slow?) ability to implement projects.
If the movement of earmarkings in the dingram is an expression for
the contributors, willingness to expand their contributions,
the expenditure curve may indicate a conservative.effect of the
organizational process, Hed FO been more efficient a larger
project pro=m might have been reality. The relative slowness
of expenditure increases mey of course have their cause in the
nbsorptive nbility of the underdeveloped countries concerned,
but studies of the World Bank indicate that this is not the case.
On the other hand it should be pointe out that 1966/67 might
be a breakthrough in the ability of F1,0 to implement projects.
Because most projects take about 5 years to complete, the effect
of consecutive aporovels and allocaton of earmarkings from unDp
has had a stronely c=ulative effect in FO. Considering that the
UNDP-projects in the beginning represented a radically new form
of activity, the organizntion had a hard time adjusting to the
impact, Because this impact now is being abooxbed, and because
a substantial number of projects now are being completed, a con-
servative effect on the project program size, if it has existed,
may disappear, especially if a political will tc increase the
resGurces of FO really exists,
- 8 3—
As noted in Chnpter 3, page 55, FiY) received in 1967 by far
the lnrgest part of the total UNDP program. In 1967 this part was
38.3 %. It had risen from 32 % in 1959 when the progrrm was
stnrted. This is another indicntor of the expansignist policy of
FAO in the field of development. Two important reasons cnn be
suggested nt this point.
The Director Generall B. R. Sen has himself opted for the
strong expansion line. Several of the unstructured interviews gave
support to the position that he has put considerable political
pressure on both member countries end on UNDP to ndopt more pro—
jects in agriculture.
In UN circles pgriculture hns (consequently?) become a more
snlient fenture in the structuring of develepment plans fJr under—
developed countries. Some also hold that this incrensing interest
in agriculture also is the cnse in many of the countries that
 need assistance. In a mnjor speech in FAO's Conference in 1963
President Nyerere of then Tangnnyika, strongly supported the im—
portance of ngriculture. However, the position is also in doubt,
Paul Sigmund in his introduction to the book "The Idcologies of
 the Developing Nations" states that most of the developing
countries stress the impgrtance of industrial development strong—
ly. It is in this connection, and becnuse agriculture hns such
primecy in development thinking, interesting to note the position
 
of Gideon Sjoberg of the CAG—group in Bloomington Indiann.
He postulates the need for an industrial—urban society if develop—
ment is to get under way and for this reason the need for social  
change in most underdeveloped countries. The policy of a streng
agriculturnl development is therefore seen as a danger because it
basically tends to conserve the existing social order, an order
thnt is detrimental to industrial development and
that makes it impossible for the society concerned to withstand
the specific ideological impact the assistance has, and therefore
makes it difficult for the country to develop its own industrial—
urban culture.
In this perspective the expansionist policy on the part of FAO,
as UN's specificolly agricultural orgnnization, becomes somewhat
more problematienl than the common notion of development seems to
imply. The role of pgricul+,ure, even in its technical sense
(more efficient production), is put unier question and the social
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aspects nnd social consequences of ogricultural development pro-
grams are brought to the fore as moybe the most importont aspects
to consider when planninE development projects, This of course
epplies to all kinds of projects, agriculturel or not,
It is worth noting that another of FAO's basic assumptions about
the development problem recently hns been put under serious scrutin
This is the assumption that a prerequisite for development is some
kind of birth or population control.6)A group of Swedish and
Norwegian authors hnve attempted to show that rapid economic
development often hes been relsted positively to a rapid growth
of the population, and that it rather is the Political and eco-
nomic system thnt hns the lorEest influence on development.
For them the socialist system seems to be sizperior, (They suggest
for example that while Ohina mainland and India are comporoble
in p0pulation growth China hns had R much more repid economic
development under a socialist economy, while Indis with n slower
development more has been under a system of trnditional democrncv.17
We see here several ways of viewing the contents of the expanding
FAO project progrRm,
b) Ty_p_e_s_af projects and their distribution.
The above resource anolysis gives an indication of the size
and the development of the UNDP/FAO program, Whet now is the
contents of it?
In 1959the Managing Director of UNDP emphasized the UN-
function of "faciliteting new enpital investments of all types
by creating conditions which would make such investments either
feasible or more effective",8)
The preinvestment concept that Hoffmnn thus introduced in the
work of the United Nations geve the Special Fund a function that
neither the 1.Torld Bank group of organizations nor the Epta had
hed, Preinvestment meant an integration of capital and expertise
in a kind of investigation or plonning function in the under-
9)developed countries themselves. 

-85--
The Managing Director further suggested that the nssistance
given through UNDP should take the form of surveys, research and
trnining, or demonstration nnd pilot projects o a combination
of these, 10)Of the 17 projects approved by the Governing
Council in 1939 for FAO-execution, 7 were concerned with prcblems
related to the use of water, 7 to the us.: of land, while 2 were
to construct marine research institutes and 1 was concerned with
agricultural trnining, 10 of the projects were of the survey
type, 4 pilot or technical projects and 3 resenrch and training,
This corresponds closely to the policy expressed by UN Generol
Assembly and by UNDP Managing Director. (We will return to the
question of the relntive influence of and UNDP on the program.)
From this bnse, how h,,s the subject-mntter of the projects
developed from 1959?
The following Table gives 3n overview. The classification is
bnsed on the organizationnl divisions.
TABLE 9
Subject-matter develcpment of the UNDP/FAO projects
Percent distribution


Subject-matter195919621965 1967 Totn1


Animal productioni
and henith:-79 14 10


Fishery12713 10 10


Forestry-2418 18 20


Rural Institution2399 4 9


Land and Water594031 40 34


Nutrition-22 4 3


Plant Production699 10 8


Economic Analysis-2 9 -6


Totnls100100100 100100


N.17N.31N=45 N=50N.287


Source: FIC) Specinl Fund Ontalogue No.
activities(067/26)page 8.
21,and Report on Field
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In Table 9 it can be noted that land and water projects by
far constitute the largest group, with forestry projects as a
good second. The table also indicates thnt Animal production and
health and Plant production are the only two fields in even
expansion, while Rurnl institution projects are the only ones
in sharp decline.-This information will -L.knder point 3 help us
study the effect the introduction of a distinctly new activity
has on a professionnl orunization, like FAO.
The UNDP/F0 projects can also be classified according to the
type of work they aim at within the subject matter field. In a
report on the field nctivities of FAO 11) the projects are de-
scribed in threc main categories.
Large scale survevs of notural resources and feasibility studies.
Projects for demonstration or trnining.
Projects within the field of applied research or technionl 

pilot projects.
A picture of the development of the work-methods {pplied in
the UNDP/FAO program-is given in the following table.
TABLE 10 

Development of UNDP/FAO project methods. Percentages.
Method 1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 Total
Training 6 16 19 20 6 26 9 14 16 11-
Research 12 28 58 43 41 18 33 16 31 28
Technical 24 16 0 13 18 31 31 39 39 27
Survey 58 40 53 24 35 25 27 31 14 31
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100


N=17 N=32 N=16 N=30 N=34 N=39 N=45 N=57 N=49 N=319
Source: UNDP(SF)/FAO project catnlogue No, 21, 21 august 1967.
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From the right hand column we see that survey projects are
the largest Eroup on the average while training projects consti-
tute the smallest. However, training is an important aspect of
most of the projects, All of them include some indignous personnel
on their staff, and tho training of these "counterportsu to con-
tinue project work when FAO/UNDP.pulls o is essential.
Over 1/4 of the projc'cts fall within the research category,
These projects are usually concerned with developing agriculturol
faculties within universities or with establishing new research
centers. FAO hos now and th 12)en been criticized for its highly
scientific approach to agricultural development. From Table 10
it can be seen that fimm a high around 1962/63 the size of the
research group of projects has declined somewhat, To gst o more
concentrRted picture of the change of methods we can divide table
10 in two in the following
TYBLE
Tlianncr,
11.


Time cut 1963 and 1967 on developmentof UNDP/-PAO methods


Percentages


Method


1959/63 1964/67
Training,demonstration 12 16
Research


34 24
TechnicalDilet projects!1 15 35
Surveys


39 25


; 100 100
Totals


1N=129 1N.190
From the period 1959/63 to the period 1964/67 training and
demonstration projects have increpsed in relative importance,
while reseprch projects have declined markedly together with the
survey-type of projects, Technical oilot projects on the other
hand, have more than doubled t'aeir relptive importnnce. These
projects are designed to "solve technicp1 problems, improve 13
manufacturing tecnniques and productivity in processing industrieso"
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We note that the weight on so enlled tachnicnl projects has
been increasing while reseerch nnd survey projects have been de-
clining in relative importance. Illthough we will look closer at
the organizntional aspects of this policy in the next section,
the change seems to indicate a tendency away from the nnpping
and study phase of the program towards tne implementntion and
building phase. This may of course be judged in any way one likes,
but if questions of bnsic policy nre agreed upon, implementation
of projects that physically and economically effect the project
countries directly can only be applauded. But if policy questions
are still open nnd if it is correct thnt basic social and poli-
tical factors relavant for any development progrem  heve  nct ex-
plicitly been discussed or negotiated, the implementation of
"technical" projects seems more dubious. It seems to be projects
of the study type that cnn bring out these nspects of develop-
ment in a specific region, and make possible rntionnl decisions.
The technical projects on the other hand to e large degree pre-
suppose such decisions. , 14)
c) The geogra hicn1 distribution of projects.
By comparing the project activities of 1W with the whole
United Nations Development Progrnm, Special Fund sector, we are
nble to get hold of some indicators of the relative role the two
organizations have in the planning of development projects,
The resolution 15)estnblishing The S-ecinl 
Fund clearly stated
the political or rnther apolitical gonls of the progrnm.
It said that due conSideration should be sivento
a wide geographical distribution over a period of years
16)
non-interference in the internal nffairs of the project
countries.
not attaching politicel conditions to the projects.
At the same time certain other principles were of a more
active and political nature,
1) Consideration should be given tc urgency of needs.
This principle may obviously come in conflict with the idea of
a wide geogrnphical distribution, especially if the limited re-
sources nvnilable to UNDP And the efficiency of the Organization
are taken into considerntion,
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2) Projects should be integratod into nationnl development plans,
and project work should be coordinated pt the international
level. This principle also seems to imply political dedisions
in the organizations thot plan the projects However, whether
such decisions actually are mede or not is an empirical question.
The foregoing analysis seems to indicate that integration and
coordination of project policy is so far not very successful,
in other words thPt the political power of the organizations
involved is small,
The overall regional distribution of the UNDP/Special Fund
program and changes over the yenrs is given in the following
table,
TABLE 12.
R= requests
A. npprovnls
UNDP project requests and approvals
by region.
Change over time.


1959
% of R % A
1965
of R% A
19671
% of R
Africa 28 8 3941 4111
The Americas 23 31 2728 31
Asia, Far East 25 31 19 24 23
Europe 4 7 6 5 4
Middle East 19 15 9 2 1
Inter regional 1 8 0 0 0


100 100 100100 100


N=164 N=44 N=1181N.82 N=108
% approved


27


69


In total
% A
43 i
18 !
26
7 1
6
0
100
881
% of R % A
34 36
25 25
26 25
9 7
6 7
100 100
N=1422 N=873


61
From Ppril to octobe
Per 30 sept. 1967.
Source: Annual reports from UNDP Managing Director.
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The tnble indicates the relationship between proj cts requested
and projects approved for each region. From receiving 8 % of the
approvals in 1959, Africa was allotted 43 % of the prcjects in
1967, and has of a total of 873 projects received 36 % or 317
projects. The large discrepancy between requests nnd approvals in
1959 is explained by lack of pertinent information in the requests
from the Africnn governments.17)In 1967 there was a sharp decline
in allotments to South and 0entrnl America, but overall this region
has received about 1/4 of all UNDP/SF projects. About the same
portion has gone to Asia and the Far East. The poorer countries in
Europe have received around 7 %. It is interesting to note the
decline in both requests and approvels from 1959 to 1967 in the
Middle Enst region. Is this a reaction to the political diffi-
culties in the region, and the fnct that USSR and other socialist
states view some of the Specialized Agencies of the UN in a politic-
al, mainly capitalist context?18)From this unnnswered question,
let me turn to the regional distribution of operntional UNDP/FAC
projects, We find the.following distribution.
TABTJF, 13.
Regional distribution of UNDP/F.A0 projects.
Percentages
Region 1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 Total
Asia 17 20 19 35 31 29 29 28
Africa 25 30 19 12 44 26 45 31
Middle East 33 10 19 19 3 6 3 11
Europe 8 10 5 0 0 3 3 4
America 17 30 38 34 22 36 20 26
	
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Totals
	
N=12 N=10 N=21 N=26 N=32 N=35 N=31 N=167
Compnring the right hand column in this tnble to the same column
in Table 12 we find thnt FAO is somewhat more favorable to the Asian
region, the Middle Eastern countries, and about equally interested
in the Americas as UNDP as the whole. FAO is however less engaged
in Africa and in Europe. But it is interesting to note that in 1960
the percentage going to Africa through FAO was already at 25 %.
Either the information problem was rapidly overwon, or else it was
all the time unimportant. The rather large fluctuations in the table
from year to year is pnrtly explained by the large-project policy
of the UNDP,
From 1960 to 1966 Asia and Africa have both increased their
relative part of the FAO program. In the Middle East the reduction
has been drastic, while in Europe the size of the program has de-
clined considerably, It is noteworthy that in 1968 the new Director
General of FAO, the dutchman Boerma, has expressed himself favor-
ably for a new interest in the European part of the program.19)
To get a somewhat clearer picture of the policy behind the
geogrnphical distribution of UNDP/FO projects, let us first compare
the distribution of projects to the distribution of population in
the project countries Both the FO/SF program, the whole UNDP/SF
program and the EPTA program will be compared to the population
in the project countries.
TABLE 1/1
Project distribution compared to popul
Percentages.
Region UNDP/SF UNDP/FA7)
tion distribution, 1961,
EPTti Population 1
in roj. countr,
Asia and the
Far East
Africa
Middle East
Europe
The Americas
Interregional
Total
	
25 28 (20) 35 57
	
36 3", (36) 15 15
	
7 11 (10) 4
	
7 4 (4) 6 8
	
25 26 (30) 26 16
0 2 0
	
100 100 100 9\ 100
	
N=873 1 N=167 1 N=12000", N=1312

 90 countries having UND2/FAO projects. See Annex...

 EPTA experts in 1960.



 million inhabitants-




The percentages in brackets are based on registered UNDP ear-


markings for 351 projects in
31.Jan,1968),and distort
the
the
FAO system (FAO Catalogue No022,
UNDP/FAO distribution further
in relation to p.9pulJti=,
Sources SF, Table 12, "PAO,able 13, EPT., Sharp, Field Admini-
-sTration in th-e-UN system, Priger i961, Population,
Russetts World Handb,,op, cit., figures from 1960.• _
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If a location of projects relative to population size is a goal
of the UN system it appears in the table thot EPTA is closest to
oal fulfilment in Asia and Africa, the total SF-program farthest
away from it and FAO in betweon. In the Middle Enst The Special
Fund is closest, FAO/UNDP again in between. In Europe FAO/UNDP is
farthest off, while in South and Central all UN allocotions
exceed the relative population size by 10 %. The•general conclusion
is that this part of the UN system obviously favors Africo, the
Middle East and Latin America, and disfavors Asia if population
size is used as a measure for equitable distribution of resources.
(The analysis also indicates a certain autonomy for each of the
(.1 UN agencies in the planning of SF-projects).
Let us briefly look at the intraregional distribution of
UNDP/FAO projects, in South America and in Africa
1. South America.
A scattergram of 10 project countries in South Americo, located
in the diegram in relation to project allocations horizontally and
per coput income (in 100$) vertically, turns out as follows.
DIAGRAM 13.
Relationship
Der caput
_ncome
1957
Source:
World
Handbook
op.cit.,
per caput income/project allocotions
600 4
500 0 3 5
400
0 7
300
6° o
8200
100
o o21
	
10
prcject allocations
Source: Projoct Catalogue No.21,
1. Bolivia,2. Paraguay, 3, Uruguay,
6.Brazill 7. Chile,8.Columbia,
in South Americo,
mill $ X
op.cit.
page 149.
4.
9.
Venezuela,5.Argentin
Ecquador,10. Peru
-93-
We notice first of all that Bolivia and Paraguay in the left
hand corner are the two countries with the smallest per caput
income and by far the smallest project allocations over the
UNDP/FAO program ns of august 1967. N3 data on the reasons for
this have been collected, but whether or not for example the re-
volution in Bolivia in 1952 and the establIshment of the National
Revolutionary Movement as the dominant lendership in the country
has played a role is not known, In Parnguay, with the military in
full dictntorial control, the ipolitical situation is quite differ-
ent to the one in Bolivia. Lny coherent reason for small UNDP/FLO
allocations at this level of explanation is obviously difficult. 20)
Otherwise the countries fnll within the theory: The poorer the
countries' inhabitants the larger the UNDP/FLO project allocations.
In this greup of 8 countries the best fitting linenr curve has the
form: Y 6.88 - 0.54X and the Pearsons correlation coefficient21)
r = -0.77. Thus the per cnput income in the country explains
r2 = 0.59, or 59 % of the variation in project allocations.
2, Africa. 

A comparable plotting of the Afrionn project countries according
to per caput income and project all0cations gi-Tes the fbllowing
picture. We note in Diagrams 13 and 14 that while per caput income
spans from $100 to $600 in South America, the bulk of the countries
in Africa fall within $50 to $100. While 6 % of the registered
countries in South Lmerica receive more than 5 million dollars in
project allocations, only 30 % of the Å'\frican countries receive
that large an amount.
DIGRLM_14.
Relationship per caput income/project allocations
in some African nations.
180 Per caput
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1.Congo 7.
2. Central African Republic 

3, Burundi 

4.Togo 10,
5. Libya 11,
6. Cameroon 12.
Congo Brazzaville 13. Somalia
ULanda 14. Nigeria
Madagascar 15. Ghana
Tanzania 16, Morocco
Ethiopia 17, Egypt
Kenya 18, Sudan.
Sources: Same as Diagram 13, page 92.
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In this diagram the countries seem to gether in two groups.
In the lower left hand group, with small per caput income, the
large majority of countries receive less than 4 million dollars
in project allocntions, f week tendency to allocate larger amounts
to poorer countries can also be discerned in this group. If we
compute Pearsons correlation coefficient 2or the distribution of
the lower left hand group of countries we find it to be r = 0.29
or r2 = 0.08. Thus the correletion is very small and other factors
are much more important in deciding project allocations,
However, the group in the top right corner, Ghana, Morocco
and Egypt, seem to negate the general theory, the pocrer the
country the larger the ellocations. Of the poor African nations
only Sudan receives larger allocations than these three. This may
indicate that the larger and more developed of the poor countries
are in a better position to present their pleas in the inter-
national society, and that this superior ability has influence
on the allocntion of project resources It may of course also in-
dicate a preference or n large interest in these countries in the
organization aiding in the preparation of project requests.
On the other hand quite another distribution may appear if
project allocations were compared to size of population in the
project countries. This has not been done in the present study,
but if we look at a compnrable dimension, the total GNP in
these African countries and compare this variable to project
allocations we find the following distribution.
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We note that countries 1, 11, 15 end lb (see list under Diagram
14) constitute a separate group, distributed such that the richest
countries receive the least project allocetions. But in total we
must conclude that there is no distinct relation between the wealth
of a nation and whet it receives in project resources from UNDP/F.;i0.
There must be other mechnnisms nt work influencing the allocation,
or perhaps it is more or lHss haphazard. J lack of operntional
development policy might of course lend exactly to this result.
While it might be natural te concentrnte on the poorest countries
first, a disconnected planning process, with each division in FAO
quite independent in project policy making, would naturally in
total lend to a random selection of countries according to wealth
- as the diagrams 14 and 15 indicete.;
3. Asia.
For Asian project countries comparable information on per
caput income, population etc, is scanty, but some wenk indi-
cntions of correlations could be found. 22)
Population.To take this variable fi2st, a very slight relat-
ionship between populntion size and project allocntions in
positive direction appears for 14 countries thnt were listed
in Russetts World Handbook.
GNP er cn ut. Here the situation ressembles the 3ne depicted
for Africa, but the deviant group is in the left hand corner,
thus generally conforming with the theory of more allocntions
to poorer countries,
of o ,ulation in ngriculture. Most.of the 14 Asian
countries hnve between 70 % and 90 % of their populntion in
agriculture. H3wever, n wenk tendency of larger allocntions to
cuntries with somewhat lower % in ngriculture can be dis-
cerned, but it is not significant, small group of Asian
countries with around 50/60 % in agriculture reccive quite small
allocations compared to the majority of others.
These data indicate the conclusion that FAO and UNDP are
concerned with allocating projects to countries in relation to
their needs. However, the data als0 show thnt countries that
nre relntively rich and large seem to hnve an advnntnge
in one way or another, Whether this is through better ability
to present information nnd argue their cnuse in the organizations
concerned, or whether.it is becnuse they are fnvored because
of other standards of evnluation than economic poverty, is not
known. Overall, however, needs measured in the mncro economic
terms used here (GNP, GNP per cnput, % population in agriculture
etc.) don't show any systematic influence on planning of project
policy.
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d) The recruitment and geographical distribution of experts
and project mnrin ers,
The following study of the nntionnlity nnd professional
structure of the operationnl UNDP/FAO nrojects is meant on the
one hand to show the cultural impnct of the project progrnm,
on the other to serve ns n bnse for the study of some of the
values present in th2 orgnnizational planning process, It is
believed thnt the different nationnlity groups (See Table 15,)
represent relatively distinct administrntive, economic and po-
litical traditions, and thRt these traditions more or less nre
transferred with the expert to the project environment. To
what degree the experts vnlues are nbsorbed is an onen question,
but in general, the more experts and th2 longer their stay the
larger the impact, It is of course also an open question
explicitly what impact a,German, a Russian cr nn Americnn extler'.
has, a auestion that eould be studied through individual project
approaches. But here differences in impact will be taken for
grented, with all the dnngers of subjectivism end feult this
implies,
FLO is generally believed to be a universal; professional,
and non-political organiation. We will in the following para-
grmphs try to show to what degree this is the case. Whet are
in other words the criterie for end the velues behind the choice
and distribution of projects, nnd whnt influence does the.organi-
zntionnl system have on this process of generation nnd distri-
bution of scarce resources?
First Where do the =EW experts and project managers come
from in the world? The following table gives a general answer,
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TABLE15.
NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERTS AND PROJECT
MNAGERS ON 170 UNDP/FAO PROJECTS.
NATIONALITY 1.
Abs
Project
Mana ers
o
2. Experts
Abs
*USSR 3 2 45 3
*Japan 1 1 24 1
China 3 2 21 1
India 3 2 57 3
Other Asian 15 8 144 8
TOTAL ASIANS 25 15 291 16
TOTAL AFRI=S 4 2 12 1
Israel 2 1 20 1
Arab 2 1 24 1
TOTAL MIDDIE EAST 4 2 44 2
Eastern Europe 7 4 61 3
*UK 32 18 341 19
*France 17 10 172 10
*Italy 6 4 60 3
*Germany 6 4 73 4
Scandinavia 13 7 104 6
Other West European21 13 253 14
TOTAL EUROPEAN 102 60 1 64 59
South America 6 4 74 4
Central America 1 1 20 1
*USA 22 13 249 14
*Canada 6 3 52 3
TOTAL AMERI=S 35 21 395 22
GRAND TOTAL 170 100 1806 100
Source: PFb:SF/67,31 July 1967


*) large powers
55 % of the PMs, 57 % of the experts come frcm the large powers.
Experts per project (mean): 10.6.
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Looking first under point 2 in the tnble we see thnt 16 %
of the experts are of Asian origin. hardly any of African, and
Middle Eastern (3 %) while the very large majority are Europenns
(59 %), The iden thnt FAO, through its expert program at least,
is dominated by Americans is not supported by this material,
Americans + Canadians constituting 17 % of the experts. Within
the European group UK alone represents 19 %, so it cnn safely
be said thnt the English impnct is strong. Of 1806 experts in
-all, 341 are of this origin. And if the program is dominated
by anyone it is by Europeans with 1064 experts and 102 project .
manngers.
The first column in the Table, which is computed 0n the bnsis
of the 170 project managers, shows a striking fenture. The per-
centages are close to identionl to those in column 2, How cnn
this be explained?
If the universe of possible expert/project mannger choices
is structured the snme way on the dimension of nationnlity, if
only professionnl criteria are used when choosing, and if
nationality nnd supply of experts are unrelated, then the table
shows near perfect randomness of choice in relation to nntionali-
ty. All this seems very unlikely,
The table may indicate the existence of a very well specified
key for the nationality distribution of experts and project
manngers, so strict thnt professionnl considerations must be
quite secondnry, especially if it is as lifficult to find
possible experts as is often snid in FAO. If this is the case
(it also has a certnin unlikehiness about it) then the question
isp what is the bpsis for this key, 60 % Europeans, 20 % Americans
and 15 % Asians etc.? Docs it for example represent a political
preference of the members of FAOr or a preference on the part
of FAO and/or UNDP?
After having presented the tnble and asked the same questions
to the FAO secretariat we got t'ae following answer from the
Director of tho Personnel Division: 23)
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"1. In principle, for certain politicel and budgetary rensons,
international orgenizations end FJO try to balance the staffine
of field projects fron the nationality point of view.
From the budgetnry point of view, for instence, it should be
noted thnt international organizntions try to utilize the
currency made Gvailatle by the voluntar contribution of Member
Governments to UNDP, by buying eqllipment, etc,
2. However. it should be noted that the difficulties of
recruitment of specialists not only oualified technically but
also linguistically and with previous experience in developing
countries, complicntes to a greet extent the recruitment tnsk
of internationnl organzntions, :n fact, thn tnbulation prepared
by mr, Gran refleets very much the conditions of the labour
market of qualified experts rether thnn the result of n definite
nationality recruitment policy.
Therefore, stntistionlly speaking, it is quite normel that
the number of experts and project managers coming from the same
country is more or less similar,"
In the next section e similnr indication as the one in Table
15 of the netionality distribution in the FAO secretarint will
be given. Maybe thc expert distribution has a similar counter—
part in the secretariat?
The general conclusion from :?able 15 is that the European,
not the American element is p:ceponderate and that within the
European group the British compose by far the largest subgroup.
AS we shall see later many indicetors show thnt this group is
largely recruited from enrlier coloninl administrators.
Let us take a closer look at the European group of experts
and study how it is distributed in the main regions of UNDP/FAO
operations. The followine tnbles give a picture of this, the
first one showing hole each national expert group is distributed,
the second one showing how the whole expert group in each
region is composed.
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TABT,F, 16 A.
Euro ean ex erts distributed •n lorc'ects throu ,hout the world
% computed vertically.
Experts East Scnndin- Other westBritish French Italian Germa
	
European avian EuropeanRe ion
Asia 33 25 7 3 33 41 23
Africa 39 34 48 33 21 14 34
Middle East 10 14 14 12 8 13 13
Europe 2 4 9 5 3 6 2 '
(1111
, douth/Central
	
16 23 22 47 35 23 28America
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100 Abs.
totaL
	
N=61 N=319 N=162 N=60 N=73 .104 =246 1026
No. of projects
with type of 23. 65 33 17 31 28 59 256
expertsN=172
TABLE 16  B.
Distribution of European experts in the five main regions of
FAO operntions.
% computed horisontally.
- Experts
Region:
EasternOtherBritish French, Italian German ScandTotalsEur. Eur.
Asia 8 33 5 1 10 19 23 99 N=239
Africa 7 32 23 6 4 4 24 00 N=342
Middle East 5 34 17 5 5 10 24 100 N=129
Europe 2 25 32 ,
	
o 4 13 17 99 N= 48
South/Central 3 28 13 11 10 9 26 100 N=268America
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It can be seen. (in 16 A.) that only the ScandinRvians and
the Germans are without their 1Rrgest group in Africa, while in
contrast the French noarly hnve hnlf of all their project experts
in this region. We note also the relatively large % of the French
group on European projects. It is tempting to draw a line to the
gaullist European policy. Turning to the Italian contingent we
note the extremely low % in Asia and the extremely large % in
South America, a distribution that mny coincide with the Itnlian
knowledge about and contact with this continent. Lastly the
Scandinavians are highly concentrated in the Asian region. The
general impression is thnt FAO seeks to avoid "difficult" politic-
al c.ombinntions in the structuring of projects for the different
regions.
In the second percentage-table (16 B.) we see that the British
constitute about 1/3 of the total group gf experts to ench region,
except in Europe where they represent 1/4. Here on the other hand
the French constitute about 1/3. We see also that "other West
European countries" represent a substantial part of each of the
regional contingents.
Now sending European experts to the developing regions they
are most acquainted with might not wholly.further the cause of
good projects. In a technical administrative sense it seems
efficient, the experts know the language, the geographical region,
etc. But in a politionl, sooial sense perhaps not. "Unacquainted"
experts are more unbound, they probably pose more daring questions
and perhaps further more novel solutions to central problems.
If this is the case a rnndom distribution of experts in terms
of nationality and social background would seem relevant, using
professional competence and nbility to identify with the needs
of recipient countries as central criteria for choice.
As a last picture of the regional distribution of experts
we have data on 88 ScandinRvian experts, (Scandinavia here
defined to include Finland and iceland). These data present the
following distribution.
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TABLE 17.
Location of Scandinavian experts (in %)
horizontall
Region Asia Africa Middle E. Europe S. America Total
Ex erts 1 2 3 4 5
Norwegian 32 15 10 8 37 100 N. 38
Swedish 56 11 11 11 11 100 N= 18
Danish 15 20 35 5 25 100 N= 20
Finnish 57 29 - - 14 100 N= 7
Icelanders 60 20 - - 20 100 N= 5
36 16 15 7 26 100 N= 88
o verticall
Region Asia Africa Middle Europe South
Ex erts
East America Total
Norwegian 38 . 36 31 50 61 43
Swedish 31 14 15 33 9 20
Danish 9 29 54 17 22 23
Finnish 13 14 - - 4 8
Icelanders 9 7 - - 4 6
	
100 100 100 100 100 100
	
N=32 N=14 N=13 N=6 N=23 N=88
We note that the largest group of Swedes is in Asia while the
largest group of Norwegians is in South America (supposedly on
fishing projects). The Danes on tho other hand are concentrated
in the Middle East, while the Finns and Icelanders are on Asian
projects first of all. In the second table we note the preponder-
ance of Norwegians, even if Ncrway both in population and GNP is
smaller than Sweden and Denmark.
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We hnve in the preceding parnErnphs Enined n picture of the
recruitment and pincement policy of U1TDP/Fi1‘0 in the operetion of
development projects. We hnve the impression thnt in one sense
attempts nre mnde to nvoid political contrasts between the project
and its environment. What is the situntion within the projects?
Taking the five main regions F0 operates in, we have looked at
ench project and registered how many regions were represented by
one or more experts.
The result was the following table.
T.L,BLF, 18.
The re ional s,read of ex erts er ro.ect.
No. of regions represented
on each project 1 2 3 4 5
% of projects 15 36 40 8 1 100 N.170
51 % of the projects have one or two regions represented while
9 % have four or five. /gnin an indicator of a very cnreful policy
of cultural integration nppenrs. The number of regions represented
on the average is 2.4.
The professionnl background of the totn1 number of experts
registered (1806, see Table 15) will not be given, only the project
manngers will be studied 0n this variable. However, we are inter-
ested in the development of the number of experts trained in the
social sciences since the start of the Special Fund/FAO program.
in 1959/60, becnuse this gives an indication of the interest in
the organization for the social aspects and social consequences
of the project implementations. Although the classification was
difficult because of differing and unprecise terminology in the
catalogues used, the fellowing Table gives a picture of this
development.
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TABLE 18' 

Experts trained in the Social Sciences on
	
UNDP/FAO projects.(Assignments per year).
Year196061626364656667Total
1. Number
assigned33817132820496
?.No.of projects121021263235314171
started.
Coefficient
	
0.25 0.330.38 0,65 0.40 0.80 0.651.000.56
The table indicates a close to even increase in the recruit—
ment of this group of experts, and under the assumption of equal
number of experts per project, their relative importance has
also increased somewhat, as the coefficient indicates. However,
the total, 96, is only a little more than 5 % of the total number
of experts on the 171 projects. As we shall see later, this group
of experts is also located on projects solely under Rural Insti—
tutions Division, thus in little contact with the more technical
projects (dambuilding, pilot farms, land and water development
etc.)
Let us move one step closer the FAO lendership question by
studying the distribution of project managers (PMs). First of
all how are the project managers distributed regionally?
The following table shows how four main groups of PMs (and their
projects) have been placed. (The table giving the overall picture
is attached as Annex 5.).
tak
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Scandinavia 2 3 2 3


2 1 13
United






Kingdom 1 7 12 2 1 1 4 4 32
USA 1 4 5 4


6 2 22
TOTAL 4 16 19 9 2 1 12 7 70
From this table we get certain indications of UNDP/FAO policy,
(it is believed by this student that FAO is practically alone in
deciding this location of different nationalities), and it tells
a.little about the possibility FAO has to locate different nation-
alities at random (thereby achieving a kind of political integrat-
ion). (Of course full randomness would not be professionally.fea-
sible, taking into account the need for the managers to know the
project region and. culture, and the advantage it is that he speaks
the indigenous language.) However, the table indicates the scope
of cultural or multinational integration that FAO accomplishes
through the projects0
We note that of 3 Russian managers 2 are on projects in relative-
ly small Asian countries and the other on a project in Eastern
Europe. The integrative effect is not striking. We secondly note
that the Scandinavian group is extremely well spread in all regions
outside Europe. We note also that 8 % of the total number of pro-
jects (13 of 171) are led by Scandinavian managers, Turning to
the British they again clearly are the largest group, and also
the group with widest spread. There is also a clear concentration
in Africa with 38 % of the British managers on projects in this
region.
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However, as we have noted earlier, (page 90), Africa also has
the largest number of projects, thus maybe explaining part of the
British "preference" for Africa. The Americans on the other hand
have their largest group of managers in South America. From the
right hand column we see that 54 of all the projects, or 32 % of
171, are anglo-american led.
The conclusion is that there is an obvious preference for
putting project managers in places where they have the best know-
ledge or the largest interest in working. Thus Amerirans prefer
South America, the British Africa where they earlier hnve been
engaged in a number of colonial ndventures, and Russians in Asia
and Eastern Europe. The Scandinavians also fulfil their image of
professional, internationally oriented neutrals.
However, an equally strong conclusion is that the integrative
effect present in the location of project managers is strong and
undeniable.
By combining information on the distribution of project managers
with informntion on the distribution of experts we find an express-
ion both for the degree of cultural integration in the relationship
PM/experts and an expression for the authority relationships in
the project program, authority measured in relative control that
project manngers have over experts from other regions. The follow-
ing table shows the nationality distribution of experts under
each group of project managers. The nbso:ute numbers are given
together with percentage computntions both horizontally and
vertically.
It cnn be noted that 66 % of the experts under Russian project
manngers are Asian, 72 % of the experts under British leadership
are European while 47 % of the experts under U.S. leadership nre
American. A tentntive conclusion is thnt the larger the super-
power the more authority it has over experts from foreign regions,
when the superpower is working in the sphere of international
development.
In general it is more common than not to put experts under
the control of their "own" project managers. The only two groups
of project managers that have more "foreign" experts under their
control than their "own" eperts are the U.S. Americans and Asians
from relatively small Asian powers (Other Asian).
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From the table over vertical percentages we sec thRt 31 % of the
American experts are controlled by U.S. project managers, 37 %
of the European experts by British PMs while 27 % of the Asian
experts are controlled by Project Managers from relatively small
Asian nations. If we sum up we find thnt 43 % of the Asian expertsp
49 % of the American experts and 69 % of the European experts are
controlled by their "own" project managers (Asian, American,
European project managers respectively).
We can sum up this information by grouping together the differ-
ent nationalities of managers and experts from the three main region
Asia, Europe and America. We then see clearly how experts from these
regions are allotted to managers from the same regions.
TABLE 20 B.
Regional distribution (in of experts and managers
within'the projects.
Nationality
Pro'ect mana er' Asian Euro
Nationality of experts.
eanAmerican
Asian 43 14 10
European 38 69 37
American 16 12 49
Source: Table 20 A.



While 14 % of the European experts are under Asian leadership,
38 % of the Asian experts are under F,uropean leadership. This may
well have its cause in the perceived recruitment possibilities,
but it clearly indicates the Europenn preponderance.
It is from the above analysis clear that in the planning of
development projects the question of how to structure the projects
in terms of nationality combinntions is equally important to the
question of professional structure of the projects, and that the
organization in this sense has to engage in political evaluations.
These evaluations tend in the direction of "avoid contrasts" and
although these conclusions are normative, we dare say again that
the above materiel indicates a hesitant policy of cultural inte-
gration.
The importance of the European element in the project program
may have many reasons. The organization heedquarters is situeted
in Europe, more specifically in Rome, a factor that may attract
more European applications and larger European recruitments than
from other regions. If however only professional considerations
were of importance, we believe that the American element would
be stronger than it is because of the extremely large educptional
capacity of the US. However, Americans may not be as tempted to
apply for work in FAO as for example Europeans. The importance
of Europeans may also be related to the dissolution of European
cblonies. It seems natural to believe that colonial administrators
not wanting to return to their home countries would apply to FAO
or a similer organization for work they feel they know how to do.
In many of the unstructured interviews held in the orgenization
information to this effect was givon. Several informants added
that those applying often did so beceuse they would have social
and employment difficulties if they returned to their home
country, and that FAO for this reason was " a haven for unsuccess-
ful and unhappy colonial administrators".
We cen study theso problems a little further by looking at how
the different project manngers are graded. Grades in the oruni-
zation range from Director General (DG) down through Directors (D),
Professionals (P) to General Service (GS). The relevant scope
within the project program is highest D2 lowest P3. The following
table shows some interesting data. We note first that the British
have an exceptionally low percent in the D1 and D2 classes and
a relatively high percent in the P4 class. The picture is exactly
opposite for the French project managers. - The Asians are highly
concentrated in the middle group, P5, while the Scandinavians are
strong on both sides, D1 and P4.
The distributions may indicate a professional quality-evaluation
of the personnel nssigned to the projects.
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What professions do the project managers belong to and what
is the relative importnnce of the different professions? Let us
look nt the distribution over time end make seme comments about
it, We note in the following table that agriculturalists naturally
enough form the lnrgest group, representing overall 50 % of the
project managers. Although information is missing, it would be
of interest to study from what social strata these experts are
recruited because a centrel idea in administration studies is
that their identifications are of importance for what problems
they find interesting and for what groups in the environment they
define as clients to the organization. 24)
1!1.1k The next largest group is the engineers. Their ideas about
successful projects most likely fall within technical categories
(like much irrigation water using little energy, dnms thnt don't
break down and technically efficient farm machinery). Their inter—
est in social and cultural problems (how does the introduction
of a specinl kind of farm machinery affect the social relation—
ehips in n community etc.) is usually small,
Economists and sociel scientists (seciologists) occupy about
equally many positions as project managers, We believe there are
significant differences between micro and macro oriented econom—
ists concerning the values nnd goals they deem important, but
unfortunately, the material this student had access to did not
differentiate. Economists naturally study problems and council
clients using economic measures for what is good, what is R
successful project etc. Social scientists on the other hand see
the different elements of projects in relation to the effect they
might have on interpersonal and cultural factors in the specific
environment the project is located, Their criteria of success,
of useful goals etc, are much vaguer than the other professional
groups here mentioned They probably function more as a mediator
of contact and as an adjustment factor betw3en project and social
environment,
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Developmental trends in Table 22 are difficult to discern,
but we note the increased number of engineers employed by FÅ0
from 1964 to 1966. The employment of social scientists Rs project
managers may be dwindling, but the smRll numbers in the Table
make any such statements very uncertain. The overall conclusion
is that the distribution represents a good stRrting point for
efficient team work, especially if it represents a norm for most
project employments, (The project managers of course have little
interaction between themselves).'
TI'IBlE 22d
Recruitment of professionals
(Project Managers)
Absolute
lawibers
Profession PM
YeRr ofect a roval
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67Total %
Economist
Engineer
Natural science
Social science 2 2 3 1 2 2 1
Agriculture 2 5 9 20 I 17 15 7
( Veterinary 6 1 1 4 3
Total 1110 20 26 32 32 20
7 I 6 12 17 21 21 12!
17
25
11
16
6 4
14 9
77 50
1 5 1 0
15 4 	 1 00
100
1
2
4
3 3 2 6 3
1 1 4 1 7 5 6
2 4
If we study the relationship between profession of PM and project
type (see Annex 6 for tabular presentation), we find indicRtions that
economists and'engineers most often lead survey projects while natural
scientists and sosiologist lead research type projects. One of five
training projects are lsd by social science trained managers, while
none of the survey projects are led by this type of managers. Only 3
of 100 pilot projects have social science leaders.
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Looking at the total number of experts trained in the
social sciences the picture is somewhat different.
TIÆLF, 23.
Experts trained in social science related
to type of project
Research Survey Training Pilot
No.of experts 26 31 27 12
No.of projects 10 18 7 7
Ratio1:2 2.6 1,7 3.9 1.7
The weight of this type of expert is again largest in training
projects, second largest in research and smallest in Survey and
Pilot projects, All types of projects however have some contact
with this type of personnel.
AS was seen in the nationality analysis of the project
managers (page 112) the study of their grades could be used as
indicators of the evaluation of the different groups. (Whether
the grades also indicate authority distribution is an open
question thnt only can be answered through nn empirical study
of authority). If we make the snme study but this time in
relation to the professions, the following table can be constructed.
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We note the very high percentnge of economists and social
scientists in the Dl class. The one project manager in the D2 clpss
is within the social science category. We note also thnt engineers
nre most henvily skewed toward the lower grade P4 and that the
only manager in the P3 class is an agriculture man. However,
taking the large size of this group into 3onsideration this is
not a significant expression for the organization's evaluation
of this group. The size speaks more clearly, ( 39 % of all the
D1's are agriculturalists.)
We have in the preceding pnragraphs gained a picture of how
the accumulated FO/UNDP project structure looked around the
middle of 1967. We have seen how the :isian region has been with-
held from a relative shnre of project resources, mainly because
of China mainland not being a member of the UN system,
The projects have in later yenrs tended towards a more technic-
al character with implementation of relatively concrete under-
takings ns the main line of work. Study and survey projects have
seen a decline. 1-A the same time however, the interest for insti-
tutional and social aspects of development projects has increased.
Rural institutional problems hpve come more into focus, and the
recruitment of personnel trained in subjects related to the social
sciences has increased, nt least in relation to number of projects
started per year. However, the importance of this group of per-
sonnel in the organizationRS a whole is still minute,
The cultural bnckground of the FfiO/UNDP projects, that is the
basic ideas about the individual's relation to the collectivity,
the structure of the good society, the role of leadership, of
education and perhaps also of religion, is basically European.
and especially British, European experts are on all projects,
Europeans arc leaders on more than half of the projects and thus
control the actions of one of every two experts assigned to pro-
jects by FAO. The impact of this European orientntion may well
be very large; and distinct, especially if it is correct that
many of the experts are earlier colonial administrators. In gene-
ral it seems that a more detailed and sociological study of the
recruitment of experts to development projects (and to the FAO
administration) would be o:r interest if we want to understand
the political, economic and ideological implications of the
-118-
project program.
The projects were as we have seen highly spread. 90 developing
nations are involved and ench receives a few million dollars in
project allocations. Trends in the allotments were difficult
to find, but some indications of more money to poorer countries
were found, especially in Latin America. However, a central con-
clusion is that FAO has not deemed it possible or necessary to
construct a coherent development policy, concentrating on certain
aspects of the,development problem with its meager resourees.
Rather it seems thnt the idea " a little to all" has served as
decision-making criterion,
2. The eneration and choice ro:ects,
In the preceding pages we have studied the UNDP/FAO policy
as it is expressed in the structure of the operational project
program, Type and location of projects indicated how UNDP/FAO
evaluated their role in agricultural development and the study
of experts and project managers gave a picture of the political
problems and tendencies present in the field work of FAO. In
other words some of the vnlues that permeate the planning of
development projects in FAO were disclosed.
What are the sources of these v21ues? In this section we
turn to the organizational processes the operational
program. Although the project program is the final outcome of
a number of "siftings" of diversified information nnd demands
for projects in FAO and UNDP the program will be used to in-
dicate some characteristics of the planning process in the Or-
ganization.
Looking back at Diagram 4 we now move downwards to the central
variables or factors "search", "focus of information" and "division
of labor", to see how these influence the generation, development
and choice of projects that are to become 0perational. We will
largely leave aside the sociopsychological problems of decision-
making and take a more macro-approach to problems of authority,
communication, coordinntion and focus of information. This way
the hypotheses of Simon Th..impson and Dahl Jacobsen more or less
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are taken ns postulates about the functioning of an administrative
system, with nll the chance this represents of going Rstray in
an international organizetion.
The problem of innovntion in orgenizations is important
in discussions about administration. Some believe it is important
because of rapid change in the environment, and that organizations
only survive when they adapt to these changes.25) Others believe
the problem in addition is releted to political preferunces
and values, innovation and adaptation in orgenizations being a
prerequisite for a democratic society, 26)This student believes
thnt the problem of innovetion related to individuals in a decision-
ra making situation is in itself a too limited approach because the
"real" problem of innovation is the prapagation of new values,
an ability that individuals generally do not havel their values
being unchangeable over relatively long timeintervals. If we
agree in the 1Rst position, studies of innovation should be held
at the organizational level, and the "new man" or "new
27)
group"-
theories of innovstion become attractive. In the present
study of planning or project development in FAO we will discuss
the problem when investigating the process of project-initiation.
a) The f3rmal 1Rnnin. rocess,
The formal procedure for applying and setting up plans
28)of operation for the projects, as expounded by UNDP and FJO
is in brief ss follows.
Requests are submitted by member governments to the Managing
Director of the UNDP. In each country only one channel is recog-
.
nized as the correct applicant.
After consideration in New York the project-suggestion is
transferred to an eppropriate agency for professional scrutiny.
An investigation team, financed by UNDP may then go to the country
concerned if this is deemed necessary.
When the Managing Director evaluates the request as satisfactoryt
he presents it et a meeting of the Governing Council of the UNDP.
If approved, the Governing Council formally appoints nn agency
(usually R UN agency) to set up a pinn of operations.
The plan of operetions must then be approved by the three
pnrties involved: Government, UNDP, and executing agency.
Final approval to commence execution is given by UNDP.
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This procedure, more or less conceived of centrally, that is
in connection with the political trends in the UN General
Assembly around the end of the 1950's, is the basis fcr the
development of FAO's work in the UNDP' sector. The procedure
puts the organization's focus keenly on the government personnel
in each country and makes the planning and implementation of
projects highly dependent upon the willingness and stability of
this personnel. Although this is a function of the international
climate, a climate thnt emphasizes the sovereignty of individual
governments to a point perhaps detrimental to the actual wishes
of n large mnjority of nations, it might be possible to find
channels of communication for international organizations that
would add to the general contact with the environment Pnd its
needs without obliviating the government and UN view cf a one
channel communication. This question we will discuss later,
Point two wns menningful a) when the plans for UNDP were
being borne out centrnlly in the UN and b) as long as the pro-
gram was relntively small. AS the case is now, with several hundred
multimillion doller projects being requested each year, it has
become a hopeless task to evaluate the projects in New York.
Formally, however, the procedure hps been upheld.although in
reality some decentralization to the specialized agencies has
taken place as discussed earlier.
We note in general the large number of steps that havo to be
taken before any operptional contact with the environment needing
the project actually occurs. The planning and approval stages
may take two years and more. The danger of separating planning
and implementntion both in terms of time and place to a degree
that makes meaningful work impossible is obvious.
Basically the procedure described above is built on a kind
of totality-concept of rationality and planning. Projects are
to be requested by governments in need, approved centrnlly for
more than 100 countries and planned by single, more or less
universal international organizations. After looking a little
closer at the planning system FAO is tied up in, we will re-
turn to a normative or s•mewhat speculative discussion of this
concept of project planning,
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b. Sociolo ical stud of the lannin s, stem.
The planning problem cnn analytically be divided into three:
1) Finding information 2) processing information and 3) making
authoritative decisions. These three steps are related to the
planner's or the planning group's knowledge. As Press and Arian
do in their book, 29)we can distinguish between four kinds of
knowledge:
technical skills,
perceptions about the legal structure of authority,
interpersonal relations within the organization and
societal values, norms and ideology.
We will look at the relationship between the planning phases
and these four types of knowledge consecutively. The analysis
will be on a general level, as interviews in the organization
trying to clarify these relationships were stopped.
The search for information is related to how attention—directing
stimuli impinge on the person or group searching.30)Some of
these stimuli come from the environment, some from the surround—
ing organization of people and some from the specific knowledge
the planner has (as defined above). The relative importance of
these sources is an empirical question, but it is believed that
the planner's basic knowledge and orientation is of utmost
importance. It probably establishes a general framework in which
the other factors can vary. Let us therefore take a brief look
at knowledge of type 1) within the organization. If we look at
the randomly chosen sample of project supervisors31)we find
the following distribution of professional fields:
TABLE 25
su ervisors.
0
5
4
1
1
Professional back round of
Agricultural training
Engineering
Economists
Natural science
Social science
ro'ect
1
N= 21
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We believe this table indicates ebout the same distribution
as the one we found for project managers (TABT;P, 22), ngricultural-
ists having about 50 % and engineers being the next largest group.
Whether there is a causal relationship is difficult to say, but
it is of course tempting to stnte that the background of the
planners is ceuse of the technical knowledge distribution in
the.manager group.
Knowledge of type 2) was difficult to get nt, but from the
unstructured interviews some ideas cen be set forth. a) tho legal
structure of authority (position descriptions, hierarchical struct-
ure, rules of procedure etc.) is very complex and therefore a
hindrnnce for flexible action, b) the legal structure in the
orgenization has not been adjusted to the new operational activities
that FAO has acquired mainly through UNDF. This has crented a gap
in the orgenizntion between rules end activity, a gap that has
been perceived ns a planning crisis, and hRs explicitly been
raised in the orge.nizetion as such. In section 4 of this chapter
a closer analysis of the crisis will be undertaken.
c) AS the orgenization has grown in size the legal structure has'
become more and more detailed in an attempt to cope rationally
with the problems of interaction the lnrger size poses.
Result: No one has an overview of the rule-repertoire and coordin-
ation breaks down with each new rule that is established. For
this reason, and because it probably is pro-innovetional, many
heve suggested loosening the rule system n the organization,
loosening and building down the hierarchical structure and thereby
letting organizational structure more adapt to knowledge of type
1) and 4). 32)
Knowledge of type 3) also nffects the finding of information
relevant to the planning of projects. In a multicultural organi-
zation like FAO it is believed thnt relationships between members
of the snme nationality will be a dominant structural aspect of
communication. Only impressionistic data on this exist from FAO:
a) When requesting general information on the functioning of
FAO a person of netionality A always sent this student to persons
of nationality A higher in the organization,,
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b) When meeting informally, the contact within nationality
groups seemed strong. Organizational problems were often discussed,
When asked if lanEuage problems were difficult the answer
generally was no. The question of whether it was noticeable or
not thnt different administrative traditions were present in the
organization, those asked hed difficulties in answering, Members
in the personnel unit were most frequent in viewing this as a
problem, Otherwise the general impression was that adeptation
to a specific FAO—way of working wns rapid for most newcomers,
However, most of the people interviewed clearly distinguished
between good end not so good members seen as administrators, and
to what degree above mentioned problems constituted this judge—
ment is ngt known,
More generally interpersonal relations were influenced by two
aspects, 1) high de2ree of centralizetion of decision making
power, both within the crganization and in relation to regional
offices end project personnel in the field, It was generally
the opinion of the interviewed thet this to a high degree stifle('
initiative in the system. It was also stated that centrelization
was combined with a high degree of politicizing at the top levels
of the organization both internally and in relation to govern—
ments. This wns often seen RS a fector thet introduced irrational,
non—professional elements into the planning of projects at lower
levels, elements that were detrimental to a strong perception
of goal fulfilment at these lower levels of the orgenization,
2) Å second point was the perceived gap between top and middle
level administrators in the system, Communication between these
levels seemed very small compared to communication within them.
This seems to explain some of the lack of operational policies
at the middle level of the organization, that is policies that
were clear and welldefined subgoals under the general theoretical
goals of the organization.
On the more psychological level the personnel in FAO seemed
rather discouraged and many were of low morale as to the useful—
ness of their work, etc, Most of those inte22viewed touched on
these problems, Mornle had however been nt a low at the point
33)of Sen takeover, and h-zd substantially improved since then,
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One person interviewed put it this way, "I don't know any Italians
outside FAO, and thnt doesn't matter. But I do personally know
about 200 FAO-member life stories. Not one of them is entirely
clean even in a simple non-idealistic sense." Another of those
interviewed stated that several of his colleagues were useless.
These statements stood in contrast to the optimistic viewpoints
forwarded in the most active divisions in the UNDP/FAO sector.
The question is whether these psychological reactions are
relnted to the FAO administrative system. Some of the points
mentioned like the centralization, the totality of project plans •
and the impact of new functions can have an influence, but study
of this has not been underteken. One hypothesis mentioned, that
the closer Headquarters personnel are to the concrete field
nctivities, the more optimistic they nre about their work, prob-
ably would be supported in such a study,
Turning lnstly to the role of societal values and identificat-
ions in the search for project information, we again miss specific
data, and we bnse our comments mainly on the nntionality distri-
bution in the crunizntion.
From 1957 FAO was led by the Indian, earlier ambassnder, Dr.
B. R. Sen. As we hnve seen in the historical description, his
election followed the fall of two Jrrierican Directors GenerPl.
Sen's election hnd substnntial support from the British, many
of the underdeveloped countries supporting th:JAmerican cnndidate
Davis. Today the Director Genernl is the dutchman Mr. Boermn,
The European element in FAO is definitely strengthened. His deputy
however is the American Oris V. Wells, earlier in the US depart-
ment of Agriculture. In the election in 1967 many underdeveloped
countries supported the election nf the African Mr. d'Arboussier
(he received 30 votes on the first ballot).
We can generally conclude thnt at the top level in the organi-
zation the European4merican culture and value orientntion is
dominnnt, and that this orientation seems to permeate the rest of
the central administratien nnd the field projects.
The probably most influential group of persons in FAO in the
operntion of the UNDP/FAO field program is the leaders of the
divisions, the division directors. Information is not complete
or systematic, but some elements of the picture can be set forth.
- 125—
Americans are centrally pinced in policy coordination units and
in The Program and Budget division. We find Americans als0 near
the hend of the largest FAO depnrtment, the technical department34,
It was obvious that some of the Americans were close to omnipre—
sent in organizationnl planning.'These examples were selected
by this student, and sny little about the overall distribution
of values and societal norms and ideologies in the organization.
But we cnn conclude that severnl Americans are centrelly placed
in FAO. Whether this is a function of American appropriations
to FAO (well above 30 % of the total) or a function of other
factors is not known.
In the FAO headquarters in Rome there seems to be about 140
35)project supervisors. Taking the small rendom sample of 21
of these, we find the following nntionality distribution.
TABTR 26 

Nationalitv distribution 0f ro.ect su ervisors.
Nationality Absolute


European 14 67
American 3 14
Asian 4 19
African 0 0
Total N = 21 100
Comparing this table to TABLE 15 we again see n general simi—
larity, with a definite majority of Europeans. Let us look a
little closer at the structure of this group end their decision—
making influence. From which European countries do the supervisors
come, how many projects do they supervise nnd how many experts
are under their control?
Project
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TABLF 27.
projectssupervisors'control over
Nationality No.of No.of No.of


su ervisors Pro'ects ex erts


Abs.% Abs.%
East European 1 25 287
UK 5 1130 13435
France 2 38 349
Scandinavia 2 719 7520
Other West Eur. 4 514 257
EUROPE.gNS 14 2876 29678
US AMERICANS 3 616 4913
ASIANS 4 38 359
Totals 21 37100 380100
We note the preponderance of the British within the European
group nnd the lack of Italian or German supervisors in the sample.
The table also strengthens the picture of European dominance in
this part of the planninE system. With 67 % of the project super-
visors the Europenns control 76 % of the projects and through
these 78 % of the experts. The strength of the British group is
more outspoken, with around 25 % of the supervisgrs they control,
30 % of the projects and 35 % of the experts. The American super-
visors on the other hand have 14 % of the supervisors, 16 % of
the projects and 13 % of the experts. However, the role of super-
visor is often combined with other planning functions, and the
Americans in the sample had high positions in the system besides
being supervisors. The weak control in this sensp of the Asian
group is as outspoken as the strength of the British. One of the
Asians must even heve been without a project at the time of being
registered. We cnn generally conclude that the British and the
European influence in this strata of the planning system is strong,
and thnt the social and economic vnlues and technical viewpoints
(with all the implications these hnve for the society where they
are applied), will be prenonderant in the structuring of project-
information and in the choosing of "goodu projects in the FAO-conte:
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c) Generpl relations to the environment,
An extremely interestin2 end impertnnt questien that ca-21
not be delved into with the materiel Rt hnnd is hcw actuelly
the pinnning system described ebove, with the culturel velue
base it hes, perceives,cow:unicates and exerts influence on the
project environments.
How does the FAO system in other words interact with the environ-
ment in constructing and implementing projects? It would be very
interesting to relate more precisely what we now know about the
system, and in generel about its interaction with the environment
to a deteiled study of the planning and implementation of a select
number of UNDP/FAO projects. How do the vplues present in the
project plans compare to environmentnl end systematic (FAO) values,
and what happens to the projects when they ere implemented? Do
they enhance positive values relative to the_project region?
and do they - in turn - effect the PAO planning system in any way?
In general we believe thet most •f the project countries take
whatever projects they can get, and that this together with the
very limited resources, gives the orgenizations e very large
influence over the composition and location of projects. It is
also believed that the feedb2ck of project results to the organie
zation's planning werk is minimal. All those interviewed on this
question stPted that reports from completed projects were hardly
ever read, and in any case no systematic discussion or use of
the results in the reports were undertaken. In the Budget Division
there was general ngreement thet no one knows the effect of pro-
jects, except maybe some of the field personnel, but their in-
fluence on planning is minimal,
Most of the planners also felt that the question of goals
was unproblematical. Agriculturel development was for all of
them fairly well defined, and it wes technicel/scientific facters
that decided whether the project should be of this or that type,
Those who identified problems in thisespect were more generally
interested in social development, stating for example that they
felt much more thought should be put into the relation between
agriculture and other sectors of development.'
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In general the FAO-problem of communicating and understanding
the environment is extremely more complex than in most national
settings. The question is however if this complexity is reduced
Sa severely thet important information does not reach the orga-
nization. First of all the system is geared to communicating
with governments (130 odd in all). Problematicel situations for
are first and foremost defined by national governments.
Politically embarrassing problems will probnbly not reach the
organization, in their full force. On the other hand FAO's access
to governmentnl channels of communication end government con-
trolled resources will often increase FAO's potential for notion:
It is probably of importence for the work of FAO what
kind of governmental yst.cin it mcata in the country.
Structurally it is believed, RS an untested hypothesis, that the
existence of a centrel planning nnd coordinating unit in the
government will reduce the relative influence of FAO over other
departments in the government. 37) Whether this results in
reluctance on the part of FAO in its relntion with the government,
or whether it increases the responsitivity of FAO to more general
espects of the'countries' own problems is not known and open for
study.
FAO tries to communicate with the environment through a host
of other institutions„ FAO/UNDP experts visit the orgenization's
headquarters, especielly before going out te projects.
In most countries there are FAO or UNDP offices through which
informntion is gnined and communication channeled. FC-committees
at the national level also exist, being the local furnisher of
answers to most questions the orunization sends to member
countries. In Norway it wns noted that all questions asked by
F.A0 to The Foreign Ministry thnt were not of clear political
content were sent directly to the F 38)0-committee. FAO also has
relntively large regional offices, but these hPve been used to
a large extent as representntive orgnns, not ns real parti-
cipants in the planning nnd decision-mnking work at Headquarters.—"
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d) The initintion of ro'ects.
An important propositim in the present paper is thet in
the cperational field-progrnms the initiPtive by and lerge and
quite contrnry tc official pclicy, is in the hands of FAO experts.
The reasons for this are pnrtly found in the structure of FLO
and in the financial mechnnisms of UNDP. How did the random
sample of project supervisors at Headquarters describe the
situntion? First, 16 of 21 supervisors answered the question on
project initiation. 13 or around 80 % stnted thnt projects are
in reality initieted by FAO personnel in Headquarters. Two meant
that gcvernment institutions were the initintcrs while the last
one felt that the F 40)AO country representntives were most
active. On asking if this role of initiation wns an expected pnrt
of their work, 16 of the 17 that answered stated thnt it was nct
formnlly expected, 11 steted that it wns expected now nnd then
and 5 that the role of initiation was not expected at all. So we
see n conflict On the one hand most FM) experts take part in
project initiation, on the other it is quite strongly felt that
this is nnt formally a legitimate pnrt of their function.
We do not have dnta on the ettitudes of project governments
concerning FLOs role as project initiator. On the one hand however
we believe thPt they are in large need of resources and therefore
quite categorically accept project proposals. On the other hand
the awakeninE nf national sentiments and the establishment of
distinct national politicel systems contradicts to same degree
a general ecceptance of the reletively unified FLO approach to
development. We can speculate here on the relation between FAO
and the many project cguntries. If the large FAO initiative is
widely nccepted in project countries it could support the idea
that, in the present situation, the project countries accept what-
ever offer the U1 agencies mnke. P. consensus in the project
countries about the values and the structure of the UNDP/FAO pro-
jects would also indicate thet FAO works in harmony with the
development interests of the poor countries. This would, as
Fisenstadt41) hPs suggested, allnw PAO initin.tive and responsibi-
lity in the planning and implementing of projects. The opposite
situation: however, where there is conflict between the values
dominant in FAO and the needs of the developing countries, would
make the national governments guard their field of influence, and
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the initiative and responsibility of outside authorities would be
circumscribed. Thus in n period of value consensus power and ini—
tintive would be decentralized in relation to national governments
and the power 0f internationel organizations would augment
if they were deemed efficient working units. In periods of value
conflict contrection of power would take place in the most in—
fluential political organs, for the time being definitely the
netional governments.
The lnst description seems to be the one closest to inter-42)national reality. We are in a period of contraction of power.
in the hands of national governments. That large project ini—
tiative is in the hands of F.10 then seems problematical. How
cen this be analyzed?
The politicel role of FAO may be perceived os unimportnnt in
many member countries. Letting FAO have initiptive then results
in some project allocetions and little politicel influence, and
the initietive is therefore eccepted.
The structure of FAO mey be such ns to fulfil the different
demands mnde by culturelly and politicelly different groups in
the environment. The ebove analysis of the structure of the
orgenization and the project progrRm seems to negete this position.
(Small Asian representetion, agriculture vs., industry etc.)
The planning system and the planners in FÅ0 may be working
without contact with the conflicting velues and needs in the
environment. Thet very little is known in the organization about
the impnct or success of projects may indicate thet this is
the case.
The orgenizational mechanism that furthers the divisionsf
interest in initiating projects is thet the initiator most often
will be given the project for implementetion end so receive
overhead allocations for administrative services. Since the divi—
sions nre built around a specific subject matter, they are eager
to "sell" their type of projects in member countries. Thus the
orunizatioml atructure has influenee on the policy of the organi—
zation in the environment, and we see thRt the more the organization
mirrors the needs of the environment, the more apt it is to work
for projects thet fulfil these needs.
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In this perspective it is interesting to note how OECD recent-
ly hns answered the questi2n of why there is sc much waste and
low priority nssistance being performed.43)
Lack of project cnpacity on the counterpnrt (Country) side.
Duplication of demands (that are presented to the different
organizations) because of lack of coordination.
Donors (and organizations?) engage in "salesmanship".
Demands are adjusted to what can be given of aid.
Lack of overall planning.
Point 1) indicates a lack of policy-ndjustment between the
body giving assistance and the recipient.
Satisfactory "absorption" of the project is thus made difficult.
This can have its CPUSC in the lack of sufficient and meaningful
communicntion but also in the fact pointed out under 3) in the
list. The second point mny well indicate the lack of coordination
between assistance-giving organizations, but just as well the inter-
disciplinary character of most development projects that are
meaningful for the recipient countries. This problem would in
other words be allevinted if the existing organizations - at
least at the policy levei - merged. The detrimental effect of
the situation described under point 4) would also benefit from
a merger. Then the demands mnde on the assistance-giving orgnni-
zation would not have to be adjusted to a very specific type of
gonl and most often n very specific type of approach (FO, WHO,
ILC, UNESCO and their methods etc.). Other criteria like the
project's integration into existing national development plans
might become more prominent. Point 5) lack of overall planning
might also be approved upon.
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e) Evaluations of nlanninF and some su, estions.
The strong orunizational motives for the initiation of
projects and the existing large possibilities for such initiative
probnbly increase the likelihood thnt points one to five above
will affect the project progrnm negntively. How can this be avoided.
With the preceding analysis as bRse, let us diScuss the project
planning problem in FAO in somewhat more evaluative terms.
A provocative question could be; Is the whole conception of a
totnl and detniled plan of operntions,fully approved before any
attempts at execution are made,a deadend street for international
development work?
It is more and more recognized that implementntion of pro—
jects depends on acceptence and support in the locel community.
This again requires the project goals to be integrnted into the
goal and value structure of the community. Pow as the project pro—
gram becomes larger and especially as the communities involved
become more and more diversified,planning at the orgnnizationnl
level becomes an extremely complex undertaking. When the goals
of an organization are well defined and stnble (ns for example
in relatively small business units in n stable market situation)
planninE cnn be a) led in deteil from the top and b) disected into
a coherent hierarchy of tesks. When the gonls do not have this
coherent and clenr nRture, and when the total organizational under—
taking reaches a certain size, this type of planninF breaks down.
Metaphoricelly we can say: the distnnce to the environment becomes
too large and chnnges in the environment become too complex to
be registered meaningfully in a unified and centrnlized system.
To ettack the planning problem in this situation theory seems
to indicete that focus in the orgnnization must be on the Foal 
,setting process itself. It is the formulation of goals thet are
meaningful and "implementnblell in the environment concerned and
thst cen be handled through a possible adjustment of orgenizational
resources that is the primary tnsk. And this tnsk is political
in the sense that it is n question 1) of understnnding the needs
of the clients (or members of the ornnization), 2) of formulating
projects that meet these needs both in substance and method and
3) of distributing the resources of the orgenizetion in a way
that does justice to the members and that makes fulfilment of
nt least some needs possible.
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This politicel function is formally taken crre of in UNDP's
Governing Council. But to the extent that points 1), 2) and 3)
actually ere decided upon in FAO the decision-making system in
the orennization should be ndjusted to this political tnsk and
not to an administrative task. What does this menn? First of all
that policy questions thnt present themselves within the boundaries
of FAO be decided upon in the political orgnns of FAO (Conference
and Council). However, to the degree that these questions are left
to the secretariat, it also should be structured politionlly.
That means structuring importnnt decision-making points as coun-
cils with both professional and representrtive criteria as
qualificntions for membership. Becnuse the making of project
policy is seen in this paper es a politionl process left to
the secretarint of FAO to a large degree, such units might be
relevant in the planning prucess. The council-iden as used here
implies thnt members are a) permanent b) elected for example by
the FAO Council and c) equal in status constantly,
Especially the central oreanizntion lendership should then cumply
to this politienl model,
This model of political administration is not relevant if
project plannine is conceived as that (formal) process described
above. What implicntions might the new model have for planning
in FAO? Given the professional/politionl structure of the decision-
making system one idea is to let projects be stnrted as soon as
the organization leadership hns found a request a) professionally
and politically reasonable and b) within reasonable limits of the
organilations total resources. (These decisions would probably
have to be made regionally if they were at all to be made, and
not on a global basis as the case is today.)(See also page 34.)
FAO would in these terms start operations on a small scale in
the community concerned at a very early stage of project con-
ception, with large chance of having to terminate it. These
project-starts or ro.ect-embr oes as we might call them, could
then be allowed to grow or die depending on their social, political
and developmental relevance. I prerequisite for this system
would be that the embryonic project team had clase contect and
access to information a) in the locality b) in the country govern-
ment and c) in the international organizations concerned. The pro-
ject's existence and fulfilment would then be dependent upon the
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project-team's ability to plan, implement and expand the project
as needs and requirements were identified. All the prcject embryoeo
would have to compete for resou2ces from the (regional?) organi-
zation or organizations working with the subject mstter concerned,
Planning at the central level would then become a tesk of de•
ciding upon main trends of possible deve-opment strategies with-
in each region and testing these strategies by planting project-
embryoes. The orgnnization would be further required to answer
questions and give relevPnt information to the embryo-teams.
Thirdly they would be required to make continunl decisions on
the distribution of the organization's resources between the
different projects as they developed. Lastly a central task would
be to work incessantly for as open Rnd as ide channels of commu-
nication between project/environment/locel ar eountry governmen
and interndtional orgnnizations in general,
Essential for this approach would be reletively long-term
assignments of experts and personnel so that projects easily
could be stopped and experts trnnsferred to new embryonic under-
takings. In this way -identificntions with specific projects would
not be of importance before  an  embryo hnd shown that it had
ability to "live". AS it is now projects are old and established
long before  any  cencrete work in the field hns been done.
In general this  planning
 model would seem to imply ho insi-
(
tutionalization of flexibility and a focus  on  the  2egional
 or
even locel setting and situetion as n bpsis for preject construct-
ion and planning. The internotion of pla-ning and implementutio-
would become closely related and ore,enizationel decision-rnaking
would be a continuous evaluntion of development strRtegies and
technical agriculturni information, The whole system of FAC
could be rebuilt, concentrating on the distribution and use of
resources in general at the central level and moving all detailed
and more technical aspects of planning to the localities where
project-embryoes are planted. Lets of red tape would have to be
eliminated and a larger degree of chance and 2isk would have to
be introduced and accepted.
This iden of an "organic" development of projects within a
dynamic, regionally oriented development policy and without any
clear and formal stages of planning, approval and implementation,
may be a viable line of work for internationRl orgRnizations,
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FAO's centralized end total approach to agricultural development
seems to be increasingly difficult as the scope and complexity
of UNDP/FAO activities nugments. The "orgnnic" Rnd decentralized
approach would not be a return to laissez faire conditions. But
it would require another type of planning. On the one hand it
would require the development of project:, and project plans in
the field. On the other it would necessitnte continual evaluation
and approval of complex requests. The need for operational devel—
opment policies at the regional level would become overriding
and FAO would probnbly hnve to be bnsically restructured to meet
the needs of culture—relative Rnd decentralized planninge
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3. The effect of UNDP functions on other FAO activities.
FAO, like most of the UN agencies, is divided in its work
between so called Reguler Program activities and Special Fund
activities, each function having its own financial sources and
often its "own" personnel in the orgnnization. How does this
affect the organization? Are the two distinct activities comple-
mentary to each other or do they compete.with each other for
organization resources? As we have seen in the preceding chapter,
FAO has had an implicit policy of integrating the two, obviously
hoping that they basically are complementary. The idea has been
that Regular Program activity supports the UNDP/FAO project
program with vital technical/scientific information and overall
policy.
If we compare TABLE 7 pege 73 with TABTIE9 page 85 we find
some interesting indicntions of the relationship between regular
and special activities in the organizetion. Looking first at
Animal Production and Health projects we note from TABLE 9 that
from 1959 to 1967 this type of projects has augmented in that
division from 0 to 14 %. Remembering that those units in FAO
who prepare projects also usually "receive" them for execution,
this increase can be interpreted to indicate an expansionist
activity on the part of the personnel in this division.
Comparing this to information in TABTE 7 we note that the
Division's estimates for Regular Program activities were increas-
ed from the biennium 62/63 to 64/65, and that they showed a
diminishing tendency thereafter. This can be interpreted in several
ways.
The division's main interest is Special Fund activities and
this reduces interest in Regular Program. However, from TABLE 7
we note that botliin 1961 nnd 1963 The Confertmc reduced the
budget requests made by the division for Regular Program activi-
ties. This indicates a will to expand also there.
Since the period before 1963 shows expansionon both programs
and after 1963 expansion in Special Fund and decline in Regular
Program, the indicetions in the two tables are purely accidental.
When Special Fund reaches a certain size in a division, then
interest in Regular Program diminishes. We note in TABT.P, 7 that
in the 1965 Conference, contrary to earlier practice, the approvals
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were larger than the estimates for Regular Program nctivity.
Turning to the Fishery division (from 1965 a Department) we
find support for interpretation 2) above. No specific policy
can be traced in the tables.
Forestry and forest products division has seen P little in—
crease in the number of projects approved each year and has about
1/5 of the totn1 number of UNDP projects. Here the estimates made
for Regular Program activity have been reduced (relatively)
and the Conference has from 1963 onwerds found it necessary to
add on to its Regulnr Program functions. Here we find a weak con—
firmation of the hypothesis that increases in UNDP functions
decreases activities within Regular Progrnm.
Rural Institutions division which is specifically concerned
with agricultural extension services hns been expansive in the
field of Regulnr Program activities (TABLE 7), At the snme time
it has been on a kind of status quo policy in relation to the
acquisition of Specinl Fund projects. Thus the inverse hypothesis
receives support in this division. Support, in other words, is
given to the iden thnt although the policy of FAO has been to
integrate regular and specinl nctivities in the existing divi—
sions, the two all the same are in competition with each other
for the time and interest of the secretnriat personnel. As a
corollary to this we note the need the earlier Director General,
Mr. Sen, found to establish units outside and in addition to the
existing FAO system to implement most of his special projects.
The general conclusion may be that one orgenization will always
have difficulties working for two mesters (in this cese UNDP on
the one hand, member governments on the other).
The same conclusions are supported when we .study the remain—
ing divisibns. In Land and Water, the absolute largest UNDP/FAO
division, we generally note thnt as UNDP allocations relatively
went down, estimates for Regulnr Program went up, and from 1965,
the opposite process set in. Nutrition and Plnnt Production
divisions show only slight confirmation, but tho tendency is clear—
ly present. Economic analysis division was also quite neutral up
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to 1965. In that yenr the division got 2 boost from Conference
for Regular Progrom functions, ond although earlier that year
4 new Special Fund projects hod been allocated to the division
3 were approved in 1966 and none in 1967.
Thus, using the above material, there seems to be a competition
between two types of activity within the snme organizational
unit once the activities distinctly have different financial
implications and different finencial sources. However, certain
qualifications seem pertinent.
1. Since the overall UNDP/FAO program has been greatly expand-
ed since 1959, it may not be any expression for explicit political
action within a division that the Special Fund component increases.
However, this qualificntion does not affect the relationship
between increase in SF/decrease in Regulnr Program.
2. Also the status quo situation in the UNDP sector may be the
result of outside forces, the policy of FAO leadership or UNDP
policy in relntion to a special type of project. However, voriat-
ions in division estim2tes on Regulor Progrem allocptions most
likely are a function of division policy, and thus indicate ex-
plicit decisions on their part.
So even if severnl externol factors moy enter into each of
the variables "UNDP allocntions" and "Regular Progrem allocetions",
these qualifications do not ernse the possibility of the con-
clusion mnde, thnt the two progrnms compete for limited orgoni-
zation resources.
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4. Conflictin views on or anizational lennin .
The growth of UNDP operetionel nctivities in FAO hes created
a large problen of planning Rnd coordinRtion in the orgRnization.
A Review Teem has studied the problems and submitted a report
with recommendations for change. The earlier Director Generel
44)
also submitted a report disngreeing on central points with
the Review Team. Then n FAO Conference wns held, a new Director
45)GenerR1 elected nnd n new report was written.
Whnt conceptions of planning do these reports represent end
how are the viewpoints related to the meterial presented in the
preceding paragraphs?
1. The Review TeRm Re ort.
a) The goals of FAO. All discussion of planning is releted to
or implies an evPluation of goals. The most technical undertaking
hns sociel consequences, and an evaluation of these consequences
seem imperntive if planning of development projects is the task
pt hand. If these propositions are velid, it is interesting to
note the Review Teem's evnluation of FAC objectives.46)
FAO should
increasc production, improve the scientific and technical
standards, and work to avoid waste.
identify areas lagging on technicR1 fronts and improve
stRndards of living in these arees.
trnin indigenous personnel in needed skills and for roles
of lendership, in cooperntion with governments concerned.
The problems of social development, and the definition of this
concept in relation to cultural variations between the regions
is not explicitly mentioned. Technical development of agriculture
seems to be perceived as socially unproblematical except for the
trnining and motivnting aspect of locel personnel,
b) Implementing the goals. The most importent recommendetion of
the Review Team is to strengthen the country eppronch to imple-
mentntion and planning, and weaken the regional approach.
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FAO's country representative should be substantially strengthened
47)in his functions. The idea of embryc planning and this suggest-
ion nre in line. However, if the regional approach in the field
was to be reduced, this approach wns to be strengthened in Head-
qunrters by erecting departments for each major region. This
meant a centralization and a polarizatiui headquarters/country
representptives. That the result would be a serious increase of
headquarters control if the concept of total project planning
is upheld does not seem to have been drawn in doubt. This would
in turn increase the cultural iMpact of the value structures
present in headquarters.
Concerning headquarters organization the interest in regional
planning and operetion is again emphasized. However, the major
recommendRtion is to draw a clear line of demarcation between
operationel and technical/advisory work. The suggestion is to
divide the whole orunization in two parts: 1. Country and
regional programs end operntions, and 2. Technicel Services. 48)
If the preceding onalysis of the relationship between the two
progrnms (Special and RegulPr) has a true empirical base, and
if the conclusi„on.of competition is evalueted in terms detrimental
to effective goal fulfilment, the suggestion of the Review Team
would seem to alleviate the effects of coLlpetitibri.. The Team
suggests "daily working relations" between the two parts of the
organization at all levels in the system. This of course is the
large nnd pr6b1eelatj_cal,:suGzestion i th report.
c) Contact with the environment. The Review Team ides is that
this contact should be channeled through the regional departments,
in the operational part of the organization. This implies the
belief that the accumulation of technical knowledge in the organi-
zation can satisfactorily proceed in the technicnl/scientific
part of FJO
, without direct contact with country projects. This
is another large question-able assumption in the report and if
social contexts take part in constitutin, relevant "technical"
knowledge in the field of agriculture, the Review TePm's concept-
ion of planning does not incorporate the consequences of this.
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It is obviously difficult to inteErRte relevant considerations
on wh2t agricultural planning is in the framework of a universal
49)international orgenization. Recent research seems to support
1) the idea that a system of public administration should be a
mirror of the sociel environment it is to work in, no matter how
technicalthe objectives are perceived tc be, if the fulfilment
of client needs is a primary goal and 2) the idea that the admi-
nistrative system has to have ability to change itself if it is
to implement change in the environment. This would require less
complexity in the form21 relations between organizational per-
sonnel and expert teams. Authority in work relations would pro-
bably have to be more p function of knowledge relevant to therik policy problem at hand than es now e function of formal
The need for a really efficiont and vcr.satile c=unication system
internally and to the project environments would have to be met.
The old bureaucratic moiel of organization based on hiernrchical
and stable structures of dutlioIity would heve to be replaced
by expert teams structured in relation to problems at hand and
restructured as problems change. These more or less utopian imagea
of FAC as a planning nnd policy making system working PS a coor-
Jinator of internationel development action in e national politic-
al and social setting would require n whole new concept
a) of being an orgenization member and b) of being an inter-
national expert. Probnbly for this reason the imnges for the time
being are utterly utopian.
2. The Director General Mr. Sen's view oints.
The discussion of FAO goals is left out by the Director
Goneral as his position on these is fairly well known. See Chapter
Four in this report). But he is in disagreement with the Review
Team on central points,
a) FAO cannot be compared to a business organization, and the
main reason for this is that operations and expertise are more
closely related than in other organizational contexts,
Operations nre, stated briefly, the dissemination of technical
expertise to local personnel, Here the view that technical know-
ledge is at least to some degree P function of the social context
is prevalent. The problem inherent in this position is how to
relate it to the existence of a centrally placed universal
organization,
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Because expertise and operations are so closely linked, Mr.
Sen. continues, it is not realistic to divide the organization
between operations and information. Instead he wants to strengthen
the planning and coordinating units directly under the Director
General.
Neither enn the Director General support the iden of moving
the regional offices into headquarters. These are necessary
units in the field.They coordinate FAO policy nnd FW-activity
in the region concerned.
Instead he suggests a regional division of some of the units
already in hendquarters. In general Mr. Sen's concept of F110
is the centralized orgpnization with all important policy making
decisions coming from the top and permcating thc organization
from the top down,
3. The new man Mr. Boerma.
To tackle these central problems in the coming years the F1',J
Conference in 1967 elected Mr. Boerma as new Director General.
Several months after election not much was heard of his policy
intentions.50)Then in September 1968 there was a joint report
from the Director General and an Ad Hoc Committee on Organization.
presented to the FAO Council. In general the report presents a
view of planning in between the two preceding positions. Operations
and information could not totelly be separated, but strong
operation units could be erected within the most important UNDP/
FAO departments, Also a new department should be created to have
5:
... the decisive role in the formulation of programs and projects.'
This function should however be coordinated with that of the
Economic and Social Department, Three technical departments,
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery should then execute the projects,
through their operations units which exist mostly within the
divisions (as before). Support of administrAtive character should
be given through another department, the Administration and Finance
DepArtment. On top of all this a policy and strategy unit should
be erected in direct contact with the Director Genernl's office.
The viewpoint here seems to be strongly influenced by norms of
efficient business management, where limited decentralization
is undertaken under the umbrella of genernlly well defined operatio2
al goals for the whole organization (profit or utility maximization;
rw.
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increasing production output etc.) As Mr. Sen indicated and has
been brought out in Chapter Four of this paper the intermediate
operational goals in FAO do not exist in an unproblematical and
static form, especially as the overall goals do not seem to
allow meaningful operationalizations directly, and as intermediate
goals in FP,0 are closely related to complex multidimensional
social change in the project environment. Thus the problem in
FAO would seem more to be a question of coordinating demands
from below (flgrass rootsu both in the environment and in the
organization) than effecting a general policy in one way or
another from above. And this coordinating problem is probAbly
more a question of politics and values than it is of efficient
management. Thus structuring FAO would ultimately become a
question of building a democratic politicAl system, not an
efficient business enterprise.
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CONCLUSION: THE FUTURF OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN
INTERNATION,,L
We have approached the problem of international planning
by Acqueinting ourselves with one of the central organizations
working in the "non-political" field of economic and social
development. As stated in the first chapter we set out to
describe the velue-structure of the organization and its main
operational program, thst is how the technicel, economic and
"ideologicel" resources of the organization were distributed
internally and externally. We focused specinl interest on the
question of nationality distribution, and used this variable as
an indicator of the ideological impact of the organizntion.
This description is seen PS a necessary first step towards
understanding the planning process, or ns described in the first
chapter, the formnl nnd informn1 decision-making process that
preceeds the approved plans of operntions for  UNDP/IW  projects,
We tried in the first chapter to anRlyze the different
theoretical appronches to the problem of planning (or un-
programmed decision-making ns March and Simon have called it).
We found that the conflict of interests and values between inter-
acting and relatively stable groups, or in other words the politic-
al process within the organization, would be the most fruitful
perspective to adopt. The problem then was to identify the values
present in the organization and the deveopment values pursued
in the project program and to study the processes internally and
externally to the orgnnization to discover how these values come
into being. We stnrted inside the orgenization, and as the study
proceeded we understood that to discover and describe the values
in the system and in its program was task enough in a preliminary
stage. The preceding chapters therefore concentrate on this de-
scription, well knowing thet a complete picture would require
knowledge of the environment, the social and economic surroundings
FAO works in, the demands and support present. in different client
groups and their ability to present these demands to the orga-
nization. First then could we see how the values and programs
FAO works for are a result or not of pressures and needs in the
environment.
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But we postulated thnt political trends and working mechanisms
inside the organization also had influence on policy-making or
planning and we turned to a more or less totpl study of the
organization to be Rble to understand this process. Whet did we
find?
The definition of the orgnnization goals was closely related
to the interests and values of the politically most powerful,
groups in the organization, Historically FAO has, in its work
effort, represented the development ideals of those nations that
won the Second World War. The reconstruction of Europe and in
this perspective the disposal of egricultural surpluses and the
control of egricultural trade were the main policy questions.
The role of FAO even in this field Was severely limited, the
powerful nations fearing that international nction would hamper
the attsinment of their own goals of economic development,
Changes in FAO policy in direction of universal economic
development and special concern for the many poor countries
in the world, did not occur before this change of perspective
gradually took hold in the West-European/Americen nations. FAO,
although formally a sovereign body, seemed to be severely sub-
ordinated the political development in the United Nations General
Assembly. First when this orgen, through open political conflicts,
established progrems for economic development of the third world
did FAO stnrt to expand activities in thi- field.
As a corollary to the political influence of the developed
nations and the contents this influence had, the structure of FAO,
as described in Chapter Three, was a replica of the Weberian
efficient, hierarchical western orgenization. Formally FAO was
comparable to a parliamentary system of public administration,
a supreme assembly electing a prime minister who in turn appoints
the members of his cabinet. Those people satisfied in this system
were exactly those ncquainted with it, Europeans and Americans.
Asisns interviewed by this student were reluctont and sceptical
towards the organization Rnd did not want to discuss its problems.
They were also (for this reason?) a minority in the planning1)system.
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Policy-meking et the top level of the orgnnization elso
showed a close relation to the politicel and agriculturn1
perceptions of the groups the organization lenders identified with.
While Mr. Sen saw FAO's primery goal as that of informing and
engeging the world in action against a hunger catestrophel the
new man, Mr. Boerma, defined the primary goal as efficient use
of new technical and administrative techniques that in a re-
latively unproblematical way favor development. Optimistically
he felt thnt through efficiency nnd technicel innovation the goal
of development could be attained. There is not a question of right
and/or wrong here. The point is that values are n group phenomenon,
and that in a planning system individuals will nearly automatically
(111 identify with and work for their besic velues and viewpoints in
the system. Thus, to clerify group structures and their value
orientations is a requisite for the study of planning in an
administretive system. In internetional edministretion, where
the velue spectrum probnbly is large, this appronch becomes all
the more pertinent,
The policy-making analysis showed the difficulty FAO faced
in trying to meke generR1 policy operetionel et nn intermediary
level. There seemed to exist a gep between the gener21 policy
and the plans for action at the divisional and branch levels.
While the Boerma-npproach mey be able to fill the gep, this
immediately raises a new problem at the top level. Filling the
gap with coordinated policy assumes 2 cohGrent top policy.
But is this realistic at the present stage of economic and social
development in the world? It seems thnt FAO as a planning system
is in a dilemme„ Either it - 2S Sen advocated - concentrates on
the genern1 problem of development in socially and economically
different regions, with the problem of integrntion of overall
policy ss the main concern, and thus atomizes the orgenization
at lower levels, or else it - with Boerma - concentretes on uni-
fying the orgnnization but then tnkes ns given agreement on over-
all policy of development. If the dilemma is real, the question
of splitting FAO and locnting the parts in the regions seemed
relevant. This could be seen as en adeptation of orgRnization
structure to the central iplanning problem, that of meeting the
demands of social groups on their own premises.
The project progrem corresponded well to the dominent values
present in the orgnnizational system, the European/Americen
appronch to development, focused on engineering end technical
training as mnin elements in the nchievement of economic progress.
The dominance of European experts was brought out and the inte-
grative effects (mixing of nationalities) of the project program
was studied in some detail. The conclusion was thet FAO follows
a hesitant policy of integration.
Different orEanizational relntionships influencing the
planning of the UNDP/FAO projects-were looked into, and we found
processes supporting the Parkinsonian notion of empirebuilding
within the divisions.We found much initiative in the hands of •
(11111 FAO personnel and we analyzed the possible causes and consequences
r of this. We found most support for the iden thet the strong
initiative indicated a kind of cultural isolation of the organi-
zation, communicetions with the environment being extremely diffi-
cult, and feedbeck from completed projects on planning of new
ones almost non-existent.
An orgenization working with two distinct programs seems,
if our analysis is relevant, to experience the two in a kind of
competition with each other for the limited resources of per-
sonnel and finances. Although personnel partly are assigned
specificelly to one or the other progrnm, at the divisional level
the dilemma of where to concentrnte work nnd interest seems to
exist. What consequences cen this have fo: planning? If policy
in the orgenization is based on a close integration of the
two progrnms (as was the case for the planning cf development
projects and the more technical scientific work of FAO) the
analysis indicates that this integrPtion is difficult to maintain.
At the divisional level it can be expected thnt the central
working groups will either concentrate on gathering and develop-
ing information on the one program or on the otherr thus becoming
specialists in one, not both. In our case this would imply either
specialist knowledge on the technical/scientific aspects of
agricultural development or specialist knowledge on project
operations. Thus in general one might expect an Rdministrative
group to excel in one field not several, This of caurse, accent-
uates the problem of how to approach integrnted planning in an
ndministrative system. In general it seems that efficient inter-
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group communicntion is more important than mixture of personnel,
if the above results at all allow genernlization,
8) The size of FAO hnd grown rapidly in the years after 1959
and this seemed to have specific effects on planning. First of
all the process of completingR plan of operations so that a
project could be stPrted in the field gradually took more time.
Secondly, as size.augmented the problems of coordination mounted.
This resulted in a continual strengthening of central coordinat-
ing units, mainly becpuse these units beceme the points in the
planning system with most information of a procedural kind.
Increased size of an organization probably augments the power
of units and personnel with knowledge about the administrative
system as such. Thirdly increased size made interdivisional
cooperation increasingly difficult, mainly because each division
becnme more differentiated and therefore more self-sufficient,
but also because of the Parkinsonian effect the system of project
allocations has on each division, Fourthly increased size seemed
to increase the administrative workload on professional officers
in general, whether they perceived of themselvesRS mainly agri-
cultural experts or administrators. The first group generplly
complained of the difficulty it therefore was to keep up in the
professional field of knowledge. However, at the smne time, only
a. small percent of those interviewed in the divisions favored
a sepnrating of administrativc and technical functions in a way
that would remove the administrative chores from so called
technical divisions. This point cnn probably be related to the
a preceding one. Influence in the system was more and more depend-

ent on Rdministrative functions and administretive overview. A
last factor thet seemed to be a function of incrensed size was
the difficulty of perceiving administrative work as menningful.
As size grew more and more personnel in the organization never
had close contact with field operations, Togethe2 with the fact
thst no one seemed to be able to pinpoint objectively real
advantages of UNDP/FAO field projects for the project countries/
this had a negative effect on the working morale in the organi-
zation. It was for many surprising thst the function of evaluat-
ing completed projects h9d not become an institutionalized function
in the organization. The diffusion of project success-criteria
in the system was non-existent, even though certain units had the
formal function of "project-evaluntion",
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These points sum up the direct reults of the study. Two
questions remain. 1) Whet light does the study shed on FiO as a
whole and its future development and 2) What perspectives does
it offer for continued studies of the planning problem?
1) On the one hand seemed to be severely circumscribed
by the interests of the different governments thnt are members
of the organization, and by the conflicts between these govern—
ments, The limiting effect of national sovereignty on FO action
and initiative was extremely strong, although at times it was
felt that the perceptions of the limitntion was a rationalization
of inaction. On the other hand several factors seemed to be
working towards the development of autonomous international
influence. Through the financial contributions made to the
organization the substantive role increRsed, and with it the right
and the need to decide on the allocations of resources to differ—
ent interest groups and countries in •he environment, a process
that in itself implies power, The organization Rlso made choices
on questions of project subject—matter and methods, thus directly
exerting influence of some kind on the local environment where
the project was implemented. Organizational trends also work to
strengthen the influence of FAO as an international organization,
The supreme body of the orgnnization, The Conference, meets only
once every two years, thus making the government influence through
this channel almost illusory, The Council meets more often, but
here only a fraction of the member goverrrents Rre representedt
and membership rotates, National influence is probably strongest
implicitly through the identifications and values of the personnel
in the secretariat, But here the idea of the international civil
servant, only serving the interests of some kind of international
society is strong, thus isolating to a certnin degree the profession—
n1 Dersonnel in the secretariat from outside pressure. This idea
also strengthens the influence of the organization,
The contact and working relationship with UNDP also tended
to transfer influence to the international organizations„ This
has been discussed earlier. In general it seems possible to
conclude thnt F2'-i0, and other UN organizations, through the politic—
ally "quiet" processes thnt are augmentinE available resources,
and through the functions they are fulfilling, are slowly devel—
oping a supranational system of international action in the field
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of economic and social development.
FAO as a whole is of course much more complex than it hns been
possible to bring out in the preceding paragrnphs. We have tried
to focus on the processes of planning and policy-making and the
results of these in terms of cultural and developmental vnlues.
The generel conclusion all the same is that complexity rsther than
consistency is the chnracter of the organization. It hns not yet
found a well defined role, and although this may be advantageous
for innovation and the ability to adnpt to changing situations,
it probably hampers the efficient attainment of goals thnt are
set, even if these mostly are constructed at the lowest level in
the organization. The dilemma present here, between efficiency
and socially relevant adaptation, seems to be of utmost importanec
in the planning of F1=0 functions.
Whether FO represents a vinble idea in the long run of how
to assist countries towards agricultural, economic and socinl
betterment can not be decided upon today. There seems to be pro-
gress, but fatal problems may be inherent in the system, PiO is
an extension of national thinking, which is built on the idea
thnt authority can lead and regulate the development of the whole
society. The creation of FAO undoubtedly was meant as a step toward
world government. But if cultural homogeneity is a requirement
for the continued existence of a government, (something the present
divisional tendencies in many national societies seems to indicate),
then the future for FAO and the other int2rnational, universal  
organizations seems dim.
Vationalism rather than universalism is the trend of our time,
The more speculative discussions of FLO's structure and planning
methods hsve more or less been guided by this basic postulate.
2) As a study of planning this pnper must be seen ns an explor-
ation into the internRtional field using approaches mainly devel-
oped in the national setting. Data was hard to get at, and the
approach itself may have been too limited already at the start.
However, with the movement of planning theory away from the purely
social-psychological approach, discussed to begin with, towards
a more sociological and political science approach, the present
clarificntion of FAO ns P system for policy-mnking and of the
main structural vRlues present in one of the main organizational
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programs, may be n fruitful sterting point for further studies,
Planning hss by Dahl Jacobsen 2)been described as the coordinat-
ion of public policy. Whnt we sre interested in are the conditions
for the functioning of en administrstive system, and the consequ.-
ences of this system's actions in the environment. We hnve in
this paper concentreted attention on the first relationship,
the conditions for tl:le functioning of the administretive system.
We have also looked closely at the output of the organization.
What we have not done is study the consequences in the environ-
ment, This, together with the demands the environment makes on
the orgnnization, would be a netural continuation of the present'
study,
Within the approach used, wc heve touched on the role of
different professional groups in the FAO-system, This study
naturnlly be brought much further. The problem in the inter-
nationnl setting, in addition to the question of the relation-
ship between professional orientetion nnd sociel chnnge and
development, is how an international ndministrative system in-
fluences the professional function and vice versa. Here it seinms
possible to undertake interecting comparisons between inter-
national and national administretive systems. For example, are
the conditiono for innovation in the two settings radically
3)different? Does for example the isolation of international
orgenizations result in other professional roles thnn those
that develop in national system intimatcy integrated in the
larger sociAl environment?
central problem of planning has for years been the scope
of a plannirrY, anterprise, in times of national crisis this ncopL
hes usually been widened, in periods of political detraction
the opposite usually has tnken place. This is probnbly related
to the chenging clarity of public goals. In times of crisis
the goals of a society become more unified and coherent. This
makes more comprehensive central planning possible. It is inter-
esting to note that the widening scope of planning in F.A
(represented by the Indicative World Plan for example).was a
corollary to an increasingly clear crisis definition on the
part of the orgenizetion leadership. Whet will happen when and
if this definition of crisis subsides?
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The FAO environment is ns differentipted ns one cnn imagine,
and the differentiation, as noted, is not subsiding if develop-
ments within nationnl societies is taken as nn indicator If
in addition change and development is a characteristic of this
environment, then the consequences for FAO planning follow direct-
ly. Planning Change and development cpn probably most fruitfully
be seen as n continual process where efficient and open communi-
cation with relevant parts of the environment is the essential
resource for success. If integration is taken as a normative
concept for whnt kind of development is nbestn, then the pro-
blem of constructing planning teams becomes essential, and the
problem of inter-profession cooperation within and between groups
a centrnl research question.
1\nother constraint on planning is the set of tools of measure-
ment so far developed for planners They are generally to be
found in the fields of rigorous system analysis, engineerng
and economics. A central problem for future researc is to develoi
useful concepts and other tools for measurement of social
phenomena, so that these cpn become an integrated part of the
planning process 4)
We conclude this study with the feeling thpt FAO represents
nn interesting potential for the development of international
initiptives and international cooperation, and thpt the organi-
zation has developed a system capable, b-,wever inefficiently,
of producing plans But this optimistic note turns to scepticism
when our attention is turned to the role of FAO in the environ-
ment. What consequences do the plans and the projects have in
the developing countries and how are the consequences - if they
exist - related to the administrative system described above?
That future study will reduce our scepticism, and that FAO will
participate in radically improving the lot of hungry and there-
fore suppressed people, is our reel hopec,
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NOTES. 

This rather drastic conclusion is based on the sample of
superviscrs and observation of nationalities of others inter-
viewed in FAO Headquarters. A more complete personnel ana-
lysis would be needed to establish it more firmly.
This is taken from a recent seminar with the Professor at
the Institute for Social Research in Oslo,
Isolation in terms of a) distnnce to the environment
(problems of communication and understanding) and b) complex-
ity of the environment (problems of policy-making, that
"fit" the needs of clients.)
(e 4. See an interesting discussion of this problem in Social 

Indicetors, R. i Bauer (ed) MIT Press 1966.
ANNEX 1
QUESTIONNAIRE Rome, March 1968
This study is interested in the planning of Special Fund projects,
especially the work being dono from the project idea is initinted
until final signature of Plan of Operations. The 'tudy concentrates
on the opinions and activities of the individual F.A0-professional,
but it is the overall picture of function in the planning
process which is the goal of the study.
The first set of questions below, thet it is kindly nsked of yo
to answer, concerns the birth of project ideas.
1. Have you yourself, in the lest couple of years, had any new pro-ject ideas, either for whole new projects or for parts of pro-jects in their planning phase? Please circle the appropriate numbers
very only
many some nonemany a fr,w

 for new prcjects 4 5 2 1 0

 for parts 4 3 2 1 0
2. Is it expected of you thpt you in cr outside of F0 suggest new
projectideas?
definitely expected notexpectedexpected now and then expected
7 2 1 0
If you have had new ideas, have any of these "materialized" in
signed Plans of Operatiens?
very only nomany some nonemany a few opinion
4 3 2 1 0 X
Viewing the total of projects end project-ideas pending in
where de they, in your opinion, originate: Give each of the follow-
ing groups the percentage that epprox, corresponds to its "project-
idea-fertility" compared to the others. If you heve non opinion,
circle the X to the right
A UNDP Resident Representatives
B FAO Hendquarters officials
No opinion C National agricultural institutionE
X F FAO country representatives
E UNDP personnel, New York
SUM 100%
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Do you heve any comments to your answer on question number 4?
Are there for example other important sources of project ideas,
and could you specify one or more of the groups above more closely?
For example, which national institutions or organizations are most
active in suggesting project ideas? (Pleace use more paper spaceif necessary)
5. Which of the FAO-professional officers you know would you off
hand say is most active in discussing ene suggesting new project
ideas?
The following questions concern your opinion about the importance
of different kinds of projects.
4101
6. If you werc asked to decide upon the relative importance of thefollowing five types of projects for best achieving FAO's goalsin the future, what part of the totel available resources (100%)
would you allocate to each type?
Surveys and feasibility studies
Training-institutions
Demonstration projects
I Applied research institutes
Technical pilot projects
No
epinion
X
sum 100 %
If we say total control of SF/FAO project policy is 100 %, what part
of this control approx. rests with the developed and underdevelop-
ed countries respectively?
Control:
developed countries
underdeveloped
sum 100 %
What do you feel should be the relative importance of the
following five subject mattr fields for best achieving FAO's
goals? Again please distribute approximately 100% (of resources)between the five
Food and animal development
Land and Water
M Agricultural planning and education
Forestry development
C Fisheries
Sum 100 %
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Taking todays level of total project resources as given, would
you favor a policy of changing the average size of the projects?
I would favor an average that is:
much like much nolarger smallerlarger todRys smaller opinion
2 1 0 -1 -2 X
What wotUd in your opinion be the most effective distribution
of the total project resources between the following areas
of the world?
P Asia
Q Africa
R 'The AmericRs No
S Europe opinion
T The Middle East X
Sum 100 %
Would this also be the most fair distribution of resources?
If not, please indicate this distribution in % to the right
of the above listo
11.,Should interregional projects in your ppinion take more or
less of the project resources in the future?
No
much more more no change less much less opinion
2 1 0 -1 -2 X
The study now turns to some questions about the planning
process within FAO.
What is in your opinion the main purpose of the project
supervisor?
What is generally speaking the main problem in the work
you do related to project planning?
Which person or group of persons within and outside your
division would you say has most influence on the setting
up of project plans? (Put an X on the line if no opinion).
Influence on the setting up of plans:
within my division
outside "
(but Within F.;',0)
_L-
How much of your time in FAO is used on the work related to
project plans? Using last week as basis for computntion, how
many hours of a normal 40-hour week do you spend on this work?
Average number of hours per week: 	
At what point between initiation of project ideas and final sig-
nnture of Planops .do you usually cone in contact with
problems related to projects? (Put a checkmark on the
horizontal line),
initiation cf Formnl submission to signsture of
project idea application Governing Council Planaps.
to UNDP
If FAO's work with the projects through the four stages
mentioned in the Rbove question is celled the planning process,
how would you evaluate this process?
	
very very No
satisfactory unsntisfactory opinion
2 1 0 -1 -2 X
The Review Tenm has (in document CL 49/16) suggested to divide
the whole Organization in two parts, one technical and one
operational. In your opinion, how would this suggestion, if
implemented; affect the work of FAO?
very positively r' very negative No
opinion
2 1 0 -1 -2 X
Whn working with :roblems relsted to proj-eL plans, whu Are
you most often in contact with?
within your division
within your department
outside your departm,
Does your work in FAO allow you enough time to keep up with
developments within your professional field? (Circle Yes or No)
Yes No
It has been pointed out that multidivisional projects pose
problems of coordination in the Organization. How do you
evaluate this problem?
very large problem large problem a problem small no
problem problem
	
4 3 2 1 0
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Do you think a trend toward more multidisciplinary SF/FAO
projects is favorable?
very very No
favorable unfevorable opinion
2 1 0 -1 -2 X
How often in your project-related work do you suspect or
know that you affect the overall size of project budgets
(before Planops is finally signed)?
very often some- very Nonever
often times seldom opinion
4 3 2 1 0 X
Which person or unit would you off hand say is most in-
fluential on the size of project budgets?
About how many projects do you normally have to work with
or think about in the matter of a week?
Number of projects:
In 1967, about how many times were you out in the field
discussing project plans?
Number of field trips:
In the month of February this year, about how many letters
did you write to / receive from other international organi-
zations concerned with some aspect of the planning of projects?
sent received
Number of letters:
If any, which international organization are you in most
frequent contact with about project plans?
Again in February 68, about how many times did you discuss by
letter or otherwise, project plans with representatives of
governments of underdeveloped countries?
approx.number of discussions in Feb. 68:
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30. How large a value do you think The Indicative World Plan will
have as a guidance for zpur project work in the future?
very large large some little very little no vnlue no op,
5 4 3 2 1 0 X
31, What part of all the problems encourered in planning pro-
jects are in your opinion caused by the methods of work in
FAO? (Put a checkmark on the horizontal line)
0 25% 50% 75% 100%
32. The last question in this group asks you to think of completed
projects. How succeseful would you sny they have been compared
to the goals set out in the original Plans cf Operations?
(Put a checkmark on the horizontal line or in the box underneatk
0 25% 50% 75% 100%
On average the projects have been more success-
ful than hoped in Planops2
The laat questi=o cirk for some lYickg,round information. I
repeat that your anonymity will be respected, and that all
answers will be treated confidentially.
What University Degrees do you have? Plense indicate subject
matter and University.
What nre your enrlier occupations end their corresponding
places of work?
To which religious group do you belong?
Do you practice your religion actively?
-7-
36. Pleace fill out the following, circling the appropriate
letters where possible, and in the two first boxes using the
official symbols, for example TE and NUa.
Dept. Office/ Post Post Years in FICD Nationality
Branch title grRde In HQ In field
Age Sex Family status No. of
M A married D widow/er children Profession
F B divorced E remarried
C not married
Whet approx. WRS you total income before taxes in 1967?
US
Are you a member of a political party in your home country?
YES NO
How would you describe the generel tendency of your personal
political opinions? (Put a checkmark on the horizontal line).
left center right
(socialist) (liberal) (conservative)
Thank you,
á
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ANNEX 2. Countries officially receiving UNDP/FA0
projects as of 1 jan 1968 and the
countries population as of 1961,
Code Population in
millions
code Population
in millions


1961


1961
15 1Afghanistan 14 2 50Mauritania 1
2 2Algerie 11 2 51Mauritius 1
51 3Argentina 20 52 52Mexico 36
51 4Bolivia 4 2 53Morocco 12
2 5Botswana 2 15 54Nepal 9
51 6. Brazil 73 52 55Nicaragua 2
2 7Burundi 2 2 56Niger 2
15 8Cambodia 5 2 57lUgeria 36
2 9 Cameroon 4 15 58Pakistan 95
2 10 Central Afr.Rep., 1 52 59Panama 1
15 11Ceylon 10 51 60Paraguay 2
2 12 Chad 3 51 61Peru 11
51 13 Chile 8 5 62Philippines 29
13 14 China Rep. 11 41 6529.:_and 30
51 15 Colombia


41 64Romania 19
2 16 Congo(Brazzaville)


2 65Rwanda 3
52 17 Costa Rica 1 32 66Saud::. Arabia 2
52 18 Cuba 7 2 67Senegel 3
47 19 Cyprus 1 2 68Sierre Leone 2
2 20 Dahomey


15 69Singapore 2
52 21 Dominicnn Rep. 3 2 70Somalia 2
51 22 Ecuador 4 32 71South Arabia Fed. 6
52 23 El Salvador


47 72Spain 31
2 24 Ethicpia 22 2 73Sudan 12
15 25 Fiji Islands 0„5 2 74Swaziland 2
2 26 Gabon 0,5 32 75Syria 5
2 27 Ghnna 7 2 76Tanzania 9
47 28 Greece 8 15 77Thailand 27
52 29 Guatemala 4 2 78llogo 1
2 30 Guinee 3 52 79Trinidd og Tobogo 1
51 31 Guyana 1 2 80Tunisia 4
52 32 Haiti 4 15 81Turkey 29
52 33 Honduras 2 2 82Uganda 7
14 34 India 442 32 83U,A.R.(Egypt) 27
15 35 Iran 21 2 84Uper Volta 4
32
31
2
36 Iraq
37 Israel
38 Ivory Coast
7
2
51
51
15
85Uruguay
86Venezuela
87Vietnam
3
8
15
52
32
2
39 Jamaica
40 Jordan
41 Kenya
2
2
8
32
41
2
88emen
89Yugoslavia
90Zambia
5
19
8


131215 42 Korea 25


32 43 Lebanon 2



2
2
2
44 Liberia
45 Madagascar
46 Malawi
1
6
2
First digit in code:
1 Asia
2 Africa
741
191
15
2
47
47 Malaysia
48 Mali
49 Malta
7
4
0.5


3 Middle East
4 Europe
5 The Americas
58
108
214


1312
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ANNEX 3 Institute for Social Research
PROJECT PLANNING IN FAO
CODEBOOK
Column Oode Reference
1 1 A Approved project - operational
2 B Approved project - / )n-operational
3 C Preliminary operations authorized
4 D Field operations completed
5 E Project Concluded
2,3,4 letters Country identification from Catalogue No. 22,
31 January 1968
56,7 Special Fund Project number from Catalogue Pfb:
•
SF/67, 31 July 1967.
8,9 Regional identification of project. Corresponds
to the first two digits in Code in Annex 2.
10 1 Institutional rescarch p,roject
2 Survey or study project
3 Training, demonstration project
4 Technical "pilot" project
5 Other
11 1 Animal Production and Health Division
2 Land and Water Development Division
3 Plant Production Pnd Protection Division
4 Forestry and forest products division
5 Nutrition Division
6 Fishery resources and exploitation Division
7 Fishery Economics and Products Division
8 Economic Analysis Division
9 Rural institutions and Services Division
0 Other
12,13 Budget total in hundred thousand US.
14 Planned project duration in years,
15,16 Nationality of project manager (PM), (Code as
first two digits in Annex 2).
17 Grade of Project Manager,
1-8 D2. Dl, P5, P4, P3, P2, Pl, Other.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8).
18 Planned duration of PWs service time in
man-months coded in the following manner:
0 0 - 9 man months
1 10 - 1
2 20 - 29
3 30 - 39
4 40 - 49
5 50 - 59
6 60 - 69
7 70 - 79
8 80 - 89
9 90 and above.
-2-
Column Code Reference
19,20 Exact number of experts on project
21 "Number of experts on project, coded:
1 1 - 4 experts
2 5-9
3 10 - 14 (This code has also been applied
4 15 - 19
20 24 in columns 27, 31, 39,and 44).5 - 

6 25 - 29
7 30 - 34
8 35 - 39
9 40 and above
22-44 Number of experts in each category (country or
(I
region of origin). The following categories have
been used:
(1) ASIA
22 USSR
23 Japan
24 China (Taiwan)
25 India
26 Other Asian
27 (Coded) Total number of Asians
28 (2) All African countries, except U.A.R.
29 Israel
30 Arab Country
31 (Coded) (3) TotPl Middle Easterners
32 Eastern Europe
33 UK
34 France
35 Italy
36 Germany
37 Scandinavia
38 Other West European
39 (Coded) (4) Total Europeans
40 South America
41 Central America
42 USA
43 Canada
44 (Coded) Total Americans
45 1-0 Year project was approved
1959 (1), -1967 (9),-1968 (0).
46 1-9 Budget coded:
1 01 - 04 hundred thousand dollars
2 05 - 06
3 U7 - Ob
4 09 - 10
5 11 - 12
6 13 - 14
7 15 - 16
8 17 - 20
9 20 and above
-3—
Column
47
48
49
50
51
52
53-58
53
54
55
56
57
59
60
Code
1 or
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
Reference
1= Regiona-J_ project(more than one country
participating),
Number of Norwegian experts
Swedish
Danish
Finnish
Icelandic
Number of experts on project but not included
in columns 22-44(except 27,31, 39, and 44
where they are included),
Rest UK
France
Ot;her West European
USSR
Scandinavia
Profession of Project Manager
Economist
Engineel'
Natural science trained
Social science trained
Agricult=list
Veterinarian
Number of experts on project that are Social
Science troined,
61.62 Nationality of Project Supervisor, Coded as
in coluyins 22-44,
á
eh
ANNEX 4
FAO/UNDP Allocations in jsia related to
per caput income, population, and % of
labor force in agriculture.
Country
Alloc-
ations
GNF per Popula-
caputtion
% in
agric.
I\ToofGNF
	
projects1957
1 2 3 4 5 67
Afthanistan 6.0 0.5 14 85 5 0.7
Cambodia 1.1 1.0 5 80 2 0.5
Ceylon 1.6 1.3 10 53 2 1,2
China (Thaiwan) 2.8 1.6 11 50 4 1,5
India 10.9 0.7 442 71 11 28.6
Iran 11.2 1.1 21 80 11 2.1
Korea 8.5 101 34 70 12 0.7
Malaysia 3,2 3.6 7 58 3 2.2
Nepal 2.7 0.5 9 93 3 0.4
Pakistan 9.5 0.7 95 65 8 6.0
Philippines 3.9 2.2 29 59 4 5.0
Singapore 2.3 4.0 2 8 2 0,6
Thailand 4.4 1.0 27 82 6 2.1
Turkey 7.6 2.2 29 77 7 5,6
Vietnam 1.1 0,8 32 - 1 0.9
Column 2: allocations in million US$. Source: Catal=Lie No. 2
hundrud US $. Source: Russett2page 155,
minion Source: Russett, paEe 354.
Approx. 1950 Source: Russett, page 177.
As  of 1 Jan. 68. Source: Project Catalogue No, 2.
billion US $. Source: Russett page 152.
4 A
hundred
3
oSIN
MAL
-2-ASIA
GNP
pr. cap.
2
T.A.
n
PHI
oTHA
CEY Q 0CHAoKORo IRA
VI ooof,FG
AM NEP
mill. $
r.Toject allocations proj. cat. 2.
o India
ropulat
ion 120
Russett 10
s 18100
90
80
70mill
'60
50
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30 o VIE



0 0
20



o IRA
1 0
9
project allocations
100
	
90 0
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70
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project allocations
ANNEX 5.1 Nationality project mannger and project
distribution
Project region
Nationality PMAsian AfriconArabEurope South
Centr.Am.
Asian
Total
- 11 USSR2



1


3
- 12 Japanese1




1
13 Chinese2 1



3
14 Indian1 2



3
15 Other Asian82



5 15
Total Asians124 3


1 5 25
20 Africans11 1



1 4
31Israelites2




2
32 Arab1 1



2
Total Middle Eastern3 1



4
41 Enstern Europe43




7
- 42 UK812 2


2 8 32
- 43 France18



2 6 17
- 44 Italian2



1 3 6
- 45 GermRn3



3 6
46 Scandinavian52 3



3 13
47 Other West Eur,59 4



3 21
Totpl European2636 9


5 26 102
51South Am.1



5 6
52 Central Am.



i 1
- 53 USA55 4



8 22
- 54 Canadian21



3 6
Total Americans86 4



17 35
Totals4750 18


6 49 170
% project managers from large states (-) 55 %



ANNEX 5.2
Project Region
Nationslity PM Asia Africa Arab Europe South/Centr
America
Totals
48 16 12 4 20 100 N= 25 15
25 25 25 0 25 100 N=4 2
0 75 25 0 0 100 N.4 2
26 35 8 5 26 100 N=102 60
23 17 11 0 49 100 N. 35 21
28 29 11 4 28 100 N.170 100
Asian
African
Middle East
European
•Americans
Tots1
ANNEX 6 

Profession P.M.
ProfessiDn J)f
tc)1-rojecttypc
(Perctrnt
'Resenrch!Survey flrininr
relatec,,
)


in brackets)
Pilot
Economist


(24)


7 (41);1 (6)5 (29).(100) N= 17
Engineer 1 ( ;14 (56)3 (12)7 (28);(100) N= 25
NaturalSc. 4 (67)


1 (17)I0 (0)1 (16)(100) N=6
SocinlSc. 9 (6;)


0 (C)) 4 (29)1 ( 7)HOD) N= 14
Ariculturalist ;"*1(.10)!


(31);8 (10)H4 (19)(100) N= 77
Veterinary 9 (60)


0 (0)11 (27).2 (13)!(100) N= 15
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